record rebuts presumption in Illinois

2016People v. Marshall, 375 Ill.

2016People v. Marshall, 375 Ill.

2023See Johnson, 154 Ill. 2d at 248-50 ; People v. Perkins, 229 Ill. 2d 34, 52 (2007). 2 We acknowledge Addison does not address whether Rule 651(c) applies to new claims added to an amended petition; however, we find its statement is supportive of our view. 9 ¶ 31 Defendant argues that the record rebuts the presumption of compliance because counsel failed to allege the required prejudice for his ineffective assistance of counsel claims.

2023See Turner, 187 Ill. 2d at 412 ; Johnson, 154 Ill. 2d at 246 ; Perkins, 229 Ill. 2d at 44 . ¶ 55 In the present case, the record rebuts the presumption of reasonable assistance created by postconviction counsel’s filing of the Rule 651(c) certificate.

2024See id. at 50 . ¶ 41 Also as in Perkins, nothing in the record rebuts that presumption, i.e., suggests that counsel did not inquire of Guise regarding the delay or had a basis to argue that the petition was timely or that Guise was not culpably negligent.

2023See Turner, 187 Ill. 2d at 412 ; Johnson, 154 Ill. 2d at 246 ; Perkins, 229 Ill. 2d at 44 . ¶ 55 In the present case, the record rebuts the presumption of reasonable assistance created by postconviction counsel’s filing of the Rule 651(c) certificate.

2023See Turner, 187 Ill. 2d at 412 ; Johnson, 154 Ill. 2d at 246 ; Perkins, 229 Ill. 2d at 44 . ¶ 55 In the present case, the record rebuts the presumption of reasonable assistance created by postconviction counsel’s filing of the Rule 651(c) certificate.

2021See Turner, 187 Ill. 2d at 416 (a reviewing court “will not speculate whether the trial court would have dismissed the petition without an evidentiary hearing if counsel had adequately performed his duties under Rule 651(c)”). ¶ 57 For the reasons outlined above, we find the record rebuts the presumption that postconviction counsel complied with Rule 651(c) and provided a reasonable level of assistance.

2025See Ellison, 2013 IL App (1st) 101261, ¶ 47 (in addressing an argument that the trial court had a - 14 - No. 1-24-0123 blanket policy of denying requests for standby counsel, we noted that “[t]he trial court is presumed to know and properly apply the law, and there is nothing in the record that affirmatively indicates that the judge did not properly apply the law”). ¶ 53 During the initial colloquy regarding Balewa’s decision to represent himself, the court stated that standby attorneys were “not a good idea.” The court then informed Balewa that if he chose to proceed pro se, he would “be on [

2022See People v. - 22 - 2022 IL App (2d) 210260-U Ellison, 2013 IL App (1st) 101261, ¶ 47 (in addressing an argument that the trial court had a blanket policy of denying requests for standby counsel, the appellate court stated that “[t]he trial court is presumed to know and properly apply the law, and there is nothing in the record that affirmatively indicates that the judge did not properly apply the law”). ¶ 77 Defendant also argues that the relevant factors identified in Gibson (the nature and gravity of the charge, the expected factual and legal complexity of the proceedings, and the abilitie

2020People v. Brazziel, 406 Ill.

2020See People v. Brazziel, 406 Ill.

1997Furthermore, there is a strong presumption that jurors follow the instructions of the court (People v. Taylor, 166 Ill. 2d 414, 438 , 655 N.E.2d 901, 913 (1995)), and nothing in the record rebuts that presumption.

1997Furthermore, there is a strong presumption that jurors follow the instructions of the court (People v. Taylor, 166 Ill. 2d 414, 438 , 655 N.E.2d 901, 913 (1995)), and nothing in the record rebuts that presumption.

2026Addison, 2023 IL 127119, ¶ 21 (noting, petitioner bears burden to overcome presumption of reasonable assistance). ¶ 54 Accordingly, nothing in the record rebuts the presumption, arising from the Rule 651(c) certificate, that no amendment was necessary to support this claim. ¶ 55 DNA Expert ¶ 56 Estrada next contends postconviction counsel provided unreasonable assistance by failing to “identify a possible defense expert, attach an affidavit from an expert, or explain the significance of an expert’s potential testimony.” Again, we disagree. - 10 - No. 1-24-0821 ¶ 57 A petitioner is entitled to

2024Therefore, it is the defendant’s burden to overcome the presumption of reasonable assistance. ¶ 15 The defendant may overcome the presumption of reasonable assistance by “demonstrating that postconviction counsel did not make all necessary amendments to the pro se petition. [Citation.] This includes making amendments that are necessary to overcome procedural bars.” Addison, 2023 IL 127119, ¶ 21 . ¶ 16 The defendant first argues that the record rebuts the presumption of reasonable assistance because postconviction counsel failed to argue that the delay in filing the postconviction petition was

2025Suarez, 224 Ill. 2d at 41-42 . ¶ 33 Here, postconviction counsel filed a Rule 651(c) certificate, and nothing in the record rebuts the presumption that counsel acted reasonably.

2021Id. ¶ 53 In this case, defendant acknowledges appointed counsel filed a Rule 651(c) certificate but argues the record rebuts the presumption reasonable assistance was afforded.

2026Id. at 392 . ¶ 31 Nothing in the record rebuts the presumption that the court’s enforcement order had sufficient factual basis, i.e., was entered because the board still needed to get in there.

2020See Corral, 217 Ill. 2d at 157 (“Any doubts which may arise from the incompleteness of the record will be resolved against the appellant.” (quoting Foutch v. O’Bryant, 99 Ill. 2d 389, 392 (1984))). ¶ 56 Moreover, nothing in the record rebuts the presumption that the court properly considered the mitigating factors presented and defendant’s rehabilitative potential.

2025See People v. Gilbert, 68 Ill. 2d 252, 260 (1977); Blair, 215 Ill. 2d at 449 . ¶ 30 C.

1987(People v. Gilbert (1977), 68 Ill. 2d 252 ; People v. Hampton (1981), 96 Ill.

2026People v. Davis, 156 Ill. 2d 149, 163 (1993) (holding petitioners under Act are “not entitled to the advocacy of counsel for purposes of exploration, investigation[,] and formulation of potential claims”).

2026Our evaluation of defendant’s argument must start with defining the nature of the claim. ¶ 17 In Miller, the United States Supreme Court held that, because children must be treated differently for purposes of sentencing, the eighth amendment forbids mandatory sentences of life without the possibility of parole for juvenile offenders convicted of murder. 567 U.S. at 471-72, 479 .

2025He also concedes that he waived any constitutional challenge to his attempted murder sentence by pleading guilty (see Jones, 2021 IL 126432, ¶ 20 ) and that the doctrine of res judicata bars his Miller-based claim because he raised it - 10 - No. 1-23-2204 in a prior postconviction petition (see Willis, No. 1-14-2006 (2016) (unpublished summary order under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23(c)); see also Dorsey, 2021 IL 123010, ¶ 31 ). ¶ 20 In spite of these concessions, defendant nonetheless argues that the record rebuts the presumption that postconviction counsel complied with Rule 651(c), as cou

2025People v. Lindsay, 239 Ill. 2d 522, 525 (2011). ¶ 72 While counsel here filed a facially valid Rule 604(d) certificate, we find the record rebuts the presumption that counsel undertook Rule 604(d) duties, and the court held a hearing on all of defendant’s claims in his motion to withdraw his plea.

2024See People v. Jordan, 218 Ill. 2d 255, 269 (2006) (we presume the trial court knew and followed the law unless the record rebuts that presumption). ¶ 30 Defendant points to the discussion of other matters – jury selection during the holiday season, the presiding judge’s vacation, and the lead prosecutor’s loss in her family – and argues that the extensions were granted for those reasons rather than for the securing of evidence as authorized by section 103-5(c).

2022However, it is the responsibility of the State alone “to evaluate the evidence and other relevant factors to determine what offenses can and should properly be charged.” People v. Edgeston, 243 Ill.