Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
7 Oregon opinions name it 2 courts 1995–2019 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Oregon courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Hamptongreen2 sentences2015The Hampton test required that the evidence must be (1) “independently relevant for a noncharacter purpose”; (2) the proponent of the evidence must offer sufficient proof that the “uncharged misconduct [i.e., the prior act] was committed and that defendant committed it”; and (3) the probative value of the uncharged misconduct evidence “must not be substantially outweighed by the dangers or considerations set forth in OEC 403.” Id. (quoting State v. Johnson, 313 Or 189, 195 , 832 P2d 443 (1992)). 2015The Hampton test required that the evidence must be (1) “independently relevant for a noncharacter purpose”; (2) the proponent of the evidence must offer sufficient proof that the “uncharged misconduct [i.e., the prior act] was committed and that defendant committed it”; and (3) the probative value of the uncharged misconduct evidence “must not be substantially outweighed by the dangers or considerations set forth in OEC 403.” Id. (quoting State v. Johnson, 313 Or 189, 195 , 832 P2d 443 (1992)). | 2 | 3 |
State v. Turnidgegreen2 sentences2016However, in the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Turnidge, 359 Or at 442 , the court ruled, “if a trial court determines that prior bad acts evidence is relevant to a nonpropensity purpose under OEC 404(3), the court, on a proper motion, must weigh the probative value of the evidence against its potential to unduly prejudice the defendant.” Although the court did not cite Hampton in that section of its analysis, it evaluated the logical relevance of the disputed “plan” evidence; in doing so, it was applying the first requirement of the Hampton test—that the evidence be independently relevant 2016However, in the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Turnidge, 359 Or at 442 , the court ruled, “if a trial court determines that prior bad acts evidence is relevant to a nonpropensity purpose under OEC 404(3), the court, on a proper motion, must weigh the probative value of the evidence against its potential to unduly prejudice the defendant.” Although the court did not cite Hampton in that section of its analysis, it evaluated the logical relevance of the disputed “plan” evidence; in doing so, it was applying the first requirement of the Hampton test—that the evidence be independently relevant | 1 | 1 |
State v. Greygreen2 sentences2004See Grey, 175 Or App at 250-51 (OEC 404(4) precludes balancing for unfair prejudice under OEC 403 if defendant does not argue that the constitutional limitations contained in OEC 404(4) apply). 2004See Grey, 175 Or App at 250-51 (OEC 404(4) precludes balancing for unfair prejudice under OEC 403 if defendant does not argue that the constitutional limitations contained in OEC 404(4) apply). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Rinkingreen2 sentences2001See State v. Rinkin, 141 Or App 355 , 368 n 7, 917 P2d 1035 (1996) (stating that the first requirement of the test can incorporate other relevancy factors); see also State v. Pinnell, 311 Or 98, 109-11 , 806 P2d 110 (1991) (explaining relevancy factors for evaluating admissibility of uncharged misconduct evidence to prove identity based on modus operandi)', State v. Johns, 301 Or 535, 555-56 , 725 P2d 312 (1986) (explaining relevancy factors for *249 evaluating uncharged misconduct evidence used to prove intent); Bracken, 174 Or App at 299-302 (analyzing and rejecting application of Johns fact 2001See State v. Rinkin, 141 Or App 355 , 368 n 7, 917 P2d 1035 (1996) (stating that the first requirement of the test can incorporate other relevancy factors); see also State v. Pinnell, 311 Or 98, 109-11 , 806 P2d 110 (1991) (explaining relevancy factors for evaluating admissibility of uncharged misconduct evidence to prove identity based on modus operandi)', State v. Johns, 301 Or 535, 555-56 , 725 P2d 312 (1986) (explaining relevancy factors for *249 evaluating uncharged misconduct evidence used to prove intent); Bracken, 174 Or App at 299-302 (analyzing and rejecting application of Johns fact | 1 | 1 |
State v. Pinnellgreen2 sentences2001See State v. Rinkin, 141 Or App 355 , 368 n 7, 917 P2d 1035 (1996) (stating that the first requirement of the test can incorporate other relevancy factors); see also State v. Pinnell, 311 Or 98, 109-11 , 806 P2d 110 (1991) (explaining relevancy factors for evaluating admissibility of uncharged misconduct evidence to prove identity based on modus operandi)', State v. Johns, 301 Or 535, 555-56 , 725 P2d 312 (1986) (explaining relevancy factors for *249 evaluating uncharged misconduct evidence used to prove intent); Bracken, 174 Or App at 299-302 (analyzing and rejecting application of Johns fact 2001See State v. Rinkin, 141 Or App 355 , 368 n 7, 917 P2d 1035 (1996) (stating that the first requirement of the test can incorporate other relevancy factors); see also State v. Pinnell, 311 Or 98, 109-11 , 806 P2d 110 (1991) (explaining relevancy factors for evaluating admissibility of uncharged misconduct evidence to prove identity based on modus operandi)', State v. Johns, 301 Or 535, 555-56 , 725 P2d 312 (1986) (explaining relevancy factors for *249 evaluating uncharged misconduct evidence used to prove intent); Bracken, 174 Or App at 299-302 (analyzing and rejecting application of Johns fact | 1 | 1 |
State v. Brackengreen1 sentence2001See State v. Rinkin, 141 Or App 355 , 368 n 7, 917 P2d 1035 (1996) (stating that the first requirement of the test can incorporate other relevancy factors); see also State v. Pinnell, 311 Or 98, 109-11 , 806 P2d 110 (1991) (explaining relevancy factors for evaluating admissibility of uncharged misconduct evidence to prove identity based on modus operandi)', State v. Johns, 301 Or 535, 555-56 , 725 P2d 312 (1986) (explaining relevancy factors for *249 evaluating uncharged misconduct evidence used to prove intent); Bracken, 174 Or App at 299-302 (analyzing and rejecting application of Johns fact | 1 | 1 |
State v. Johnsgreen2 sentences2001See State v. Rinkin, 141 Or App 355 , 368 n 7, 917 P2d 1035 (1996) (stating that the first requirement of the test can incorporate other relevancy factors); see also State v. Pinnell, 311 Or 98, 109-11 , 806 P2d 110 (1991) (explaining relevancy factors for evaluating admissibility of uncharged misconduct evidence to prove identity based on modus operandi)', State v. Johns, 301 Or 535, 555-56 , 725 P2d 312 (1986) (explaining relevancy factors for *249 evaluating uncharged misconduct evidence used to prove intent); Bracken, 174 Or App at 299-302 (analyzing and rejecting application of Johns fact 2001See State v. Rinkin, 141 Or App 355 , 368 n 7, 917 P2d 1035 (1996) (stating that the first requirement of the test can incorporate other relevancy factors); see also State v. Pinnell, 311 Or 98, 109-11 , 806 P2d 110 (1991) (explaining relevancy factors for evaluating admissibility of uncharged misconduct evidence to prove identity based on modus operandi)', State v. Johns, 301 Or 535, 555-56 , 725 P2d 312 (1986) (explaining relevancy factors for *249 evaluating uncharged misconduct evidence used to prove intent); Bracken, 174 Or App at 299-302 (analyzing and rejecting application of Johns fact | 1 | 1 |
State v. Haywardgreen2 sentences2001See also State v. Hayward, 327 Or 397, 406-09 , 963 P2d 667 (1998) (using Hampton test without the Johns factors to evaluate evidence that the murder defendant listened to “death metal” music prior to killing convenience store clerk); State v. Hopkins, 127 Or App 1, 4 , 870 P2d 849 , on recons 127 Or App 622 , rev den 319 Or 281 (1994) (using Hampton test without the Johns factors to evaluate evidence of stolen credit cards in the defendant’s possession as motive for defendant’s attempt to escape apprehension). 2001See also State v. Hayward, 327 Or 397, 406-09 , 963 P2d 667 (1998) (using Hampton test without the Johns factors to evaluate evidence that the murder defendant listened to “death metal” music prior to killing convenience store clerk); State v. Hopkins, 127 Or App 1, 4 , 870 P2d 849 , on recons 127 Or App 622 , rev den 319 Or 281 (1994) (using Hampton test without the Johns factors to evaluate evidence of stolen credit cards in the defendant’s possession as motive for defendant’s attempt to escape apprehension). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Oregon. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Woodbury v. CH2M Hill, Inc.
green
2 sentences2019In their second assignment of error, plaintiffs assert that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Hampton on plaintiffs' ELL claim. 4 "Oregon's ELL imposes liability on 'all owners, contractors or subcontractors and other persons having charge of, or responsibility for' work involving a risk or danger." Yeatts v. Polygon Northwest Co. , 360 Or. 170 , 179, 379 P.3d 445 (2016) (quoting ORS 654.305 ). 5 In addition to a worker's direct employer, ELL liability may be imposed on an indirect employer "who (1) is engaged with the plaintiff's direct employer in a common enterp 2019In their second assignment of error, plaintiffs assert that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Hampton on plaintiffs' ELL claim. 4 "Oregon's ELL imposes liability on 'all owners, contractors or subcontractors and other persons having charge of, or responsibility for' work involving a risk or danger." Yeatts v. Polygon Northwest Co. , 360 Or. 170 , 179, 379 P.3d 445 (2016) (quoting ORS 654.305 ). 5 In addition to a worker's direct employer, ELL liability may be imposed on an indirect employer "who (1) is engaged with the plaintiff's direct employer in a common enterp | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Yeatts v. Polygon Northwest Co.
green
2 sentences2019In their second assignment of error, plaintiffs assert that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Hampton on plaintiffs' ELL claim. 4 "Oregon's ELL imposes liability on 'all owners, contractors or subcontractors and other persons having charge of, or responsibility for' work involving a risk or danger." Yeatts v. Polygon Northwest Co. , 360 Or. 170 , 179, 379 P.3d 445 (2016) (quoting ORS 654.305 ). 5 In addition to a worker's direct employer, ELL liability may be imposed on an indirect employer "who (1) is engaged with the plaintiff's direct employer in a common enterp 2019In their second assignment of error, plaintiffs assert that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Hampton on plaintiffs' ELL claim. 4 "Oregon's ELL imposes liability on 'all owners, contractors or subcontractors and other persons having charge of, or responsibility for' work involving a risk or danger." Yeatts v. Polygon Northwest Co. , 360 Or. 170 , 179, 379 P.3d 445 (2016) (quoting ORS 654.305 ). 5 In addition to a worker's direct employer, ELL liability may be imposed on an indirect employer "who (1) is engaged with the plaintiff's direct employer in a common enterp | 1 | 2019–2019 |
State v. Johnson
green
2 sentences2015The Hampton test required that the evidence must be (1) “independently relevant for a noncharacter purpose”; (2) the proponent of the evidence must offer sufficient proof that the “uncharged misconduct [i.e., the prior act] was committed and that defendant committed it”; and (3) the probative value of the uncharged misconduct evidence “must not be substantially outweighed by the dangers or considerations set forth in OEC 403.” Id. (quoting State v. Johnson, 313 Or 189, 195 , 832 P2d 443 (1992)). 2015The Hampton test required that the evidence must be (1) “independently relevant for a noncharacter purpose”; (2) the proponent of the evidence must offer sufficient proof that the “uncharged misconduct [i.e., the prior act] was committed and that defendant committed it”; and (3) the probative value of the uncharged misconduct evidence “must not be substantially outweighed by the dangers or considerations set forth in OEC 403.” Id. (quoting State v. Johnson, 313 Or 189, 195 , 832 P2d 443 (1992)). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
State v. Williams
green
2 sentences2015In State v. Williams, 357 Or 1, 24 , 346 P3d 455 (2015), however, the Supreme Court held that OEC 404(4) “supersedes” OEC 404(3) in criminal cases “except to the extent required by the state or federal constitution,” and “the admission of‘other acts’ evidence to prove character and propensity under OEC 404(4) depends on whether the risk of unfair prejudice outweighs the probative value of the evidence under OEC 403,” id. at 20 . 10 In the wake of Williams , “other acts” evidence offered “for nonpropensity purposes— i.e., to prove motive * * * generally will be admissible as long as the particu 2015In State v. Williams, 357 Or 1, 24 , 346 P3d 455 (2015), however, the Supreme Court held that OEC 404(4) “supersedes” OEC 404(3) in criminal cases “except to the extent required by the state or federal constitution,” and “the admission of‘other acts’ evidence to prove character and propensity under OEC 404(4) depends on whether the risk of unfair prejudice outweighs the probative value of the evidence under OEC 403,” id. at 20 . 10 In the wake of Williams , “other acts” evidence offered “for nonpropensity purposes— i.e., to prove motive * * * generally will be admissible as long as the particu | 1 | 2015–2015 |
State v. Hopkins
green
2 sentences2001See also State v. Hayward, 327 Or 397, 406-09 , 963 P2d 667 (1998) (using Hampton test without the Johns factors to evaluate evidence that the murder defendant listened to “death metal” music prior to killing convenience store clerk); State v. Hopkins, 127 Or App 1, 4 , 870 P2d 849 , on recons 127 Or App 622 , rev den 319 Or 281 (1994) (using Hampton test without the Johns factors to evaluate evidence of stolen credit cards in the defendant’s possession as motive for defendant’s attempt to escape apprehension). 2001See also State v. Hayward, 327 Or 397, 406-09 , 963 P2d 667 (1998) (using Hampton test without the Johns factors to evaluate evidence that the murder defendant listened to “death metal” music prior to killing convenience store clerk); State v. Hopkins, 127 Or App 1, 4 , 870 P2d 849 , on recons 127 Or App 622 , rev den 319 Or 281 (1994) (using Hampton test without the Johns factors to evaluate evidence of stolen credit cards in the defendant’s possession as motive for defendant’s attempt to escape apprehension). | 1 | 2001–2001 |
State v. Hopkins
green
1 sentence2001See also State v. Hayward, 327 Or 397, 406-09 , 963 P2d 667 (1998) (using Hampton test without the Johns factors to evaluate evidence that the murder defendant listened to “death metal” music prior to killing convenience store clerk); State v. Hopkins, 127 Or App 1, 4 , 870 P2d 849 , on recons 127 Or App 622 , rev den 319 Or 281 (1994) (using Hampton test without the Johns factors to evaluate evidence of stolen credit cards in the defendant’s possession as motive for defendant’s attempt to escape apprehension). | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Hampton Tree Farms, Inc. v. Jewett
green
2 sentences1995Plaintiff, Hampton Tree Farms, Inc. (Hampton), seeks review of a Court of Appeals decision reversing the trial court’s grant of Hampton’s motion for summary judgment as to the counterclaims of defendant Erickson Hardwood Company (EHC). 1 Hampton Tree Farms, Inc. v. Jewett, 125 Or App 178 , 865 P2d 420 (1993). 1995Plaintiff, Hampton Tree Farms, Inc. (Hampton), seeks review of a Court of Appeals decision reversing the trial court’s grant of Hampton’s motion for summary judgment as to the counterclaims of defendant Erickson Hardwood Company (EHC). 1 Hampton Tree Farms, Inc. v. Jewett, 125 Or App 178 , 865 P2d 420 (1993). | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Welch v. Bancorp Management Advisors, Inc.
green
2 sentences1995Welch v. Bancorp Management Services, 296 Or 713, 716 , 679 P2d 866 (1984). 1995Welch v. Bancorp Management Services, 296 Or 713, 716 , 679 P2d 866 (1984). | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.