Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
7 Texas opinions name it 2 courts 1985–2015 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp.red1 sentence2015See Lehmann v. Har–Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001). | 1 | 1 |
Hadnot v. Wenco Distributorsgreen1 sentence2003Hadnot v. Wenco Distribs., 961 S.W.2d 232, 235 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, no writ). | 1 | 1 |
Stephenson v. LeBoeufgreen1 sentence2003In its motion, Stewart Title stated under the heading “Why summary judgment should be granted[:] The subject matter of Perot’s dispute with McDonald’s has been the subject of no fewer than four adjudications.” The motion then goes on to discuss the settlement, the three dismissals, and the affirmance of the third dismissal. [14] Cf. Stephenson v. LeBoeuf , 16 S.W.3d 829, 842 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. denied) (finding portion of escrow funds should be distributed to claimant because claim was not discharged in bankruptcy). [15] On appeal, Perot also contends the trial court err | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Tony Gullo Motors I, L.P. and Brien Garcia v. Nury Chapa
green
2 sentences2007The Texas Supreme Court recently curtailed the Stewart Title exception, stating that intertwined facts do not make fees recoverable and that “it is only when discrete legal services advance both a recoverable and unrecoverable claim that they are so intertwined that they need not be segregated.” Chapa, 212 S.W.3d at 313-14 . 2007The Texas Supreme Court recently curtailed the Stewart Title exception, stating that intertwined facts do not make fees recoverable and that “it is only when discrete legal services advance both a recoverable and unrecoverable claim that they are so intertwined that they need not be segregated.” Chapa, 212 S.W.3d at 313-14 . | 2 | 2007–2007 |
Stewart Title Guaranty Co. v. Sterling
green
1 sentence1997Sterling, 822 S.W.2d at 10 . | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Cook Consultants, Inc. v. Larson
green
2 sentences1985The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment as to Stewart Title; and it reversed the trial court's judgment as to Cook Consultants, rendering judgment that Larson take nothing. 677 S.W.2d 718 (Tex. App.Dallas 1984). 1985The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment as to Stewart Title; and it reversed the trial court’s judgment as to Cook Consultants, rendering judgment that Larson take nothing. 677 S.W.2d 718 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1984). | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.