superintendent of public instruction in Pennsylvania

1967This sentence is not involved in the determination of the question before us, but the last is, for it declares that all officers elected by the people, not within the exceptions, ‘shall be removed by the Governor for reasonable cause, after due notice and full hearing, on the address of two-thirds of the Senate.’ Here is a distinct constitutional expression, and there can be no debate as to the validity of any legislation repugnant to it: Commonwealth v. Moir, 199 Pa. 534 .

1909This sentence is not involved in the determination of the question before us, but the last is, for it declares that all officers elected by the people, not within the exceptions, “shall be removed by the Governor for reasonable cause, after due notice and full hearing, on the address of two-thirds of the Senate.” Here is a distinct constitutional expression, and there can be no debate as to the validity of any legislation repugnant to it: Commonwealth v. Moir, 199 Pa. 534 .

1961This court reversed the Superintendent of Public Instruction, and the Supreme Court reversed this court (Board of Public Education v. Beilau, 386 Pa. 82 ).

1927It was mooted, but not decided, in Bowman’s Case, 225 Pa. 364, 367 , and, as to appointed officers, in Com. v. Benn, 284 Pa. 421, 429 .

1927We are aware that our conclusion may be thought to conflict with general statements appearing in some of our previous decisions, generally as dicta or by way of argument, in dealing with other constitutional provisions than the one now under review;. for instance, article III, section 11, which provides: “No bill shall be passed giving any extra compensation to any public officer, servant, employee, agent or contractor, after services shall have been rendered or contract made,” and the immediately preceding clause in article VI, section 4, which prescribes that “Appointed officers, other than

1927We are aware that our conclusion may be thought to conflict with general statements appearing in some of our previous decisions, generally as dicta or by way of argument, in dealing with other constitutional provisions than the one now under review;. for instance, article III, section 11, which provides: “No bill shall be passed giving any extra compensation to any public officer, servant, employee, agent or contractor, after services shall have been rendered or contract made,” and the immediately preceding clause in article VI, section 4, which prescribes that “Appointed officers, other than

1927We are aware that our conclusion may be thought to conflict with general statements appearing in some of our previous decisions, generally as dicta or by way of argument, in dealing with other constitutional provisions than the one now under review;. for instance, article III, section 11, which provides: “No bill shall be passed giving any extra compensation to any public officer, servant, employee, agent or contractor, after services shall have been rendered or contract made,” and the immediately preceding clause in article VI, section 4, which prescribes that “Appointed officers, other than

1927It was mooted, but not decided, in Bowman’s Case, 225 Pa. 364, 367 , and, as to appointed officers, in Com. v. Benn, 284 Pa. 421, 429 .

1902Tener, 100 Pa. 222 , and Lane v. Com., 103 Pa. 481 , in which it was held that the constitution made no distinction in regard to the power and mode of removal, between state, county and municipal officers.

1901Until its enactment,' no authority was vested in any court of common pleas to issue the writ to a state officer: Commonwealth v. Wickersham, supra. In that case an application was made to the court of common pleas of .Dauphin county in 1879 for a mandamus against the superintendent of public instruction.