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7 Texas opinions name it 2 courts 1944–2022 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Pilarcik v. Emmonsgreen2 sentences2002Pilarcik v. Emmons, 966 S.W.2d 474, 478 (Tex.1998). 2002Pilarcik v. Emmons , 966 S.W.2d 474, 478 (Tex. 1998). | 2 | 2 |
In Re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc.green1 sentence2019“Quantum meruit is an equitable remedy that is ‘based upon the promise implied by law to pay for beneficial services rendered and knowingly accepted.’” Hill v. Shamoun & Norman, LLP, 544 S.W.3d 724, 732 (Tex. 2018) (quoting In re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 166 S.W.3d 732, 740 (Tex. 2005) (orig. proceeding)). | 1 | 1 |
Albert G. Hill, Jr. v. Shamoun & Norman, Llpgreen1 sentence2019“Quantum meruit is an equitable remedy that is ‘based upon the promise implied by law to pay for beneficial services rendered and knowingly accepted.’” Hill v. Shamoun & Norman, LLP, 544 S.W.3d 724, 732 (Tex. 2018) (quoting In re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 166 S.W.3d 732, 740 (Tex. 2005) (orig. proceeding)). | 1 | 1 |
Connell v. Connellgreen1 sentence2001Ordinarily, the issue of fraudulent intent constitutes a question of fact to be determined by a trier of fact. (17) Quinn v. Dupree , 303 S.W.2d 769, 774 (Tex. 1957) (stating that fraudulent intent, as required under former statutory version of section 24.005, should be deduced from those facts and circumstances that law considers badges of fraud and thus requires submission to trier of fact); Coleman Cattle Co., Inc. v. Carpentier , 10 S.W.3d 430, 433 (Tex. App.--Beaumont 2000, no pet.) (considering summary judgment claim under UFTA, which raised issue of intent to defraud); Connell , 889 S.W | 1 | 1 |
Spoljaric v. Percival Tours, Inc.green1 sentence2001With respect to the final element, "actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor of the debtor," see id. § 24.005(a)(1) (emphasis added), Reagan contends that "the transactions between 1901 L.P. and Lakeway, L.P. were undertaken with the intent and purpose of destroying Reagan's claim under the lease [to ownership of the billboard] and claim to the right to enforce its right of first refusal to purchase the property." "Intent is a fact question uniquely within the realm of the trier of fact because it so depends upon the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their | 1 | 1 |
Coleman Cattle Co., Inc. v. Carpentiergreen1 sentence2001Ordinarily, the issue of fraudulent intent constitutes a question of fact to be determined by a trier of fact. (17) Quinn v. Dupree , 303 S.W.2d 769, 774 (Tex. 1957) (stating that fraudulent intent, as required under former statutory version of section 24.005, should be deduced from those facts and circumstances that law considers badges of fraud and thus requires submission to trier of fact); Coleman Cattle Co., Inc. v. Carpentier , 10 S.W.3d 430, 433 (Tex. App.--Beaumont 2000, no pet.) (considering summary judgment claim under UFTA, which raised issue of intent to defraud); Connell , 889 S.W | 1 | 1 |
Quinn v. Dupreegreen1 sentence2001Ordinarily, the issue of fraudulent intent constitutes a question of fact to be determined by a trier of fact. (17) Quinn v. Dupree , 303 S.W.2d 769, 774 (Tex. 1957) (stating that fraudulent intent, as required under former statutory version of section 24.005, should be deduced from those facts and circumstances that law considers badges of fraud and thus requires submission to trier of fact); Coleman Cattle Co., Inc. v. Carpentier , 10 S.W.3d 430, 433 (Tex. App.--Beaumont 2000, no pet.) (considering summary judgment claim under UFTA, which raised issue of intent to defraud); Connell , 889 S.W | 1 | 1 |
Van Hook v. Waltongreen1 sentence2001Ordinarily, the issue of fraudulent intent constitutes a question of fact to be determined by a trier of fact. (17) Quinn v. Dupree , 303 S.W.2d 769, 774 (Tex. 1957) (stating that fraudulent intent, as required under former statutory version of section 24.005, should be deduced from those facts and circumstances that law considers badges of fraud and thus requires submission to trier of fact); Coleman Cattle Co., Inc. v. Carpentier , 10 S.W.3d 430, 433 (Tex. App.--Beaumont 2000, no pet.) (considering summary judgment claim under UFTA, which raised issue of intent to defraud); Connell , 889 S.W | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
FWT, Inc. v. Haskin Wallace Mason Property Management, L.L.P.
green
1 sentence2022Reagan’s challenge to the merits of the district court’s ruling on the plea relies primarily on FWT, Inc. v. Haskin Wallace Mason Property Management, LLP, 301 S.W.3d 787 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2009, pet. denied). | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Sanchez v. Schindler
green
2 sentences1991After this court allowed recovery under the Wrongful Death Statute for loss of consortium for the death of a minor child or parent, respectively, in Sanchez v. Schindler, 651 S.W.2d 249 (Tex.1983) and Cavnar v. Quality Control Parking, Inc., 696 S.W.2d 549 (Tex.1985), the judgments were applied partially retrospectively by limiting recovery to future causes and those still in the judicial process. 1991After this court allowed recovery under the Wrongful Death Statute for loss of consortium for the death of a minor child or parent, respectively, in Sanchez v. Schindler, 651 S.W.2d 249 (Tex.1983) and Cavnar v. Quality Control Parking, Inc., 696 S.W.2d 549 (Tex. 1985), the judgments were applied partially retrospectively by limiting recovery to future causes and those still in the judicial process. | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Cavnar v. Quality Control Parking, Inc.
red
2 sentences1991After this court allowed recovery under the Wrongful Death Statute for loss of consortium for the death of a minor child or parent, respectively, in Sanchez v. Schindler, 651 S.W.2d 249 (Tex.1983) and Cavnar v. Quality Control Parking, Inc., 696 S.W.2d 549 (Tex.1985), the judgments were applied partially retrospectively by limiting recovery to future causes and those still in the judicial process. 1991After this court allowed recovery under the Wrongful Death Statute for loss of consortium for the death of a minor child or parent, respectively, in Sanchez v. Schindler, 651 S.W.2d 249 (Tex.1983) and Cavnar v. Quality Control Parking, Inc., 696 S.W.2d 549 (Tex. 1985), the judgments were applied partially retrospectively by limiting recovery to future causes and those still in the judicial process. | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Reagan County Purchasing Co. v. State
green
1 sentence1944Reagan County Purchasing Company et al. v. State, Tex.Civ.App., 65 S.W.2d 353 . | 1 | 1944–1944 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.