record rebuts presumption in California

2021(Glage, supra, 226 Cal.App.3d at p. 322 .) 16 We are not persuaded by Aerojet’s assertion that the record rebuts the presumption of prejudice.

2021(Glage, supra, 226 Cal.App.3d at p. 322 .) 16 We are not persuaded by Aerojet’s assertion that the record rebuts the presumption of prejudice.

2020(People v. Krebs (2019) 8 Cal.5th 265, 335 .) Nothing from this record rebuts this presumption.

2020(People v. Krebs (2019) 8 Cal.5th 265, 335 .) Nothing from this record rebuts this presumption.

2025In fact, defense counsel brought the issue to the court’s attention by objecting to the prosecutor’s argument twice on the ground that it improperly referred to 4 Although a restitution hearing “ ‘does not require the formalities of other phases of a criminal prosecution’ ” (People v. Keichler (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 1039, 1048 ), a restitution order must still be supported by substantial evidence.

2025The instruction reinforced that message by stating that CSAAS “is not evidence that the defendant committed any of the crimes charged” and may be considered “only in deciding whether or not [JD1 and JD2’s] conduct was not inconsistent with the conduct of someone who has been molested, and in evaluating the believability of [their] testimony.” Nothing in this record rebuts our presumption that the jury understood and followed that instruction (People v. Holt, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 662 ).

2025The sentence as orally pronounced would be unauthorized because “[t]o neither strike nor impose a prior prison term enhancement is a legally unauthorized sentence.” (People v. Bradley (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 386, 390 ; see People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 354 [unauthorized sentence is one that cannot lawfully be imposed under any circumstance in the particular case].) And the sentence as written in the clerk’s minutes and abstract of judgment would violate section 1385’s requirement that “the reasons for the exercise of discretion must be set forth in writing in the minutes.” (Bradley, at p

2024Nevertheless, “[t]he court is presumed to have considered all of the relevant factors in the absence of an affirmative record to the contrary.” (People v. Myers (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 305, 310 .) Nothing in this record rebuts this presumption.

2023But the court “‘is presumed to have been aware of and followed the applicable law.’” (People v. Stowell (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1107, 1114 .) Nothing in the record rebuts that presumption.

2023(People v. Czirban (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 1073 , 1096– 1097.) Nothing in the record rebuts this presumption, especially given that defense counsel cited section 1170, subdivision (b), to the trial court (albeit in a sentencing memorandum and not at the hearing) and submitted letters citing mitigating factors, and the trial court referred to Griffin’s childhood at the hearing.

2021(See People v. Williams (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 587, 607 .) Nothing in the record rebuts that presumption, especially given the jury’s not-true finding on the gang allegation and its failure to return a conviction on the more serious of the two witness-dissuasion charges.

2016We presume, as we must, jurors heeded the instruction (People v. Turner, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 190 ; People v. Mickey (1991) 54 Cal.3d 612, 689, fn. 17 ), and nothing in the record rebuts this presumption (People v. Merriman, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 71 ).

2016We presume, as we must, jurors heeded the instruction (People v. Turner, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 190 ; People v. Mickey (1991) 54 Cal.3d 612, 689, fn. 17 ), and nothing in the record rebuts this presumption (People v. Merriman, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 71 ).

2013(People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 725 ; People v. Mickey (1991) 54 Cal.3d 612, 689, fn. 17 .) Nothing in this record rebuts that presumption.

2013(Zapien, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 996 ; People v. Craig (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 905, 919-920 ; cf. People v. Cissna (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 1105, 1114-1115, 1118, 1120-1122 [court would not presume juror followed instructions where the juror engaged in daily (“pervasive”) conversations with a friend about “deliberative-type” issues, such as whether the alleged victim had a motive to lie, and why Cissna had not testified].) The second test for juror bias is whether “even if the information is not „inherently‟ prejudicial . . . from the nature of the misconduct and the surrounding circumstances, the c

2013(Zapien, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 996 ; People v. Craig (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 905, 919-920 ; cf. People v. Cissna (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 1105, 1114-1115, 1118, 1120-1122 [court would not presume juror followed instructions where the juror engaged in daily (“pervasive”) conversations with a friend about “deliberative-type” issues, such as whether the alleged victim had a motive to lie, and why Cissna had not testified].) The second test for juror bias is whether “even if the information is not „inherently‟ prejudicial . . . from the nature of the misconduct and the surrounding circumstances, the c

2013(Zapien, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 996 ; People v. Craig (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 905, 919-920 ; cf. People v. Cissna (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 1105, 1114-1115, 1118, 1120-1122 [court would not presume juror followed instructions where the juror engaged in daily (“pervasive”) conversations with a friend about “deliberative-type” issues, such as whether the alleged victim had a motive to lie, and why Cissna had not testified].) The second test for juror bias is whether “even if the information is not „inherently‟ prejudicial . . . from the nature of the misconduct and the surrounding circumstances, the c

2013(Zapien, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 996 ; People v. Craig (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 905, 919-920 ; cf. People v. Cissna (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 1105, 1114-1115, 1118, 1120-1122 [court would not presume juror followed instructions where the juror engaged in daily (“pervasive”) conversations with a friend about “deliberative-type” issues, such as whether the alleged victim had a motive to lie, and why Cissna had not testified].) The second test for juror bias is whether “even if the information is not „inherently‟ prejudicial . . . from the nature of the misconduct and the surrounding circumstances, the c

2007(Sanchez, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 852 .) We reject his argument. *1185 5.

2002As in People v. Harper, supra, 186 Cal.App.3d at page 1430 , the record rebuts the presumption of prejudice arising from the jury misconduct in this case.

1999(Adoption of Oukes, supra, 14 Cal.App.3d at p. 466 ; In re Neal (1968) 265 Cal.App.2d 482, 487 [ 71 Cal.Rptr. 300 ]; In re Bisenius, supra, 173 Cal.App.2d at p. 522 ; Howton v. Howton (1942) 51 Cal.App.2d 323, 326 [ 124 P.2d 837 ].) In short, appellant entirely abdicated his role and responsibilities as Cleve’s father. “ ‘[T]he legal obligations of parenthood include the duties of *1317 support, of care and protection, and of education.

1999(Adoption of Oukes, supra, 14 Cal.App.3d at p. 466 ; In re Neal (1968) 265 Cal.App.2d 482, 487 [ 71 Cal.Rptr. 300 ]; In re Bisenius, supra, 173 Cal.App.2d at p. 522 ; Howton v. Howton (1942) 51 Cal.App.2d 323, 326 [ 124 P.2d 837 ].) In short, appellant entirely abdicated his role and responsibilities as Cleve’s father. “ ‘[T]he legal obligations of parenthood include the duties of *1317 support, of care and protection, and of education.

1990In sum, given “the strength of the evidence that misconduct occurred, the nature and seriousness of the misconduct, and the probability that actual prejudice may have ensued,” i.e., the “substantial likelihood” that the jurors were impermissibly influenced to Hawes’s detriment (see Hasson v. Ford Motor Co., supra, 32 Cal.3d 388, 417 ; People v. Marshall, supra, 50 Cal.3d 907, 951 ), we conclude that neither Glage’s arguments nor our review of the entire record rebuts the presumption that the misconduct was prejudicial to Hawes.

1990We are aware that in People v. Karls, supra, 46 Cal.3d 612 , the court found no basis for prejudice in the jury’s consideration of the dictionary definition of “mitigating.” There, however, after noting the extraneous definition, the court explained that the dictionary definition may not have been “particularly helpful” to the jury’s understanding of the instructions and the defendant offered “no persuasive argument to support a conclusion that the jury might have been misled.” (Id. at pp. 644-645.) Here, on the other hand, the record supports a finding that the dictionary definition of “prepo

1990We are aware that in People v. Karls, supra, 46 Cal.3d 612 , the court found no basis for prejudice in the jury’s consideration of the dictionary definition of “mitigating.” There, however, after noting the extraneous definition, the court explained that the dictionary definition may not have been “particularly helpful” to the jury’s understanding of the instructions and the defendant offered “no persuasive argument to support a conclusion that the jury might have been misled.” (Id. at pp. 644-645.) Here, on the other hand, the record supports a finding that the dictionary definition of “prepo

1990In sum, given “the strength of the evidence that misconduct occurred, the nature and seriousness of the misconduct, and the probability that actual prejudice may have ensued,” i.e., the “substantial likelihood” that the jurors were impermissibly influenced to Hawes’s detriment (see Hasson v. Ford Motor Co., supra, 32 Cal.3d 388, 417 ; People v. Marshall, supra, 50 Cal.3d 907, 951 ), we conclude that neither Glage’s arguments nor our review of the entire record rebuts the presumption that the misconduct was prejudicial to Hawes.