Bartkus exception in Texas

2018App. 1987) (stating that the legal principle of the “law of the case” provides that an appellate 9 court’s resolution of a question of law in a previous appeal of the same case will govern the disposition of the same issue in a subsequent appeal); Ex parte Walker, 489 S.W.3d at 13-14 (concluding that Walker failed to allege facts showing that the Bartkus exception to the dual sovereignty doctrine applied to the State’s indictments).

2018App. 1987) (stating that the legal principle of the “law of the case” provides that an appellate 9 court’s resolution of a question of law in a previous appeal of the same case will govern the disposition of the same issue in a subsequent appeal); Ex parte Walker, 489 S.W.3d at 13-14 (concluding that Walker failed to allege facts showing that the Bartkus exception to the dual sovereignty doctrine applied to the State’s indictments).

2020The Bartkus exception refers to Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 123–24 (1959), in which the United States Supreme Court, in dictum, described a possible exception to the dual sovereignty rule where, “in a criminal proceeding, one 13 sovereign becomes so involved in another sovereign’s prosecution, such that a subsequent prosecution by the non-prosecuting sovereign amounts to a ‘sham and a cover’ for the first prosecution.” Kappmeyer, 127 S.W.3d at 181–82.

2020The Bartkus exception refers to Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 123–24 (1959), in which the United States Supreme Court, in dictum, described a possible exception to the dual sovereignty rule where, “in a criminal proceeding, one 13 sovereign becomes so involved in another sovereign’s prosecution, such that a subsequent prosecution by the non-prosecuting sovereign amounts to a ‘sham and a cover’ for the first prosecution.” Kappmeyer, 127 S.W.3d at 181–82.

2016In at least two separate opinions, the First District Court of Appeals rejected claims for application of the exception, concluding that “Texas law has not recognized the so-called Bartkus exception to the dual sovereignty rule.” Bui, 983 S.W.2d at 76 ; see also Kappmeyer v. State, 127 S.W.3d 178, 183 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.) (concluding that the record showed nothing more than cooperation between federal and state authorities and, thus, there was “no basis for deviating from [the court’s earlier] holding in [Bui ] ... that Texas law has not recognized the so-called ‘Bartku

2016In at least two separate opinions, the First District Court of Appeals rejected claims for application of the exception, concluding that “Texas law has not recognized the so-called Bartkus exception to the dual sovereignty rule.” Bui, 983 S.W.2d at 76 ; see also Kappmeyer v. State, 127 S.W.3d 178, 183 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.) (concluding that the record showed nothing more than cooperation between federal and state authorities and, thus, there was “no basis for deviating from [the court’s earlier] holding in [Bui ] ... that Texas law has not recognized the so-called ‘Bartku

2016See Candelas, 91 S.W.3d at 813 (concluding that Bartkus exception did not apply to bar the petitioner’s state prosecution where the petitioner failed to show that federal authorities had manipulated the State into prosecuting the petitioner in state court); Gary, 895 S.W.2d at 466, 468 (concluding that Bartkus exception did not apply to bar the state prosecution of the petitioner following his federal conviction for the same acts where the record showed that the state indictment was obtained before the federal indictment and the only assertion of alleged collusion was the State’s acknowledgeme

1998Since Bartkus was decided by the Supreme Court in 1959, Texas courts have cited Bartkus in nine cases, but only to uphold the dual sovereignty rule. 4 Ex parte Williams, 799 S.W.2d 304 , 306 n. 8 (Tex.Crim.App.1990); Reynolds v. State, 548 S.W.2d 733, 735-36 (Tex.Crim.App.1977); Breedlove, 470 S.W.2d at 882 ; Supak v. State, 388 S.W.2d 721, 723 (Tex.Crim.App.1965); Garrett v. State, 387 S.W.2d 53, 56 (Tex.Crim.App.1965); Ex parte Gary, 895 S.W.2d 465, 468 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 1995, pet. ref'd); Parrish v. State 889 S.W.2d 658, 660 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994 pet. ref'd); Guerra v. State,

2016Walker cites to only one case, United States v. Belcher, in which the Bartkus exception has been applied to preclude successive prosecutions by separate sovereigns. 762 F.Supp. 666 (W.D.Va.1991), In Belcher, a Virginia state prosecutor unsuccessfully prosecuted the defendant in state court for manufacturing marijuana and using a firearm in the commission of a felony.

2016Walker cites to only one case, United States v. Belcher, in which the Bartkus exception has been applied to preclude successive prosecutions by separate sovereigns. 762 F.Supp. 666 (W.D.Va.1991), In Belcher, a Virginia state prosecutor unsuccessfully prosecuted the defendant in state court for manufacturing marijuana and using a firearm in the commission of a felony.

2016See Candelas, 91 S.W.3d at 813 (concluding that Bartkus exception did not apply to bar the petitioner’s state prosecution where the petitioner failed to show that federal authorities had manipulated the State into prosecuting the petitioner in state court); Gary, 895 S.W.2d at 466, 468 (concluding that Bartkus exception did not apply to bar the state prosecution of the petitioner following his federal conviction for the same acts where the record showed that the state indictment was obtained before the federal indictment and the only assertion of alleged collusion was the State’s acknowledgeme

2003Although there have been no reported Texas cases since Bui in which a defendant has affirmatively prevailed under the "Bartkus exception,” there is one appellant court opinion that seems to impliedly recognize the "Bartkus exception.” In Candelas v. State, 91 S.W.3d 810, 812 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2002, no pet.), the El Paso Court of Appeals, citing Bartkus , stated: "One exception to the dual-sovereignty doctrine is the sham-prosecution.” Discussing Bartkus v. Illinois, the El Paso Court wrote that "In that case, the United States Supreme Court held that a subsequent prosecution was prevented when

2003While the “Bartkus exception” did not bar cooperation between state and federal prosecutors, the court noted that “cooperation between state and federal authorities is a welcome innovation.” 831 F.2d 181, 182-83 (9th Cir.1987).

2003While the “ Bartkus exception” did not bar cooperation between state and federal prosecutors, the court noted that “cooperation between state and federal authorities is a welcome innovation.” 831 F.2d 181, 182-83 (9th Cir. 1987).

2020The Bartkus exception refers to Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 123–24 (1959), in which the United States Supreme Court, in dictum, described a possible exception to the dual sovereignty rule where, “in a criminal proceeding, one 13 sovereign becomes so involved in another sovereign’s prosecution, such that a subsequent prosecution by the non-prosecuting sovereign amounts to a ‘sham and a cover’ for the first prosecution.” Kappmeyer, 127 S.W.3d at 181–82.

2020The Bartkus exception refers to Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 123–24 (1959), in which the United States Supreme Court, in dictum, described a possible exception to the dual sovereignty rule where, “in a criminal proceeding, one 13 sovereign becomes so involved in another sovereign’s prosecution, such that a subsequent prosecution by the non-prosecuting sovereign amounts to a ‘sham and a cover’ for the first prosecution.” Kappmeyer, 127 S.W.3d at 181–82.

2016Because the terms “sham” and “tool” denote a “special relationship” involving “a strong element of manipulation[,]” United States v. Rashed, 234 F.3d 1280, 1283 (D.C.Cir.2000), numerous federal courts have suggested that the Bartkus exception, to the extent it exists, is limited to the extraordinary situation in which one sovereign is “ ‘so dominated, controlled, or manipulated by the actions of the other that it [does] not act of its own volition.’ ” Angleton, 314 F.3d at 774 n. 15 (quoting United States v. Baptista-Rodriguez, 17 F.3d 1354, 1361 (11th Cir.1994)); see also United States v. Tra

2016Because the terms “sham” and “tool” denote a “special relationship” involving “a strong element of manipulation[,]” United States v. Rashed, 234 F.3d 1280, 1283 (D.C.Cir.2000), numerous federal courts have suggested that the Bartkus exception, to the extent it exists, is limited to the extraordinary situation in which one sovereign is “ ‘so dominated, controlled, or manipulated by the actions of the other that it [does] not act of its own volition.’ ” Angleton, 314 F.3d at 774 n. 15 (quoting United States v. Baptista-Rodriguez, 17 F.3d 1354, 1361 (11th Cir.1994)); see also United States v. Tra

2016Because the terms “sham” and “tool” denote a “special relationship” involving “a strong element of manipulation[,]” United States v. Rashed, 234 F.3d 1280, 1283 (D.C.Cir.2000), numerous federal courts have suggested that the Bartkus exception, to the extent it exists, is limited to the extraordinary situation in which one sovereign is “ ‘so dominated, controlled, or manipulated by the actions of the other that it [does] not act of its own volition.’ ” Angleton, 314 F.3d at 774 n. 15 (quoting United States v. Baptista-Rodriguez, 17 F.3d 1354, 1361 (11th Cir.1994)); see also United States v. Tra

2016Because the terms “sham” and “tool” denote a “special relationship” involving “a strong element of manipulation[,]” United States v. Rashed, 234 F.3d 1280, 1283 (D.C.Cir.2000), numerous federal courts have suggested that the Bartkus exception, to the extent it exists, is limited to the extraordinary situation in which one sovereign is “ ‘so dominated, controlled, or manipulated by the actions of the other that it [does] not act of its own volition.’ ” Angleton, 314 F.3d at 774 n. 15 (quoting United States v. Baptista-Rodriguez, 17 F.3d 1354, 1361 (11th Cir.1994)); see also United States v. Tra

2016Because the terms “sham” and “tool” denote a “special relationship” involving “a strong element of manipulation[,]” United States v. Rashed, 234 F.3d 1280, 1283 (D.C.Cir.2000), numerous federal courts have suggested that the Bartkus exception, to the extent it exists, is limited to the extraordinary situation in which one sovereign is “ ‘so dominated, controlled, or manipulated by the actions of the other that it [does] not act of its own volition.’ ” Angleton, 314 F.3d at 774 n. 15 (quoting United States v. Baptista-Rodriguez, 17 F.3d 1354, 1361 (11th Cir.1994)); see also United States v. Tra

2016Because the terms “sham” and “tool” denote a “special relationship” involving “a strong element of manipulation[,]” United States v. Rashed, 234 F.3d 1280, 1283 (D.C.Cir.2000), numerous federal courts have suggested that the Bartkus exception, to the extent it exists, is limited to the extraordinary situation in which one sovereign is “ ‘so dominated, controlled, or manipulated by the actions of the other that it [does] not act of its own volition.’ ” Angleton, 314 F.3d at 774 n. 15 (quoting United States v. Baptista-Rodriguez, 17 F.3d 1354, 1361 (11th Cir.1994)); see also United States v. Tra

2016His primary role in the state prosecution as the state prosecutor was not affected by a federal status that became significant only when he took on the federal prosecution of [the defendant].”); United States v. Paiz, 905 F.2d 1014, 1024 (7th Cir.1990) (concluding that designation of state prosecutor as a Special Deputy United States Attorney for purposes of the defendant’s federal prosecution did not invoke Bartkus exception).

2016As .this track record suggests, there is some room for debate over whether the Bartkus exception is just narrow or whether it is indeed real.”); Angleton, 314 F.3d at 773-74 (“The Bartkus Court’s failure to identify a particular instance of a sham prosecution may mean that the exception does not exist.”); United States v. Brocksmith, 991 F.2d 1363, 1366 (7th Cir.1993) (“We have questioned whether Bartkus truly meant to create [a ‘sham prosecution’] exception, and we have uniformly rejected such claims.”).

2016As .this track record suggests, there is some room for debate over whether the Bartkus exception is just narrow or whether it is indeed real.”); Angleton, 314 F.3d at 773-74 (“The Bartkus Court’s failure to identify a particular instance of a sham prosecution may mean that the exception does not exist.”); United States v. Brocksmith, 991 F.2d 1363, 1366 (7th Cir.1993) (“We have questioned whether Bartkus truly meant to create [a ‘sham prosecution’] exception, and we have uniformly rejected such claims.”).

2016Because the terms “sham” and “tool” denote a “special relationship” involving “a strong element of manipulation[,]” United States v. Rashed, 234 F.3d 1280, 1283 (D.C.Cir.2000), numerous federal courts have suggested that the Bartkus exception, to the extent it exists, is limited to the extraordinary situation in which one sovereign is “ ‘so dominated, controlled, or manipulated by the actions of the other that it [does] not act of its own volition.’ ” Angleton, 314 F.3d at 774 n. 15 (quoting United States v. Baptista-Rodriguez, 17 F.3d 1354, 1361 (11th Cir.1994)); see also United States v. Tra

2016Because the terms “sham” and “tool” denote a “special relationship” involving “a strong element of manipulation[,]” United States v. Rashed, 234 F.3d 1280, 1283 (D.C.Cir.2000), numerous federal courts have suggested that the Bartkus exception, to the extent it exists, is limited to the extraordinary situation in which one sovereign is “ ‘so dominated, controlled, or manipulated by the actions of the other that it [does] not act of its own volition.’ ” Angleton, 314 F.3d at 774 n. 15 (quoting United States v. Baptista-Rodriguez, 17 F.3d 1354, 1361 (11th Cir.1994)); see also United States v. Tra

2016However, as many federal courts have recognized, the Bartkus exception, to the extent it exists, is an exceedingly narrow exception that applies, if at all, “only in the rarest of circumstances.” United States v. Angleton, 314 F.3d 767, 774 (5th Cir.2002).

2016However, as many federal courts have recognized, the Bartkus exception, to the extent it exists, is an exceedingly narrow exception that applies, if at all, “only in the rarest of circumstances.” United States v. Angleton, 314 F.3d 767, 774 (5th Cir.2002).

1998Since Bartkus was decided by the Supreme Court in 1959, Texas courts have cited Bartkus in nine cases, but only to uphold the dual sovereignty rule. 4 Ex parte Williams, 799 S.W.2d 304 , 306 n. 8 (Tex.Crim.App.1990); Reynolds v. State, 548 S.W.2d 733, 735-36 (Tex.Crim.App.1977); Breedlove, 470 S.W.2d at 882 ; Supak v. State, 388 S.W.2d 721, 723 (Tex.Crim.App.1965); Garrett v. State, 387 S.W.2d 53, 56 (Tex.Crim.App.1965); Ex parte Gary, 895 S.W.2d 465, 468 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 1995, pet. ref'd); Parrish v. State 889 S.W.2d 658, 660 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994 pet. ref'd); Guerra v. State,

1998Since Bartkus was decided by the Supreme Court in 1959, Texas courts have cited Bartkus in nine cases, but only to uphold the dual sovereignty rule. 4 Ex parte Williams, 799 S.W.2d 304 , 306 n. 8 (Tex.Crim.App.1990); Reynolds v. State, 548 S.W.2d 733, 735-36 (Tex.Crim.App.1977); Breedlove, 470 S.W.2d at 882 ; Supak v. State, 388 S.W.2d 721, 723 (Tex.Crim.App.1965); Garrett v. State, 387 S.W.2d 53, 56 (Tex.Crim.App.1965); Ex parte Gary, 895 S.W.2d 465, 468 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 1995, pet. ref'd); Parrish v. State 889 S.W.2d 658, 660 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994 pet. ref'd); Guerra v. State,

1998Since Bartkus was decided by the Supreme Court in 1959, Texas courts have cited Bartkus in nine cases, but only to uphold the dual sovereignty rule. 4 Ex parte Williams, 799 S.W.2d 304 , 306 n. 8 (Tex.Crim.App.1990); Reynolds v. State, 548 S.W.2d 733, 735-36 (Tex.Crim.App.1977); Breedlove, 470 S.W.2d at 882 ; Supak v. State, 388 S.W.2d 721, 723 (Tex.Crim.App.1965); Garrett v. State, 387 S.W.2d 53, 56 (Tex.Crim.App.1965); Ex parte Gary, 895 S.W.2d 465, 468 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 1995, pet. ref'd); Parrish v. State 889 S.W.2d 658, 660 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994 pet. ref'd); Guerra v. State,

1998Since Bartkus was decided by the Supreme Court in 1959, Texas courts have cited Bartkus in nine cases, but only to uphold the dual sovereignty rule. 4 Ex parte Williams, 799 S.W.2d 304 , 306 n. 8 (Tex.Crim.App.1990); Reynolds v. State, 548 S.W.2d 733, 735-36 (Tex.Crim.App.1977); Breedlove, 470 S.W.2d at 882 ; Supak v. State, 388 S.W.2d 721, 723 (Tex.Crim.App.1965); Garrett v. State, 387 S.W.2d 53, 56 (Tex.Crim.App.1965); Ex parte Gary, 895 S.W.2d 465, 468 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 1995, pet. ref'd); Parrish v. State 889 S.W.2d 658, 660 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994 pet. ref'd); Guerra v. State,

1998Since Bartkus was decided by the Supreme Court in 1959, Texas courts have cited Bartkus in nine cases, but only to uphold the dual sovereignty rule. 4 Ex parte Williams, 799 S.W.2d 304 , 306 n. 8 (Tex.Crim.App.1990); Reynolds v. State, 548 S.W.2d 733, 735-36 (Tex.Crim.App.1977); Breedlove, 470 S.W.2d at 882 ; Supak v. State, 388 S.W.2d 721, 723 (Tex.Crim.App.1965); Garrett v. State, 387 S.W.2d 53, 56 (Tex.Crim.App.1965); Ex parte Gary, 895 S.W.2d 465, 468 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 1995, pet. ref'd); Parrish v. State 889 S.W.2d 658, 660 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994 pet. ref'd); Guerra v. State,

1998Since Bartkus was decided by the Supreme Court in 1959, Texas courts have cited Bartkus in nine cases, but only to uphold the dual sovereignty rule. 4 Ex parte Williams, 799 S.W.2d 304 , 306 n. 8 (Tex.Crim.App.1990); Reynolds v. State, 548 S.W.2d 733, 735-36 (Tex.Crim.App.1977); Breedlove, 470 S.W.2d at 882 ; Supak v. State, 388 S.W.2d 721, 723 (Tex.Crim.App.1965); Garrett v. State, 387 S.W.2d 53, 56 (Tex.Crim.App.1965); Ex parte Gary, 895 S.W.2d 465, 468 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 1995, pet. ref'd); Parrish v. State 889 S.W.2d 658, 660 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994 pet. ref'd); Guerra v. State,

1998Since Bartkus was decided by the Supreme Court in 1959, Texas courts have cited Bartkus in nine cases, but only to uphold the dual sovereignty rule. 4 Ex parte Williams, 799 S.W.2d 304 , 306 n. 8 (Tex.Crim.App.1990); Reynolds v. State, 548 S.W.2d 733, 735-36 (Tex.Crim.App.1977); Breedlove, 470 S.W.2d at 882 ; Supak v. State, 388 S.W.2d 721, 723 (Tex.Crim.App.1965); Garrett v. State, 387 S.W.2d 53, 56 (Tex.Crim.App.1965); Ex parte Gary, 895 S.W.2d 465, 468 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 1995, pet. ref'd); Parrish v. State 889 S.W.2d 658, 660 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994 pet. ref'd); Guerra v. State,

1998Since Bartkus was decided by the Supreme Court in 1959, Texas courts have cited Bartkus in nine cases, but only to uphold the dual sovereignty rule. 4 Ex parte Williams, 799 S.W.2d 304 , 306 n. 8 (Tex.Crim.App.1990); Reynolds v. State, 548 S.W.2d 733, 735-36 (Tex.Crim.App.1977); Breedlove, 470 S.W.2d at 882 ; Supak v. State, 388 S.W.2d 721, 723 (Tex.Crim.App.1965); Garrett v. State, 387 S.W.2d 53, 56 (Tex.Crim.App.1965); Ex parte Gary, 895 S.W.2d 465, 468 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 1995, pet. ref'd); Parrish v. State 889 S.W.2d 658, 660 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994 pet. ref'd); Guerra v. State,

1998Since Bartkus was decided by the Supreme Court in 1959, Texas courts have cited Bartkus in nine cases, but only to uphold the dual sovereignty rule. 4 Ex parte Williams, 799 S.W.2d 304 , 306 n. 8 (Tex.Crim.App.1990); Reynolds v. State, 548 S.W.2d 733, 735-36 (Tex.Crim.App.1977); Breedlove, 470 S.W.2d at 882 ; Supak v. State, 388 S.W.2d 721, 723 (Tex.Crim.App.1965); Garrett v. State, 387 S.W.2d 53, 56 (Tex.Crim.App.1965); Ex parte Gary, 895 S.W.2d 465, 468 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 1995, pet. ref'd); Parrish v. State 889 S.W.2d 658, 660 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994 pet. ref'd); Guerra v. State,

1998Since Bartkus was decided by the Supreme Court in 1959, Texas courts have cited Bartkus in nine cases, but only to uphold the dual sovereignty rule. 4 Ex parte Williams, 799 S.W.2d 304 , 306 n. 8 (Tex.Crim.App.1990); Reynolds v. State, 548 S.W.2d 733, 735-36 (Tex.Crim.App.1977); Breedlove, 470 S.W.2d at 882 ; Supak v. State, 388 S.W.2d 721, 723 (Tex.Crim.App.1965); Garrett v. State, 387 S.W.2d 53, 56 (Tex.Crim.App.1965); Ex parte Gary, 895 S.W.2d 465, 468 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 1995, pet. ref'd); Parrish v. State 889 S.W.2d 658, 660 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994 pet. ref'd); Guerra v. State,

1998Since Bartkus was decided by the Supreme Court in 1959, Texas courts have cited Bartkus in nine cases, but only to uphold the dual sovereignty rule. 4 Ex parte Williams, 799 S.W.2d 304 , 306 n. 8 (Tex.Crim.App.1990); Reynolds v. State, 548 S.W.2d 733, 735-36 (Tex.Crim.App.1977); Breedlove, 470 S.W.2d at 882 ; Supak v. State, 388 S.W.2d 721, 723 (Tex.Crim.App.1965); Garrett v. State, 387 S.W.2d 53, 56 (Tex.Crim.App.1965); Ex parte Gary, 895 S.W.2d 465, 468 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 1995, pet. ref'd); Parrish v. State 889 S.W.2d 658, 660 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994 pet. ref'd); Guerra v. State,

1998Since Bartkus was decided by the Supreme Court in 1959, Texas courts have cited Bartkus in nine cases, but only to uphold the dual sovereignty rule. 4 Ex parte Williams, 799 S.W.2d 304 , 306 n. 8 (Tex.Crim.App.1990); Reynolds v. State, 548 S.W.2d 733, 735-36 (Tex.Crim.App.1977); Breedlove, 470 S.W.2d at 882 ; Supak v. State, 388 S.W.2d 721, 723 (Tex.Crim.App.1965); Garrett v. State, 387 S.W.2d 53, 56 (Tex.Crim.App.1965); Ex parte Gary, 895 S.W.2d 465, 468 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 1995, pet. ref'd); Parrish v. State 889 S.W.2d 658, 660 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994 pet. ref'd); Guerra v. State,