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7 Texas opinions name it 1 courts 1984–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Barraza v. Kolibagreen2 sentences1998Arnett Grain Co., Inc., 560 S.W.2d 85, 88 (Tex.1977) -(holding that if appellee’s breach of contract action had been asserted in a counterclaim or crossclaim, article 5539c, the predecessor to section 16.069, would have applied); Barraza v. Koliba, 933 S.W.2d 164, 167-68 (Tex.App. — San Antonio 1996, writ denied) (plaintiffs filed declaratory action and asked for attorney’s fees; holding: defendant’s DTPA counterclaim timely under section 16.069); ECC Parkway Joint Venture v. Baldwin, 765 S.W.2d 504, 513-14 (Tex.App. — Dallas 1989, writ denied) (Duvall-Giles asserted that section 16.069 did no 1998Arnett Grain Co., Inc., 560 S.W.2d 85, 88 (Tex.1977) (holding that if appellee’s breach of contract action had been asserted in a counterclaim or crossclaim, article 5539c, the predecessor to section 16.069, would have applied); Barraza v. Koliba, 933 S.W.2d 164, 167-68 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1996, writ denied) (plaintiffs filed declaratory action and asked for attorney’s fees; holding: defendant’s DTPA counterclaim timely under section 16.069); ECC Parkway Joint Venture v. Baldwin, 765 S.W.2d 504, 513-14 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1989, writ denied) (Duvall-Giles asserted that section 16.069 did not app | 2 | 2 |
ECC Parkway Joint Venture v. Baldwingreen2 sentences1998Arnett Grain Co., Inc., 560 S.W.2d 85, 88 (Tex.1977) -(holding that if appellee’s breach of contract action had been asserted in a counterclaim or crossclaim, article 5539c, the predecessor to section 16.069, would have applied); Barraza v. Koliba, 933 S.W.2d 164, 167-68 (Tex.App. — San Antonio 1996, writ denied) (plaintiffs filed declaratory action and asked for attorney’s fees; holding: defendant’s DTPA counterclaim timely under section 16.069); ECC Parkway Joint Venture v. Baldwin, 765 S.W.2d 504, 513-14 (Tex.App. — Dallas 1989, writ denied) (Duvall-Giles asserted that section 16.069 did no 1998Arnett Grain Co., Inc., 560 S.W.2d 85, 88 (Tex.1977) (holding that if appellee’s breach of contract action had been asserted in a counterclaim or crossclaim, article 5539c, the predecessor to section 16.069, would have applied); Barraza v. Koliba, 933 S.W.2d 164, 167-68 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1996, writ denied) (plaintiffs filed declaratory action and asked for attorney’s fees; holding: defendant’s DTPA counterclaim timely under section 16.069); ECC Parkway Joint Venture v. Baldwin, 765 S.W.2d 504, 513-14 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1989, writ denied) (Duvall-Giles asserted that section 16.069 did not app | 2 | 2 |
Hobbs Trailers v. JT Arnett Grain Co., Inc.green2 sentences1998Arnett Grain Co., Inc., 560 S.W.2d 85, 88 (Tex.1977) -(holding that if appellee’s breach of contract action had been asserted in a counterclaim or crossclaim, article 5539c, the predecessor to section 16.069, would have applied); Barraza v. Koliba, 933 S.W.2d 164, 167-68 (Tex.App. — San Antonio 1996, writ denied) (plaintiffs filed declaratory action and asked for attorney’s fees; holding: defendant’s DTPA counterclaim timely under section 16.069); ECC Parkway Joint Venture v. Baldwin, 765 S.W.2d 504, 513-14 (Tex.App. — Dallas 1989, writ denied) (Duvall-Giles asserted that section 16.069 did no 1998Arnett Grain Co., Inc., 560 S.W.2d 85, 88 (Tex.1977) (holding that if appellee’s breach of contract action had been asserted in a counterclaim or crossclaim, article 5539c, the predecessor to section 16.069, would have applied); Barraza v. Koliba, 933 S.W.2d 164, 167-68 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1996, writ denied) (plaintiffs filed declaratory action and asked for attorney’s fees; holding: defendant’s DTPA counterclaim timely under section 16.069); ECC Parkway Joint Venture v. Baldwin, 765 S.W.2d 504, 513-14 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1989, writ denied) (Duvall-Giles asserted that section 16.069 did not app | 2 | 2 |
Jon Thomas Ford v. Stategreen1 sentence2020However, the car in the Ford case was specifically identified (Chevy Tahoe with roof rack and horizontal stripes), and a plethora of other specific facts linked the defendant to the incident, such as DNA, witness testimony, and surveillance photos of the vehicle on the night of the incident. 444 S.W.3d 171, 193 (Tex. App.— San Antonio 2014), aff’d, 477 S.W.3d 321 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Fentis v. Stategreen1 sentence2018When the state attempts to use a defendant’s flight as an inference of guilt, “the circumstances must indicate that the flight is ‘so connected with the offense on trial as to render it relevant as a circumstance bearing upon his guilt.” Fentis v. State, 582 S.W.2d 779, 781 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Hurst v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.green2 sentences1986Nothing further is required in order to meet the Baldwin test. 611 S.W.2d at 616 ; see also Hurst v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 647 S.W.2d 249, 252 (Tex.1983); Weitzel, 691 S.W.2d at 600 . 1986Nothing further is required in order to meet the Baldwin test. 611 S.W.2d at 616 ; see also Hurst v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 647 S.W.2d 249, 252 (Tex.1983); Weitzel, 691 S.W.2d at 600 . | 1 | 1 |
Dickinson State Bank v. Ogdengreen2 sentences1984Set-off “is the doctrine of bringing into the presence of each other the obligation of A to B and B to A and by the judicial action of the court making each obligation extinguish the other.” Dickinson State Bank at 221, citing Nalle v. Harrell, 118 Tex. 149 , 12 S.W.2d 550 (1929). 1984Set-off “is the doctrine of bringing into the presence of each other the obligation of A to B and B to A and by the judicial action of the court making each obligation extinguish the other.” Dickinson State Bank at 221, citing Nalle v. Harrell, 118 Tex. 149 , 12 S.W.2d 550 (1929). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Ford, Jon Thomas
green
1 sentence2020However, the car in the Ford case was specifically identified (Chevy Tahoe with roof rack and horizontal stripes), and a plethora of other specific facts linked the defendant to the incident, such as DNA, witness testimony, and surveillance photos of the vehicle on the night of the incident. 444 S.W.3d 171, 193 (Tex. App.— San Antonio 2014), aff’d, 477 S.W.3d 321 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Lyles v. Johnson
green
1 sentence1989Cf. Lyles v. Johnson, 585 S.W.2d 778 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1979, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (claim of offset is not an affirmative claim). *514 Claims for attorney’s fees are generally contingent on the claimant’s prevailing. | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Weitzel v. Barnes
green
2 sentences1986Nothing further is required in order to meet the Baldwin test. 611 S.W.2d at 616 ; see also Hurst v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 647 S.W.2d 249, 252 (Tex.1983); Weitzel, 691 S.W.2d at 600 . 1986Nothing further is required in order to meet the Baldwin test. 611 S.W.2d at 616 ; see also Hurst v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 647 S.W.2d 249, 252 (Tex.1983); Weitzel, 691 S.W.2d at 600 . | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Smith v. Baldwin
green
2 sentences1986Nothing further is required in order to meet the Baldwin test. 611 S.W.2d at 616 ; see also Hurst v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 647 S.W.2d 249, 252 (Tex.1983); Weitzel, 691 S.W.2d at 600 . 1986Nothing further is required in order to meet the Baldwin test. 611 S.W.2d at 616 ; see also Hurst v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 647 S.W.2d 249, 252 (Tex.1983); Weitzel, 691 S.W.2d at 600 . | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Nalle v. Harrell
green
2 sentences1984Set-off “is the doctrine of bringing into the presence of each other the obligation of A to B and B to A and by the judicial action of the court making each obligation extinguish the other.” Dickinson State Bank at 221, citing Nalle v. Harrell, 118 Tex. 149 , 12 S.W.2d 550 (1929). 1984Set-off “is the doctrine of bringing into the presence of each other the obligation of A to B and B to A and by the judicial action of the court making each obligation extinguish the other.” Dickinson State Bank at 221, citing Nalle v. Harrell, 118 Tex. 149 , 12 S.W.2d 550 (1929). | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Providence Hospital v. Truly
green
2 sentences1984An exception to the Baldwin rule is set out in Providence Hospital v. Truly, supra, where the Waco court held that the offset will be credited after the trebling when it is paid by a settling third party not sued under the Act. 1984An exception to the Baldwin rule is set out in Providence Hospital v. Truly, supra, where the Waco court held that the offset will be credited after the trebling when it is paid by a settling third party not sued under the Act. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.