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7 Texas opinions name it 1 courts 2010–2025 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Peck v. Peckgreen2 sentences2023Five conditions must have occurred for a party’s admission to be conclusive against him: (1) the declaration relied upon must have been made in the course of a judicial proceeding; (2) the declaration was contrary to an essential fact embraced in the theory of recovery or defense asserted by the party; (3) the statement was 4 In Palau v. Sanchez, No. 03-08-00136-CV, 2010 WL 4595705 , at *14 n.13 (Tex. App.—Austin Nov. 10, 2010, pet. denied) (mem. op.), the court collected cases for the proposition that “there are many instances in which a separate-property claim may be waived or barred without 2023Id. (citing U.S. Fid. & Guar. | 1 | 2 |
Fillingim v. Fillingimgreen1 sentence2022See Tex. Fam. 5 Code § 3.003; Pearson v. Fillingim, 332 S.W.3d 361, 363 (Tex. 2011) (per curiam). | 1 | 1 |
Hodge v. Ellisgreen2 sentences2022See Weed, 565 S.W.3d at 407 (citing Hodge, 277 S.W.2d at 906–07); Cardenas, 2017 WL 1089683 , at *2; In re Marriage of Moncey, 404 S.W.3d at 712 . 2022Here, 29 because Texie introduced evidence that the funds in the 127 Account were commingled, the separate-property presumption created by the deed recital disappeared, Weed, 565 S.W.3d at 412–13, and “the burden shift[ed] back to [Michael] to prove that the property [was] actually separate property.” Id. at 407 (citing Hodge, 277 S.W.2d at 906–07). | 1 | 1 |
Richard O. Weed, Timothy A. Weed, and Rees R. Oliver, III v. Frost Bank, Individually and as Independent of the Estate of Rees R. Oliver, Jr.green2 sentences2022Here, 29 because Texie introduced evidence that the funds in the 127 Account were commingled, the separate-property presumption created by the deed recital disappeared, Weed, 565 S.W.3d at 412–13, and “the burden shift[ed] back to [Michael] to prove that the property [was] actually separate property.” Id. at 407 (citing Hodge, 277 S.W.2d at 906–07). 2022Here, 29 because Texie introduced evidence that the funds in the 127 Account were commingled, the separate-property presumption created by the deed recital disappeared, Weed, 565 S.W.3d at 412–13, and “the burden shift[ed] back to [Michael] to prove that the property [was] actually separate property.” Id. at 407 (citing Hodge, 277 S.W.2d at 906–07). | 1 | 1 |
Dutton v. Duttongreen1 sentence2010See Knight v. Knight, 301 S.W.3d 723, 730 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet.) (separate-property claim waived by failure to object); Peck v. Peck, 172 S.W.3d 26, 31-32 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, pet. denied) (separate- property claim barred because of judicial admission); Dutton v. Dutton, 18 S.W.3d 849, 853 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2000, pet. denied) (same); Mathis v. Mathis, No. 04-95-00386-CV, 1996 Tex. App. LEXIS 5102 , at *13 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Nov. 20, 1996, no writ) (not designated for publication) (separate-property claim waived by entering into agreed judgment). 27 Characteriza | 1 | 1 |
Knight v. Knightgreen1 sentence2010See Knight v. Knight, 301 S.W.3d 723, 730 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet.) (separate-property claim waived by failure to object); Peck v. Peck, 172 S.W.3d 26, 31-32 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, pet. denied) (separate- property claim barred because of judicial admission); Dutton v. Dutton, 18 S.W.3d 849, 853 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2000, pet. denied) (same); Mathis v. Mathis, No. 04-95-00386-CV, 1996 Tex. App. LEXIS 5102 , at *13 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Nov. 20, 1996, no writ) (not designated for publication) (separate-property claim waived by entering into agreed judgment). 27 Characteriza | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
in the Matter of the Marriage of Melissa Lea Gunn Everse and Johannes Everse
green
1 sentence2025Id. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
in the Matter of the Marriage of John Paul Moncey and Tammie Jo Moncey
green
1 sentence2022See Weed, 565 S.W.3d at 407 (citing Hodge, 277 S.W.2d at 906–07); Cardenas, 2017 WL 1089683 , at *2; In re Marriage of Moncey, 404 S.W.3d at 712 . | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Licata v. Licata
green
1 sentence2018Id. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Frost National Bank of San Antonio v. Newton
green
1 sentence2017Separate Property of one Spouse CAN NOT become the Separate Property of the other because the nature of property is determined by the Constitution rather than that which may be just and fair,, Tex. Const., Art. 16 § 15...; Eggemeyer v. EgggfflByer, 3.- •- r 554 S.W.2d 149 (Tx.1977)... | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.