police officer exception in Oregon

2020We also do not rely on our holding in State v. Enyeart, 266 Or App 763, 768 , 340 P3d 57 (2014), as dispositive, even though that holding depended on our obser- vation that “the knowing mental state * * * applies to the crime of attempting to elude a police officer.” In Enyeart, the defendant had been charged with attempt- ing to elude a police officer in violation of ORS 811.540(1)(b)(A), but he was con- victed instead of interfering with a peace officer in violation of ORS 162.247(1)(b) as a lesser-included offense.

2020We also do not rely on our holding in State v. Enyeart, 266 Or App 763, 768 , 340 P3d 57 (2014), as dispositive, even though that holding depended on our obser- vation that “the knowing mental state * * * applies to the crime of attempting to elude a police officer.” In Enyeart, the defendant had been charged with attempt- ing to elude a police officer in violation of ORS 811.540(1)(b)(A), but he was con- victed instead of interfering with a peace officer in violation of ORS 162.247(1)(b) as a lesser-included offense.

2016The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed. ______________ ** Appeal from Sherman County Circuit Court, Donald Hull, Judge. 264 Or App 510 , 334 P3d 463 (2014). ** Nakamoto, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case. 566 State v. Suppah Case Summary: After being unlawfully stopped for a traffic violation, defen- dant gave the deputy a false name and date of birth, which led the state to charge defendant with giving false information to a police officer in violation of ORS 807.620.

2016The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed. ______________ ** Appeal from Sherman County Circuit Court, Donald Hull, Judge. 264 Or App 510 , 334 P3d 463 (2014). ** Nakamoto, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case. 566 State v. Suppah Case Summary: After being unlawfully stopped for a traffic violation, defen- dant gave the deputy a false name and date of birth, which led the state to charge defendant with giving false information to a police officer in violation of ORS 807.620.

2012While we are mindful of the Supreme Court’s admonition that “the reading of other decisions is normally of little assistance when this issue is presented and that each case must be decided on its own particular facts[,]” Wallace v. Green Thumb, Inc., 296 Or 79, 81 , 672 P2d 344 (1983), three cases are useful, by way of instructive contrast, in assessing employer’s position: Walker, Allen, and Halsey Shedd RFPD v. Leopard, 180 Or App 332 , 44 P3d 610 (2002).

2012While we are mindful of the Supreme Court’s admonition that “the reading of other decisions is normally of little assistance when this issue is presented and that each case must be decided on its own particular facts[,]” Wallace v. Green Thumb, Inc., 296 Or 79, 81 , 672 P2d 344 (1983), three cases are useful, by way of instructive contrast, in assessing employer’s position: Walker, Allen, and Halsey Shedd RFPD v. Leopard, 180 Or App 332 , 44 P3d 610 (2002).

2012While we are mindful of the Supreme Court’s admonition that “the reading of other decisions is normally of little assistance when this issue is presented and that each case must be decided on its own particular facts[,]” Wallace v. Green Thumb, Inc., 296 Or 79, 81 , 672 P2d 344 (1983), three cases are useful, by way of instructive contrast, in assessing employer’s position: Walker, Allen, and Halsey Shedd RFPD v. Leopard, 180 Or App 332 , 44 P3d 610 (2002).

2012While we are mindful of the Supreme Court’s admonition that “the reading of other decisions is normally of little assistance when this issue is presented and that each case must be decided on its own particular facts[,]” Wallace v. Green Thumb, Inc., 296 Or 79, 81 , 672 P2d 344 (1983), three cases are useful, by way of instructive contrast, in assessing employer’s position: Walker, Allen, and Halsey Shedd RFPD v. Leopard, 180 Or App 332 , 44 P3d 610 (2002).

2002Second, in Sandrock, this court concluded that a police officer could claim the absolute privilege against a charge that he defamed the plaintiff; we then noted, “Because we conclude that the statements were absolutely privileged, we do not address the question of discretionary immunity.” 58 Or App at 314 n 1.

2000That rule requires the officer to sign below the statement: "I affirm by my signature that the foregoing event occurred." See also ORS 813.410(4)(f) (requiring the department to issue a subpoena for the attendance of the police officer at the hearing if requested by petitioner or the department). [3] The dissent takes this opinion to task for elevating form over substance. 168 Or.App. at 450 , 4 P.3d 93 .

1982App. 364 , 602 P.2d 1121 . *629 Both Oregon cases applying the rule have involved the potential liability of a landowner for an injury that occurred on his premises. [2] The trial court here expanded the rule to bar an action for wrongful death of a police officer whose claim was not based upon any premises liability.