ten factors in Texas

2012In re Estate of Graham, 69 S.W.3d 598 , 609–10 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2001, no pet.) (citing Rothermel, 369 S.W.2d at 923 ).

2011In re Estate of Graham, 69 S.W.3d 598, 609-10 (Tex. App.–Corpus Christi 2001, no pet.); see also Peralez, 2010 Tex. App. LEXIS 4781 , at **13-14. 2.

2016See In re Rains, 473 S.W.3d at 464 . 5 Because these factors take the court’s analysis well beyond the scope of the inquiry authorized by the Act, we again decline to follow Rains .

2015See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Ridgway, 135 S.W.3d 598, 601 (Tex. 2004) (“We have repeatedly held that more than a scintilla of evidence exists if the evidence rises to a level that would enable reasonable and fair-minded people to differ in their conclusions.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).

2015See Part I, supra. Indeed, this interpretation would give the Floodplain Administrator such standardless discretion that it would create “a situation ripe for ‘resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application.’” Bradley, 990 S.W.2d at 253 (quoting Grayned, 408 U.S. at 109)).

2015Compare Br. of Appellant at 63 n.4, with Westergren v. Jennings, 441 S.W.3d 670, 682 (Tex. App.–Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, no pet.). -10- DRCP’s interpretation wholly ignores the conjunctive “and” that instructed Judge Saucedo to consider the entire Ordinance—including the provisions intended to “promote the public health, safety and general welfare and to minimize public and private losses due to flood conditions” and “[p]rotect human life and health”—not just the ten factors DRCP repeatedly presents as the alpha and the omega of this dispute.

2015See Part I, supra. Indeed, this interpretation would give the Floodplain Administrator such standardless discretion that it would create “a situation ripe for ‘resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application.’” Bradley, 990 S.W.2d at 253 (quoting Grayned, 408 U.S. at 109)).

2015See Pritchett v. Nathan Rodgers Const. & Realty Corp., 379 So. 2d 545, 547 (Ala. 1979) (it is an abuse of discretion to deny a permit application, “without any statement of the reasons for denying the building permit”).