specification error in California

1936(Crow v. Crow, 168 Cal. 607, 611 [ 143 Pac. 689 ] ; Regoli v. Stevenson, 179 Cal. 257, 258 [ 176 Pac. 158 ].) Furthermore, the burden was on the appellant Nelson (the employer) to show that respondent could have obtained other employment by the use of reasonable diligence and the approximate wage he would have probably received.

1936(Crow v. Crow, 168 Cal. 607, 611 [ 143 Pac. 689 ] ; Regoli v. Stevenson, 179 Cal. 257, 258 [ 176 Pac. 158 ].) Furthermore, the burden was on the appellant Nelson (the employer) to show that respondent could have obtained other employment by the use of reasonable diligence and the approximate wage he would have probably received.

1936(Crow v. Crow, 168 Cal. 607, 611 [ 143 Pac. 689 ] ; Regoli v. Stevenson, 179 Cal. 257, 258 [ 176 Pac. 158 ].) Furthermore, the burden was on the appellant Nelson (the employer) to show that respondent could have obtained other employment by the use of reasonable diligence and the approximate wage he would have probably received.

1936(Crow v. Crow, 168 Cal. 607, 611 [ 143 Pac. 689 ] ; Regoli v. Stevenson, 179 Cal. 257, 258 [ 176 Pac. 158 ].) Furthermore, the burden was on the appellant Nelson (the employer) to show that respondent could have obtained other employment by the use of reasonable diligence and the approximate wage he would have probably received.

2013(In re Matthew A. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 537, 539, 541-542 ; In re Ali A. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 569, 571 .) We will modify the judgment by striking the court’s specification of a maximum term of physical confinement.

1987(El Dorado Oil Works v. McColgan (1950) 34 Cal.2d 731, 737-738 [ 215 P.2d 4 ]; Pacific Fruit Express Co. v. McColgan (1944) 67 Cal.App.2d 93, 101-102 [ 153 P.2d 607 ].) “The essential requirement is the Legislature’s specification of a standard—‘an intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized to [administer the act] is directed to conform’ [citation]— but it may leave to the administrative agency the precise determination necessary to bring the standard into operation.” (El Dorado Oil Works v. McColgan, supra, 34 Cal.2d 731, 738 .) Section 25.12(h) surely complies with this pr

1987(El Dorado Oil Works v. McColgan (1950) 34 Cal.2d 731, 737-738 [ 215 P.2d 4 ]; Pacific Fruit Express Co. v. McColgan (1944) 67 Cal.App.2d 93, 101-102 [ 153 P.2d 607 ].) “The essential requirement is the Legislature’s specification of a standard—‘an intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized to [administer the act] is directed to conform’ [citation]— but it may leave to the administrative agency the precise determination necessary to bring the standard into operation.” (El Dorado Oil Works v. McColgan, supra, 34 Cal.2d 731, 738 .) Section 25.12(h) surely complies with this pr

1987(El Dorado Oil Works v. McColgan (1950) 34 Cal.2d 731, 737-738 [ 215 P.2d 4 ]; Pacific Fruit Express Co. v. McColgan (1944) 67 Cal.App.2d 93, 101-102 [ 153 P.2d 607 ].) “The essential requirement is the Legislature’s specification of a standard—‘an intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized to [administer the act] is directed to conform’ [citation]— but it may leave to the administrative agency the precise determination necessary to bring the standard into operation.” (El Dorado Oil Works v. McColgan, supra, 34 Cal.2d 731, 738 .) Section 25.12(h) surely complies with this pr

1987(El Dorado Oil Works v. McColgan (1950) 34 Cal.2d 731, 737-738 [ 215 P.2d 4 ]; Pacific Fruit Express Co. v. McColgan (1944) 67 Cal.App.2d 93, 101-102 [ 153 P.2d 607 ].) “The essential requirement is the Legislature’s specification of a standard—‘an intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized to [administer the act] is directed to conform’ [citation]— but it may leave to the administrative agency the precise determination necessary to bring the standard into operation.” (El Dorado Oil Works v. McColgan, supra, 34 Cal.2d 731, 738 .) Section 25.12(h) surely complies with this pr

1950XIII, § 14, subd. (d), authorizing the imposition of the old corporation franchise tax) that the Legislature need not prescribe the exact method by which the tax is to be fixed, but “may delegate to its taxing officers the power to adopt a suitable method.” (Utah Construction Co. v. Richardson, 187 Cal. 649, 652 [ 203 P. 401 ].) The essential requirement is the Legislature’s specification of a standard—“an intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized to [administer the act] is directed to conform” (Hampton & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 [ 48 S.Ct. 348 , 72 L.Ed. 624

1950XIII, § 14, subd. (d), authorizing the imposition of the old corporation franchise tax) that the Legislature need not prescribe the exact method by which the tax is to be fixed, but “may delegate to its taxing officers the power to adopt a suitable method.” (Utah Construction Co. v. Richardson, 187 Cal. 649, 652 [ 203 P. 401 ].) The essential requirement is the Legislature’s specification of a standard—“an intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized to [administer the act] is directed to conform” (Hampton & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 [ 48 S.Ct. 348 , 72 L.Ed. 624

1950XIII, § 14, subd. (d), authorizing the imposition of the old corporation franchise tax) that the Legislature need not prescribe the exact method by which the tax is to be fixed, but “may delegate to its taxing officers the power to adopt a suitable method.” (Utah Construction Co. v. Richardson, 187 Cal. 649, 652 [ 203 P. 401 ].) The essential requirement is the Legislature’s specification of a standard—“an intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized to [administer the act] is directed to conform” (Hampton & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 [ 48 S.Ct. 348 , 72 L.Ed. 624

1950XIII, § 14, subd. (d), authorizing the imposition of the old corporation franchise tax) that the Legislature need not prescribe the exact method by which the tax is to be fixed, but “may delegate to its taxing officers the power to adopt a suitable method.” (Utah Construction Co. v. Richardson, 187 Cal. 649, 652 [ 203 P. 401 ].) The essential requirement is the Legislature’s specification of a standard—“an intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized to [administer the act] is directed to conform” (Hampton & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 [ 48 S.Ct. 348 , 72 L.Ed. 624

1949(Estate of Trefren, 86 Cal.App.2d 139 *568 [ 194 P.2d 574, 575 ]; Estate of Bristol, 23 Cal.2d 221, 223 [ 143 P.2d 689 ], and cases cited.) Under this rule we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to respondent and resolve all conflicts in her favor.

1949(Estate of Trefren, 86 Cal.App.2d 139 *568 [ 194 P.2d 574, 575 ]; Estate of Bristol, 23 Cal.2d 221, 223 [ 143 P.2d 689 ], and cases cited.) Under this rule we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to respondent and resolve all conflicts in her favor.

1949(Estate of Trefren, 86 Cal.App.2d 139 *568 [ 194 P.2d 574, 575 ]; Estate of Bristol, 23 Cal.2d 221, 223 [ 143 P.2d 689 ], and cases cited.) Under this rule we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to respondent and resolve all conflicts in her favor.

1949(Estate of Trefren, 86 Cal.App.2d 139 *568 [ 194 P.2d 574, 575 ]; Estate of Bristol, 23 Cal.2d 221, 223 [ 143 P.2d 689 ], and cases cited.) Under this rule we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to respondent and resolve all conflicts in her favor.

1926As to the specification of error resulting from impeachment of the same witness because of his lack of memory of the facts to which his attention was directed, it is unquestionable that the law as expressed in the authorities sustain appellant’s position that “where a witness called by a party has simply failed to testify to all that party expected or desired, but has not given testimony against him, it is not permissible for the party calling him to prove that such witness had previously made statements which, if sworn to at the trial, would tend to make out his case. ’ ’ (People v. Creeks, 1

1926As to the specification of error resulting from impeachment of the same witness because of his lack of memory of the facts to which his attention was directed, it is unquestionable that the law as expressed in the authorities sustain appellant’s position that “where a witness called by a party has simply failed to testify to all that party expected or desired, but has not given testimony against him, it is not permissible for the party calling him to prove that such witness had previously made statements which, if sworn to at the trial, would tend to make out his case. ’ ’ (People v. Creeks, 1

1926As to the specification of error resulting from impeachment of the same witness because of his lack of memory of the facts to which his attention was directed, it is unquestionable that the law as expressed in the authorities sustain appellant’s position that “where a witness called by a party has simply failed to testify to all that party expected or desired, but has not given testimony against him, it is not permissible for the party calling him to prove that such witness had previously made statements which, if sworn to at the trial, would tend to make out his case. ’ ’ (People v. Creeks, 1

1926As to the specification of error resulting from impeachment of the same witness because of his lack of memory of the facts to which his attention was directed, it is unquestionable that the law as expressed in the authorities sustain appellant’s position that “where a witness called by a party has simply failed to testify to all that party expected or desired, but has not given testimony against him, it is not permissible for the party calling him to prove that such witness had previously made statements which, if sworn to at the trial, would tend to make out his case. ’ ’ (People v. Creeks, 1