Theft Act claim in Texas

2016Air Routing Int’l Corp. (Canada) v. Britannia Airways, Ltd., 150 S.W.3d 682, 686 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.) (“The Theft Act is unusual in Texas law in that it requires the court to award attorney’s fees to a party who successfully defends a Theft Act claim, without any prerequisite that the claim is found to be groundless, frivolous, or brought in bad faith.”); see also Arrow Marble, LLC v. Estate of Killion, 441 S.W.3d 702, 706 (Tex. App.— Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, no pet.) (“Equicap’s status defending against a TTLA claim does not prevent recovery of attorney’s fees.”).

2016Air Routing Int’l Corp. (Canada) v. Britannia Airways, Ltd., 150 S.W.3d 682, 686 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.) (“The Theft Act is unusual in Texas law in that it requires the court to award attorney’s fees to a party who successfully defends a Theft Act claim, without any prerequisite that the claim is found to be groundless, frivolous, or brought in bad faith.”); see also Arrow Marble, LLC v. Estate of Killion, 441 S.W.3d 702, 706 (Tex. App.— Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, no pet.) (“Equicap’s status defending against a TTLA claim does not prevent recovery of attorney’s fees.”).

2004See Hamrick, 125 S.W.3d at 585-86 ; Goebel, 76 S.W.3d at 657-58 ; Chilton Ins.

2004See Hamrick, 125 S.W.3d at 585-86 ; Goebel, 76 S.W.3d at 657-58 ; Chilton Ins.

2004Co. v. Sterling, 822 S.W.2d 1, 11-12 (Tex.1991), we conclude the trial court erred in requiring segregation because these claims arose out of the same transaction and because the prosecution or defense of these claims entailed proof or defense of essentially the same facts. 1 Accordingly, we sever and reverse the part of the trial court’s judgment awarding zero attorney’s fees based on the failure to segregate, and we remand to the trial court for a determination of the amount of reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees to be awarded to the parties successfully defending against the Theft Act

2004Co. v. Sterling, 822 S.W.2d 1, 11-12 (Tex.1991), we conclude the trial court erred in requiring segregation because these claims arose out of the same transaction and because the prosecution or defense of these claims entailed proof or defense of essentially the same facts. 1 Accordingly, we sever and reverse the part of the trial court’s judgment awarding zero attorney’s fees based on the failure to segregate, and we remand to the trial court for a determination of the amount of reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees to be awarded to the parties successfully defending against the Theft Act

2004Prac. & Rem Code Ann. ' 134.005(b) (Vernon 1997); Johns v. Ram-Forwarding, Inc ., 29 S.W.3d 635 , 637 B 38 (Tex. App. C Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, no pet.) (holding Theft Act entitles defendant to recover reasonable and necessary attorney = s fees in successfully defending Theft Act claim even if defendant does not recover any actual damages); Scott A. Brister, Proof of Attorney = s Fees in Texas , 24 St.

2004PRAC. & Rem Code Ann. § 134.005 (b) (Vernon 1997); Johns v. Ram-Forwarding, Inc., 29 S.W.3d 635, 637-38 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, no pet.) (holding Theft Act entitles defendant to recover reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees in successfully defending Theft Act claim even if defendant does not recover any actual damages); Scott A. Brister, Proof of Attorney’s Fees in Texas, 24 St.

2016See Wortham, 179 S.W.3d at 199 (construing allegations in pleadings as did the trial court and the parties); Parr v. Pichinson, 370 S.W.2d 941, 944 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1963, writ ref’d) (“Ordinarily, the construction placed by the parties on their pleadings will be adhered to.”).

2016See Wortham, 179 S.W.3d at 199 (construing allegations in pleadings as did the trial court and the parties); Parr v. Pichinson, 370 S.W.2d 941, 944 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1963, writ ref’d) (“Ordinarily, the construction placed by the parties on their pleadings will be adhered to.”).

2016See Wilson, 169 S.W.3d at 369 .

2016See Wilson, 169 S.W.3d at 369 .

2016See Wortham, 179 S.W.3d at 199 (construing allegations in pleadings as did the trial court and the parties); Parr v. Pichinson, 370 S.W.2d 941, 944 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1963, writ ref’d) (“Ordinarily, the construction placed by the parties on their pleadings will be adhered to.”).

2016See Wortham, 179 S.W.3d at 199 (construing allegations in pleadings as did the trial court and the parties); Parr v. Pichinson, 370 S.W.2d 941, 944 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1963, writ ref’d) (“Ordinarily, the construction placed by the parties on their pleadings will be adhered to.”).

2016Air Routing Int’l Corp. (Canada) v. Britannia Airways, Ltd., 150 S.W.3d 682, 686 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.) (“The Theft Act is unusual in Texas law in that it requires the court to award attorney’s fees to a party who successfully defends a Theft Act claim, without any prerequisite that the claim is found to be groundless, frivolous, or brought in bad faith.”); see also Arrow Marble, LLC v. Estate of Killion, 441 S.W.3d 702, 706 (Tex. App.— Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, no pet.) (“Equicap’s status defending against a TTLA claim does not prevent recovery of attorney’s fees.”).

2016Air Routing Int’l Corp. (Canada) v. Britannia Airways, Ltd., 150 S.W.3d 682, 686 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.) (“The Theft Act is unusual in Texas law in that it requires the court to award attorney’s fees to a party who successfully defends a Theft Act claim, without any prerequisite that the claim is found to be groundless, frivolous, or brought in bad faith.”); see also Arrow Marble, LLC v. Estate of Killion, 441 S.W.3d 702, 706 (Tex. App.— Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, no pet.) (“Equicap’s status defending against a TTLA claim does not prevent recovery of attorney’s fees.”).

2004See Sedgwick v. Kirby Lumber Co. , 130 Tex. 163 , 107 S.W.2d 358 , 359 B 60 (1937); see also Holley , 864 S.W.3d at 706 (stating A [t]he trial court may properly take into consideration . . . the proceedings that are conducted in its presence @ ). [18] Broughton testified that the discovery regarding contributory negligence also related to issues such as whether a Britannia employee might have stolen the money.

2004See Sedgwick v. Kirby Lumber Co. , 130 Tex. 163 , 107 S.W.2d 358 , 359 B 60 (1937); see also Holley , 864 S.W.3d at 706 (stating A [t]he trial court may properly take into consideration . . . the proceedings that are conducted in its presence @ ). [18] Broughton testified that the discovery regarding contributory negligence also related to issues such as whether a Britannia employee might have stolen the money.