six-part test in Oregon

2009Defendant argues that any error was invited, because, in a colloquy with the court in the pretrial hearing, the prosecutor initially asserted that the evidence was admissible because it satisfied the six-part test for admission of intent evidence under State v. Johns, 301 Or 535 , 725 P2d 312 (1986), including the requirement that the probative value of the evidence not be substantially outweighed by its potentially unfair prejudicial effect.

2009Defendant argues that any error was invited, because, in a colloquy with the court in the pretrial hearing, the prosecutor initially asserted that the evidence was admissible because it satisfied the six-part test for admission of intent evidence under State v. Johns, 301 Or 535 , 725 P2d 312 (1986), including the requirement that the probative value of the evidence not be substantially outweighed by its potentially unfair prejudicial effect.

2004Defendant next contends that, even if—as we have concluded—Palmer’s undisclosed reports were “appraisals” *253 that were subject to mandatory disclosure under ORS 35.346(5)(b), the state still would not be entitled to relief under ORCP 71B because those appraisals do not qualify as “newly discovered evidence” under the six-part test set forth in Oberg, 316 Or at 272 .

2004Under that standard: “(1) [the evidence] must be such as will probably change the result if a new trial is granted; (2) it must have been discovered since the trial; (3) it must be such as, with due diligence, could not have been discovered before the trial; (4) it must be material to the issue; (5) it must not be merely cumulative; (6) it must not be merely impeaching or contradicting of former evidence.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

1995Plaintiff argues that the issue is controlled by Marks v. McKenzie High School Fact-Finding Team, 319 Or 451 , 878 P2d 417 (1994), in which the Supreme Court articulated a six-part test for determining whether an entity is a “public body” within the meaning of ORS 192.410(3).

1995Plaintiff argues that the issue is controlled by Marks v. McKenzie High School Fact-Finding Team, 319 Or 451 , 878 P2d 417 (1994), in which the Supreme Court articulated a six-part test for determining whether an entity is a “public body” within the meaning of ORS 192.410(3).

1993The presence of nystagmus or ‘eyeball bounce’ in four or more parts of the test indicates that the subject is impaired by alcohol.” The trial court evaluated extensive scientific testimony and evidence concerning the test, weighed the factors enunciated by the Supreme Court in State v. Brown, 297 Or 404 , 687 P2d 751 (1984), and arrived at its conclusion under OEC 403. 1 Under Brown , expert testimony must be relevant under OEC 401 2 and provide assistance to the trier of fact under OEC 702. 3 If the requirements of OEC 401 and OEC 702 are met, then the testimony is subject to exclusion only i

1993The presence of nystagmus or ‘eyeball bounce’ in four or more parts of the test indicates that the subject is impaired by alcohol.” The trial court evaluated extensive scientific testimony and evidence concerning the test, weighed the factors enunciated by the Supreme Court in State v. Brown, 297 Or 404 , 687 P2d 751 (1984), and arrived at its conclusion under OEC 403. 1 Under Brown , expert testimony must be relevant under OEC 401 2 and provide assistance to the trier of fact under OEC 702. 3 If the requirements of OEC 401 and OEC 702 are met, then the testimony is subject to exclusion only i

1987In State v. Williams, 2 Or App 367, 371 , 486 P2d 909 (1970), we set forth a six part test for determining whether a new trial should be granted based on newly discovered evidence: “Newly discovered evidence which will justify a new trial: *291 “(1) Must be such as will probably change the result if a new trial is granted; “(2) Must have been discovered since the trial; “(3) Must be such as could not have been discovered before the trial by the exercise of due diligence; “(4) Must be material to the issue; “(5) Must not be merely cumulative of former evidence; [and] “(6) Must not be merely imp