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7 Texas opinions name it 2 courts 2002–2015 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Estelle v. McGuiregreen2 sentences2005The legal formulation settled upon was: "whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury applied the challenged instruction in a way that prevents the consideration of constitutionally relevant evidence." Id. at 380 , 110 S.Ct. 1190 . [3] Weeks v. Angelone, 528 U.S. 225, 236 , 120 S.Ct. 727 , 145 L.Ed.2d 727 (2000) (citing Boyde , and holding that death-penalty mitigating-evidence instructions were constitutionally adequate); see also Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 74-75 , 112 S.Ct. 475 , 116 L.Ed.2d 385 (1991) (stating that "[w]hile the instruction was not as clear as it might have b 2005The legal formulation settled upon was: "whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury applied the challenged instruction in a way that prevents the consideration of constitutionally relevant evidence." Id. at 380 , 110 S.Ct. 1190 . [3] Weeks v. Angelone, 528 U.S. 225, 236 , 120 S.Ct. 727 , 145 L.Ed.2d 727 (2000) (citing Boyde , and holding that death-penalty mitigating-evidence instructions were constitutionally adequate); see also Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 74-75 , 112 S.Ct. 475 , 116 L.Ed.2d 385 (1991) (stating that "[w]hile the instruction was not as clear as it might have b | 2 | 2 |
Weeks v. Angelonegreen2 sentences2005The legal formulation settled upon was: "whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury applied the challenged instruction in a way that prevents the consideration of constitutionally relevant evidence." Id. at 380 , 110 S.Ct. 1190 . [3] Weeks v. Angelone, 528 U.S. 225, 236 , 120 S.Ct. 727 , 145 L.Ed.2d 727 (2000) (citing Boyde , and holding that death-penalty mitigating-evidence instructions were constitutionally adequate); see also Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 74-75 , 112 S.Ct. 475 , 116 L.Ed.2d 385 (1991) (stating that "[w]hile the instruction was not as clear as it might have b 2005The legal formulation settled upon was: "whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury applied the challenged instruction in a way that prevents the consideration of constitutionally relevant evidence." Id. at 380 , 110 S.Ct. 1190 . [3] Weeks v. Angelone, 528 U.S. 225, 236 , 120 S.Ct. 727 , 145 L.Ed.2d 727 (2000) (citing Boyde , and holding that death-penalty mitigating-evidence instructions were constitutionally adequate); see also Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 74-75 , 112 S.Ct. 475 , 116 L.Ed.2d 385 (1991) (stating that "[w]hile the instruction was not as clear as it might have b | 2 | 2 |
Penry v. Johnsongreen2 sentences2004Cf. Penry II, 121 S.Ct. at 1922 (federal constitutional issue is whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury applied the challenged instruction in a way that prevented the consideration of constitutionally relevant mitigating evidence). 2004Cf. Penry II, 121 S.Ct. at 1922 (federal constitutional issue is whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury applied the challenged instruction in a way that prevented the consideration of constitutionally relevant mitigating evidence). | 2 | 2 |
Boyde v. Californiagreen2 sentences2005The legal formulation settled upon was: "whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury applied the challenged instruction in a way that prevents the consideration of constitutionally relevant evidence.” Id. at 380 , 110 S.Ct. 1190 . . 2005The legal formulation settled upon was: "whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury applied the challenged instruction in a way that prevents the consideration of constitutionally relevant evidence.” Id. at 380 , 110 S.Ct. 1190 . . | 1 | 2 |
Armstrong v. Tolergreen2 sentences2005The legal formulation settled upon was: "whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury applied the challenged instruction in a way that prevents the consideration of constitutionally relevant evidence." Id. at 380 , 110 S.Ct. 1190 . [3] Weeks v. Angelone, 528 U.S. 225, 236 , 120 S.Ct. 727 , 145 L.Ed.2d 727 (2000) (citing Boyde , and holding that death-penalty mitigating-evidence instructions were constitutionally adequate); see also Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 74-75 , 112 S.Ct. 475 , 116 L.Ed.2d 385 (1991) (stating that "[w]hile the instruction was not as clear as it might have b 2005The legal formulation settled upon was: "whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury applied the challenged instruction in a way that prevents the consideration of constitutionally relevant evidence." Id. at 380 , 110 S.Ct. 1190 . [3] Weeks v. Angelone, 528 U.S. 225, 236 , 120 S.Ct. 727 , 145 L.Ed.2d 727 (2000) (citing Boyde , and holding that death-penalty mitigating-evidence instructions were constitutionally adequate); see also Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 74-75 , 112 S.Ct. 475 , 116 L.Ed.2d 385 (1991) (stating that "[w]hile the instruction was not as clear as it might have b | 1 | 1 |
Johnson v. Texasgreen2 sentences2005The legal formulation settled upon was: "whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury applied the challenged instruction in a way that prevents the consideration of constitutionally relevant evidence." Id. at 380 , 110 S.Ct. 1190 . [3] Weeks v. Angelone, 528 U.S. 225, 236 , 120 S.Ct. 727 , 145 L.Ed.2d 727 (2000) (citing Boyde , and holding that death-penalty mitigating-evidence instructions were constitutionally adequate); see also Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 74-75 , 112 S.Ct. 475 , 116 L.Ed.2d 385 (1991) (stating that "[w]hile the instruction was not as clear as it might have b 2005The legal formulation settled upon was: "whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury applied the challenged instruction in a way that prevents the consideration of constitutionally relevant evidence." Id. at 380 , 110 S.Ct. 1190 . [3] Weeks v. Angelone, 528 U.S. 225, 236 , 120 S.Ct. 727 , 145 L.Ed.2d 727 (2000) (citing Boyde , and holding that death-penalty mitigating-evidence instructions were constitutionally adequate); see also Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 74-75 , 112 S.Ct. 475 , 116 L.Ed.2d 385 (1991) (stating that "[w]hile the instruction was not as clear as it might have b | 1 | 1 |
Ex Parte Tennardgreen1 sentence2002See Jimenez, 32 S.W.3d at 238-39 ; Smith, 898 S.W.2d at 857-72 (Clinton, J, dissenting) (explaining why a life-sentenced capital murder defendant’s parole eligibility could be considered mitigating); cf. Ex parte Tennard, 960 S.W.2d 57, 61 (Tex.Cr.App.1997), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 956 , 118 S.Ct. 2376 , 141 L.Ed.2d 743 (1998) (constitutional issue in cases like this, where constitutional issue is preserved, is whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury applied the challenged instruction in a way that prevents the consideration of constitutionally relevant mitigating evidence). | 1 | 1 |
Smith v. Stategreen1 sentence2002See Jimenez, 32 S.W.3d at 238-39 ; Smith, 898 S.W.2d at 857-72 (Clinton, J, dissenting) (explaining why a life-sentenced capital murder defendant’s parole eligibility could be considered mitigating); cf. Ex parte Tennard, 960 S.W.2d 57, 61 (Tex.Cr.App.1997), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 956 , 118 S.Ct. 2376 , 141 L.Ed.2d 743 (1998) (constitutional issue in cases like this, where constitutional issue is preserved, is whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury applied the challenged instruction in a way that prevents the consideration of constitutionally relevant mitigating evidence). | 1 | 1 |
Jimenez v. Stategreen1 sentence2002See Jimenez, 32 S.W.3d at 238-39 ; Smith, 898 S.W.2d at 857-72 (Clinton, J, dissenting) (explaining why a life-sentenced capital murder defendant’s parole eligibility could be considered mitigating); cf. Ex parte Tennard, 960 S.W.2d 57, 61 (Tex.Cr.App.1997), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 956 , 118 S.Ct. 2376 , 141 L.Ed.2d 743 (1998) (constitutional issue in cases like this, where constitutional issue is preserved, is whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury applied the challenged instruction in a way that prevents the consideration of constitutionally relevant mitigating evidence). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Luquis v. State
green
2 sentences2015Id. 2006Id. at 368 . | 2 | 2006–2015 |
Dougan v. Singletary
green
1 sentence2002See Jimenez, 32 S.W.3d at 238-39 ; Smith, 898 S.W.2d at 857-72 (Clinton, J, dissenting) (explaining why a life-sentenced capital murder defendant’s parole eligibility could be considered mitigating); cf. Ex parte Tennard, 960 S.W.2d 57, 61 (Tex.Cr.App.1997), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 956 , 118 S.Ct. 2376 , 141 L.Ed.2d 743 (1998) (constitutional issue in cases like this, where constitutional issue is preserved, is whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury applied the challenged instruction in a way that prevents the consideration of constitutionally relevant mitigating evidence). | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Dixon v. Texas
green
1 sentence2002See Jimenez, 32 S.W.3d at 238-39 ; Smith, 898 S.W.2d at 857-72 (Clinton, J, dissenting) (explaining why a life-sentenced capital murder defendant’s parole eligibility could be considered mitigating); cf. Ex parte Tennard, 960 S.W.2d 57, 61 (Tex.Cr.App.1997), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 956 , 118 S.Ct. 2376 , 141 L.Ed.2d 743 (1998) (constitutional issue in cases like this, where constitutional issue is preserved, is whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury applied the challenged instruction in a way that prevents the consideration of constitutionally relevant mitigating evidence). | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Love v. Tippy
green
1 sentence2002See Jimenez, 32 S.W.3d at 238-39 ; Smith, 898 S.W.2d at 857-72 (Clinton, J, dissenting) (explaining why a life-sentenced capital murder defendant’s parole eligibility could be considered mitigating); cf. Ex parte Tennard, 960 S.W.2d 57, 61 (Tex.Cr.App.1997), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 956 , 118 S.Ct. 2376 , 141 L.Ed.2d 743 (1998) (constitutional issue in cases like this, where constitutional issue is preserved, is whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury applied the challenged instruction in a way that prevents the consideration of constitutionally relevant mitigating evidence). | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.