police officer hearing in Pennsylvania

2023In Bryant, the Superior Court explained, an officer likewise did not personally observe a suspected, recent shooting, but the “totality of the circumstances (being in a high-crime area, the police officer hearing gunshots and seeing three men running from the area where [the officer] believed the gunshots originated) justified a Terry stop.” Id.

2004Colyer v. Pennsylvania State Police, 165 Pa.Cmwlth. 41 , 644 A.2d 230 (1994). .Additionally, we note that section 1(a) of the Heart and Lung Act does not grant a police officer the presumption that an injury occurred in the "performance of his duties.” See Gilotty v. Township of Moon, 846 A.2d 195 (Pa.Cmwlth.2004) (comparing sections 1(a) and 1(b) of the Heart and Lung Act, 53 P.S. § 637(a) and 53 P.S. § 637(b), respectively, and refusing to draft a presumption in favor of the employee into 53 P.S. § 637(a) similar to that existing in 53 P.S. § 637(b)).

2004Colyer v. Pennsylvania State Police, 165 Pa.Cmwlth. 41 , 644 A.2d 230 (1994). .Additionally, we note that section 1(a) of the Heart and Lung Act does not grant a police officer the presumption that an injury occurred in the "performance of his duties.” See Gilotty v. Township of Moon, 846 A.2d 195 (Pa.Cmwlth.2004) (comparing sections 1(a) and 1(b) of the Heart and Lung Act, 53 P.S. § 637(a) and 53 P.S. § 637(b), respectively, and refusing to draft a presumption in favor of the employee into 53 P.S. § 637(a) similar to that existing in 53 P.S. § 637(b)).

2004Colyer v. Pennsylvania State Police, 165 Pa.Cmwlth. 41 , 644 A.2d 230 (1994). .Additionally, we note that section 1(a) of the Heart and Lung Act does not grant a police officer the presumption that an injury occurred in the "performance of his duties.” See Gilotty v. Township of Moon, 846 A.2d 195 (Pa.Cmwlth.2004) (comparing sections 1(a) and 1(b) of the Heart and Lung Act, 53 P.S. § 637(a) and 53 P.S. § 637(b), respectively, and refusing to draft a presumption in favor of the employee into 53 P.S. § 637(a) similar to that existing in 53 P.S. § 637(b)).

1991Menosky v. Commonwealth, 121 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 464, 550 A.2d 1372 (1988).

1991Rep.] 81 (1952).” In defining the terms malfeasance, misfeasance and nonfeasance in office for purposes of prosecution of a police officer for violation of those common law offenses, the court in Commonwealth v. Haines, 147 Pa. Super. 165 , 24 A.2d 85 (1942), stated as follows: “The defendant, as a detective, was required to investigate any and all complaints of violation of the criminal law occurring in Upper Darby Township.

1991Rep.] 81 (1952).” In defining the terms malfeasance, misfeasance and nonfeasance in office for purposes of prosecution of a police officer for violation of those common law offenses, the court in Commonwealth v. Haines, 147 Pa. Super. 165 , 24 A.2d 85 (1942), stated as follows: “The defendant, as a detective, was required to investigate any and all complaints of violation of the criminal law occurring in Upper Darby Township.

1984Commonwealth v. Hawkins, 439 A.2d 748 supra. Defendant contends that the offense was discovered on June 11, 1982, when the confidential informant told the police officer that the claim for the truck was fraudulent; thus, the one year expired on June 12, 1983, more than three months prior to commencement of the prosecution on September 26, 1983.

1984In Commonwealth v. Hawkins, 439 A. 2d 748 , the Superior Court dealt with this issue as follows at 750: “We are now faced with defining the term ‘discovery of the offense”, as set forth in 18 Pa.C.S. § 108(c)(1).