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7 Texas opinions name it 2 courts 1989–2023 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Regents of the University of Michigan v. Ewinggreen2 sentences1989Ewing, 474 U.S. at 228 n. 14, 106 S.Ct. at 515 n. 14; Levi v. University of Texas at San Antonio, 840 F.2d at 280-81 (acknowledging that the Ewing standard for reviewing academic decisions also extends to equal protection claims); Clements v. County of Nassau, 835 F.2d at 1006 . 1989Ewing, 474 U.S. at 228 n. 14, 106 S.Ct. at 515 n. 14; Levi v. University of Texas at San Antonio, 840 F.2d at 280-81 (acknowledging that the Ewing standard for reviewing academic decisions also extends to equal protection claims); Clements v. County of Nassau, 835 F.2d at 1006 . | 1 | 2 |
Doug Crownover v. Mid-Continent Casualty Cogreen2 sentences2023Ewing, 420 S.W.3d at 31 ; see also Crownover, 772 F.3d at 210 (applying the Ewing analysis in determining the contractual-liability exclusion in a CGL policy did not apply, and it therefore did not need to address whether the insureds could “establish an exception to that exclusion”). 2023Ewing, 420 S.W.3d at 31 ; see also Crownover, 772 F.3d at 210 (applying the Ewing analysis in determining the contractual-liability exclusion in a CGL policy did not apply, and it therefore did not need to address whether the insureds could “establish an exception to that exclusion”). | 1 | 1 |
Mann Frankfort Stein & Lipp Advisors, Inc. v. Fieldinggreen1 sentence2020Mann Frankfort Stein & Lipp Advisors, Inc. v. Fielding, 289 S.W.3d 844, 848 (Tex. 2009). | 1 | 1 |
Humphries v. ADVANCED PRINT MEDIAgreen1 sentence2019See Humphries v. Advanced Print Media, 339 S.W.3d 206, 208 (Tex. App.— Dallas 2011, no pet.); see Berger v. Flores, No. 03-12-00415-CV, 2015 WL 3654555 , at *4 (Tex. App.—Austin June 12, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.). (5) The Issue of Privilege Is Moot on Appeal, Given Ewing’s Forfeiture of any Attack on the “Truth” Defense Ewing’s petition alleges that the statement at issue was published “at the knowing and willful direction of Defendants Juan Sabillon and Brent Rhodes, and with malice.” Though the 10 “[I]ntentional infliction of emotional distress requires proof that: (1) the defendant acted in | 1 | 1 |
James v. Hitchcock Independent School Districtgreen2 sentences2019See James, 742 S.W.2d at 704 . 2019See id. | 1 | 1 |
Hoffmann-La Roche Inc. v. Zeltwangergreen1 sentence2019See Humphries v. Advanced Print Media, 339 S.W.3d 206, 208 (Tex. App.— Dallas 2011, no pet.); see Berger v. Flores, No. 03-12-00415-CV, 2015 WL 3654555 , at *4 (Tex. App.—Austin June 12, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.). (5) The Issue of Privilege Is Moot on Appeal, Given Ewing’s Forfeiture of any Attack on the “Truth” Defense Ewing’s petition alleges that the statement at issue was published “at the knowing and willful direction of Defendants Juan Sabillon and Brent Rhodes, and with malice.” Though the 10 “[I]ntentional infliction of emotional distress requires proof that: (1) the defendant acted in | 1 | 1 |
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Sturgesgreen1 sentence2019Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Sturges, 52 S.W.3d 711, 713 (Tex. 2001). 2 Originally appealed to the Third Court of Appeals, this case was transferred to this Court by the Texas Supreme Court pursuant to its docket equalization efforts. | 1 | 1 |
City of San Antonio ex rel. City Public Service Board v. Tommy Harral Construction, Inc.green1 sentence2018Here, the order entered by the trial court denying Ewing’s motion for summary judgment did not specify the basis for its ruling and merely stated that Ewing had “permission” to “pursue an interlocutory appeal.” It is well-settled that to invoke this court’s permissive-appeal jurisdiction, “the trial court must make a substantive ruling on the controlling legal issue being appealed so that the legal issue presented to this court is the same legal issue determined by the trial court.” Eagle Gun Range, Inc. v. Bancalari, 495 S.W.3d 887, 889 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2016, no pet.); see City of San An | 1 | 1 |
Eagle Gun Range, Inc., David L. Prince, Justin Pollard, Mark Sliger, Jeffrey D. Saupp, and Bill Scott v. Quinn Bancalari, Individually and in His Capacity as Administrator of the Estate of Alessandro Jon Bancalari, and for and on Behalf of All Those Entitled to Recover for the Death of Alessandro Jon Bancalarigreen1 sentence2018Here, the order entered by the trial court denying Ewing’s motion for summary judgment did not specify the basis for its ruling and merely stated that Ewing had “permission” to “pursue an interlocutory appeal.” It is well-settled that to invoke this court’s permissive-appeal jurisdiction, “the trial court must make a substantive ruling on the controlling legal issue being appealed so that the legal issue presented to this court is the same legal issue determined by the trial court.” Eagle Gun Range, Inc. v. Bancalari, 495 S.W.3d 887, 889 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2016, no pet.); see City of San An | 1 | 1 |
Dr. Kenneth Levi v. University of Texas at San Antoniogreen2 sentences1989Ewing, 474 U.S. at 228 n. 14, 106 S.Ct. at 515 n. 14; Levi v. University of Texas at San Antonio, 840 F.2d at 280-81 (acknowledging that the Ewing standard for reviewing academic decisions also extends to equal protection claims); Clements v. County of Nassau, 835 F.2d at 1006 . 1989Ewing, 474 U.S. at 228 n. 14, 106 S.Ct. at 515 n. 14; Levi v. University of Texas at San Antonio, 840 F.2d at 280-81 (acknowledging that the Ewing standard for reviewing academic decisions also extends to equal protection claims); Clements v. County of Nassau, 835 F.2d at 1006 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Ewing Construction Company, Incorporated v. Amerisure Insurance Company
green
2 sentences2023Ewing, 420 S.W.3d at 31 ; see also Crownover, 772 F.3d at 210 (applying the Ewing analysis in determining the contractual-liability exclusion in a CGL policy did not apply, and it therefore did not need to address whether the insureds could “establish an exception to that exclusion”). 2023Ewing, 420 S.W.3d at 31 ; see also Crownover, 772 F.3d at 210 (applying the Ewing analysis in determining the contractual-liability exclusion in a CGL policy did not apply, and it therefore did not need to address whether the insureds could “establish an exception to that exclusion”). | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Gilbert Texas Construction, L.P. v. Underwriters at Lloyd's London
green
1 sentence2014The district court’s analysis relied in large part on Gilbert Texas Construction, L.P. v. Underwriters at Lloyd’s London, 327 S.W.3d 118 (Tex.2010), in which this Court interpreted the contractual liability exclusion in a CGL policy. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Clements v. County of Nassau
green
2 sentences1989Ewing, 474 U.S. at 228 n. 14, 106 S.Ct. at 515 n. 14; Levi v. University of Texas at San Antonio, 840 F.2d at 280-81 (acknowledging that the Ewing standard for reviewing academic decisions also extends to equal protection claims); Clements v. County of Nassau, 835 F.2d at 1006 . 1989Ewing, 474 U.S. at 228 n. 14, 106 S.Ct. at 515 n. 14; Levi v. University of Texas at San Antonio, 840 F.2d at 280-81 (acknowledging that the Ewing standard for reviewing academic decisions also extends to equal protection claims); Clements v. County of Nassau, 835 F.2d at 1006 . | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.