transportation plea in Texas

2012In the last decade, we have sometimes referred to sovereign immunity as a matter of subject matter jurisdiction, beginning with a per curiam opinion in Texas Department of Transportation v. Jones, 8 S.W.3d at 639 (holding that the court of appeals had to determine whether the driver’s pleadings in a suit for damages stated a claim under the Texas Tort Claims Act before affirming the trial court’s denial of the Department of Transportation’s plea to the jurisdiction); see also, e.g., Univ. of Tex. at El Paso v. Herrera, 322 S.W.3d 192, 202 (Tex.2010); Reata, 197 S.W.3d at 374 ; Miranda, 133 S.W

2012In the last decade, we have sometimes referred to sovereign immunity as a matter of subject matter jurisdiction, beginning with a per curiam opinion in Texas Department of Transportation v. Jones, 8 S.W.3d at 639 (holding that the court of appeals had to determine whether the driver’s pleadings in a suit for damages stated a claim under the Texas Tort Claims Act before affirming the trial court’s denial of the Department of Transportation’s plea to the jurisdiction); see also, e.g., Univ. of Tex. at El Paso v. Herrera, 322 S.W.3d 192, 202 (Tex. 2010); Reata, 197 S.W.3d at 374 ; Miranda, 133 S.

2012In the last decade, we have sometimes referred to sovereign immunity as a matter of subject matter jurisdiction, beginning with a per curiam opinion in Texas Department of Transportation v. Jones, 8 S.W.3d at 639 (holding that the court of appeals had to determine whether the driver’s pleadings in a suit for damages stated a claim under the Texas Tort Claims Act before affirming the trial court’s denial of the Department of Transportation’s plea to the jurisdiction); see also, e.g., Univ. of Tex. at El Paso v. Herrera, 322 S.W.3d 192, 202 (Tex.2010); Reata, 197 S.W.3d at 374 ; Miranda, 133 S.W

2012In the last decade, we have sometimes referred to sovereign immunity as a matter of subject matter jurisdiction, beginning with a per curiam opinion in Texas Department of Transportation v. Jones, 8 S.W.3d at 639 (holding that the court of appeals had to determine whether the driver’s pleadings in a suit for damages stated a claim under the Texas Tort Claims Act before affirming the trial court’s denial of the Department of Transportation’s plea to the jurisdiction); see also, e.g., Univ. of Tex. at El Paso v. Herrera, 322 S.W.3d 192, 202 (Tex. 2010); Reata, 197 S.W.3d at 374 ; Miranda, 133 S.

2016See In re Douglas, 333 S.W.3d at 284-87 (holding that section 11.101 permits trial court to make vexatious litigant determination on its own motion “after notice and hearing as provided by Subchapter B [sections 11.051-057]”); see also Tex. Civ.

2015Nabors Drilling, U.S.A., Inc. v. Escoto, 288 S.W.3d 401 (Tex. 2009). 872 Gammill v. Jack Williams Chevrolet, Inc., 972 S.W.2d 713, 726 (Tex. 1998) (discussing the bumblebee analogy borrowed from Berry v. City of Detroit, 25 F.3d 1342, 1349-50 (6th Cir. 1994)).

2015Associated Servs., Inc., 989 S.W.2d 120, 125 (Tex. App. - San Antonio 1999, pet. denied) (noting that the expert opinions were ″highly subjective″). 1401 Brown, supra note 1, at 828. 1402 Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. Mendez, 204 S.W.3d 797, 803 (Tex. 2006). 1403 Johnson v. Manitowoc Boom Trucks, Inc., 484 F.3d 426, 434 (6th Cir. 2007). 1404 2 Goode, Wellborn & Sharlot, supra note 114, § 702.6, at 60; see also E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Robinson, 923 S.W.2d 549, 559 (Tex. 1995) (″″When an expert prepares reports and findings before being hired as a witness, that record will limit the degre

2015Co., 705 F.3d 531, 535-37 (5th Cir. 2013) (holding no error in excluding expert opinion that crossing was ultrahazardous that was ″transparently subjective″ where expert did not rely on any guidelines or publications but instead on his ″education and experience″ and admitted that crossing’s visibility complied with Department of Transportation standard). 1400 Buls v. Fuselier, 55 S.W.3d 204, 208-09 (Tex. App. - Texarkana 2001, no pet.) (upholding exclusion of podiatrist’s testimony, noting that his opinions were ″highly subjective″); Weiss v. Mech.

2015Associated Servs., Inc., 989 S.W.2d 120, 125 (Tex. App. - San Antonio 1999, pet. denied) (noting that the expert opinions were ″highly subjective″). 1401 Brown, supra note 1, at 828. 1402 Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. Mendez, 204 S.W.3d 797, 803 (Tex. 2006). 1403 Johnson v. Manitowoc Boom Trucks, Inc., 484 F.3d 426, 434 (6th Cir. 2007). 1404 2 Goode, Wellborn & Sharlot, supra note 114, § 702.6, at 60; see also E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Robinson, 923 S.W.2d 549, 559 (Tex. 1995) (″″When an expert prepares reports and findings before being hired as a witness, that record will limit the degre

2015Co., 705 F.3d 531 , 535-37 & n.11 (5th Cir. 2013) (holding no error in excluding expert opinion that crossing was ultrahazardous that was ″transparently subjective″ where expert did not rely on any guidelines or publications but instead on his ″education and experience″ and unidentified industry ″standards, customs and practices″ and admitted that crossing’s visibility complied with Department of Transportation standard). 871 See Escoto v. Estate of Ambriz, 200 S.W.3d 716, 727 (Tex. App. - Corpus Christi 2006) (holding trial court did not abuse discretion in rejecting reliability challenge to

2015Associated Servs., Inc., 989 S.W.2d 120, 125 (Tex. App. - San Antonio 1999, pet. denied) (noting that the expert opinions were ″highly subjective″). 1401 Brown, supra note 1, at 828. 1402 Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. Mendez, 204 S.W.3d 797, 803 (Tex. 2006). 1403 Johnson v. Manitowoc Boom Trucks, Inc., 484 F.3d 426, 434 (6th Cir. 2007). 1404 2 Goode, Wellborn & Sharlot, supra note 114, § 702.6, at 60; see also E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Robinson, 923 S.W.2d 549, 559 (Tex. 1995) (″″When an expert prepares reports and findings before being hired as a witness, that record will limit the degre

2015Nabors Drilling, U.S.A., Inc. v. Escoto, 288 S.W.3d 401 (Tex. 2009). 872 Gammill v. Jack Williams Chevrolet, Inc., 972 S.W.2d 713, 726 (Tex. 1998) (discussing the bumblebee analogy borrowed from Berry v. City of Detroit, 25 F.3d 1342, 1349-50 (6th Cir. 1994)).

2015Associated Servs., Inc., 989 S.W.2d 120, 125 (Tex. App. - San Antonio 1999, pet. denied) (noting that the expert opinions were ″highly subjective″). 1401 Brown, supra note 1, at 828. 1402 Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. Mendez, 204 S.W.3d 797, 803 (Tex. 2006). 1403 Johnson v. Manitowoc Boom Trucks, Inc., 484 F.3d 426, 434 (6th Cir. 2007). 1404 2 Goode, Wellborn & Sharlot, supra note 114, § 702.6, at 60; see also E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Robinson, 923 S.W.2d 549, 559 (Tex. 1995) (″″When an expert prepares reports and findings before being hired as a witness, that record will limit the degre

2015Associated Servs., Inc., 989 S.W.2d 120, 125 (Tex. App. - San Antonio 1999, pet. denied) (noting that the expert opinions were ″highly subjective″). 1401 Brown, supra note 1, at 828. 1402 Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. Mendez, 204 S.W.3d 797, 803 (Tex. 2006). 1403 Johnson v. Manitowoc Boom Trucks, Inc., 484 F.3d 426, 434 (6th Cir. 2007). 1404 2 Goode, Wellborn & Sharlot, supra note 114, § 702.6, at 60; see also E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Robinson, 923 S.W.2d 549, 559 (Tex. 1995) (″″When an expert prepares reports and findings before being hired as a witness, that record will limit the degre

2015Co., 705 F.3d 531 , 535-37 & n.11 (5th Cir. 2013) (holding no error in excluding expert opinion that crossing was ultrahazardous that was ″transparently subjective″ where expert did not rely on any guidelines or publications but instead on his ″education and experience″ and unidentified industry ″standards, customs and practices″ and admitted that crossing’s visibility complied with Department of Transportation standard). 871 See Escoto v. Estate of Ambriz, 200 S.W.3d 716, 727 (Tex. App. - Corpus Christi 2006) (holding trial court did not abuse discretion in rejecting reliability challenge to

2015Co., 705 F.3d 531, 535-37 (5th Cir. 2013) (holding no error in excluding expert opinion that crossing was ultrahazardous that was ″transparently subjective″ where expert did not rely on any guidelines or publications but instead on his ″education and experience″ and admitted that crossing’s visibility complied with Department of Transportation standard). 1400 Buls v. Fuselier, 55 S.W.3d 204, 208-09 (Tex. App. - Texarkana 2001, no pet.) (upholding exclusion of podiatrist’s testimony, noting that his opinions were ″highly subjective″); Weiss v. Mech.

2001NOTES [1] "[I]mmunity from suit defeats a trial court's subject matter jurisdiction and thus is properly asserted in a plea to the jurisdiction." Texas Dept. of Transp. v. Jones, 8 S.W.3d 636, 639 (Tex.1999). [2] Burris, 877 S.W.2d at 299 ; accord Kitchen, 867 S.W.2d at 786 (icy bridge is premise defect); Payne, 838 S.W.2d at 238 (culvert running perpendicular to and beneath highway was premises defect, not special defect); City of Houston v. Rushing, 7 S.W.3d 909, 916 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet.) (stopped pickup truck blocking traffic as result of accident was not defect or da

2001NOTES [1] "[I]mmunity from suit defeats a trial court's subject matter jurisdiction and thus is properly asserted in a plea to the jurisdiction." Texas Dept. of Transp. v. Jones, 8 S.W.3d 636, 639 (Tex.1999). [2] Burris, 877 S.W.2d at 299 ; accord Kitchen, 867 S.W.2d at 786 (icy bridge is premise defect); Payne, 838 S.W.2d at 238 (culvert running perpendicular to and beneath highway was premises defect, not special defect); City of Houston v. Rushing, 7 S.W.3d 909, 916 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet.) (stopped pickup truck blocking traffic as result of accident was not defect or da

2001NOTES [1] "[I]mmunity from suit defeats a trial court's subject matter jurisdiction and thus is properly asserted in a plea to the jurisdiction." Texas Dept. of Transp. v. Jones, 8 S.W.3d 636, 639 (Tex.1999). [2] Burris, 877 S.W.2d at 299 ; accord Kitchen, 867 S.W.2d at 786 (icy bridge is premise defect); Payne, 838 S.W.2d at 238 (culvert running perpendicular to and beneath highway was premises defect, not special defect); City of Houston v. Rushing, 7 S.W.3d 909, 916 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet.) (stopped pickup truck blocking traffic as result of accident was not defect or da

2001NOTES [1] "[I]mmunity from suit defeats a trial court's subject matter jurisdiction and thus is properly asserted in a plea to the jurisdiction." Texas Dept. of Transp. v. Jones, 8 S.W.3d 636, 639 (Tex.1999). [2] Burris, 877 S.W.2d at 299 ; accord Kitchen, 867 S.W.2d at 786 (icy bridge is premise defect); Payne, 838 S.W.2d at 238 (culvert running perpendicular to and beneath highway was premises defect, not special defect); City of Houston v. Rushing, 7 S.W.3d 909, 916 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet.) (stopped pickup truck blocking traffic as result of accident was not defect or da

2001NOTES [1] "[I]mmunity from suit defeats a trial court's subject matter jurisdiction and thus is properly asserted in a plea to the jurisdiction." Texas Dept. of Transp. v. Jones, 8 S.W.3d 636, 639 (Tex.1999). [2] Burris, 877 S.W.2d at 299 ; accord Kitchen, 867 S.W.2d at 786 (icy bridge is premise defect); Payne, 838 S.W.2d at 238 (culvert running perpendicular to and beneath highway was premises defect, not special defect); City of Houston v. Rushing, 7 S.W.3d 909, 916 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet.) (stopped pickup truck blocking traffic as result of accident was not defect or da

2001NOTES [1] "[I]mmunity from suit defeats a trial court's subject matter jurisdiction and thus is properly asserted in a plea to the jurisdiction." Texas Dept. of Transp. v. Jones, 8 S.W.3d 636, 639 (Tex.1999). [2] Burris, 877 S.W.2d at 299 ; accord Kitchen, 867 S.W.2d at 786 (icy bridge is premise defect); Payne, 838 S.W.2d at 238 (culvert running perpendicular to and beneath highway was premises defect, not special defect); City of Houston v. Rushing, 7 S.W.3d 909, 916 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet.) (stopped pickup truck blocking traffic as result of accident was not defect or da

2001NOTES [1] "[I]mmunity from suit defeats a trial court's subject matter jurisdiction and thus is properly asserted in a plea to the jurisdiction." Texas Dept. of Transp. v. Jones, 8 S.W.3d 636, 639 (Tex.1999). [2] Burris, 877 S.W.2d at 299 ; accord Kitchen, 867 S.W.2d at 786 (icy bridge is premise defect); Payne, 838 S.W.2d at 238 (culvert running perpendicular to and beneath highway was premises defect, not special defect); City of Houston v. Rushing, 7 S.W.3d 909, 916 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet.) (stopped pickup truck blocking traffic as result of accident was not defect or da

2001NOTES [1] "[I]mmunity from suit defeats a trial court's subject matter jurisdiction and thus is properly asserted in a plea to the jurisdiction." Texas Dept. of Transp. v. Jones, 8 S.W.3d 636, 639 (Tex.1999). [2] Burris, 877 S.W.2d at 299 ; accord Kitchen, 867 S.W.2d at 786 (icy bridge is premise defect); Payne, 838 S.W.2d at 238 (culvert running perpendicular to and beneath highway was premises defect, not special defect); City of Houston v. Rushing, 7 S.W.3d 909, 916 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet.) (stopped pickup truck blocking traffic as result of accident was not defect or da

2001NOTES [1] "[I]mmunity from suit defeats a trial court's subject matter jurisdiction and thus is properly asserted in a plea to the jurisdiction." Texas Dept. of Transp. v. Jones, 8 S.W.3d 636, 639 (Tex.1999). [2] Burris, 877 S.W.2d at 299 ; accord Kitchen, 867 S.W.2d at 786 (icy bridge is premise defect); Payne, 838 S.W.2d at 238 (culvert running perpendicular to and beneath highway was premises defect, not special defect); City of Houston v. Rushing, 7 S.W.3d 909, 916 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet.) (stopped pickup truck blocking traffic as result of accident was not defect or da

2001NOTES [1] "[I]mmunity from suit defeats a trial court's subject matter jurisdiction and thus is properly asserted in a plea to the jurisdiction." Texas Dept. of Transp. v. Jones, 8 S.W.3d 636, 639 (Tex.1999). [2] Burris, 877 S.W.2d at 299 ; accord Kitchen, 867 S.W.2d at 786 (icy bridge is premise defect); Payne, 838 S.W.2d at 238 (culvert running perpendicular to and beneath highway was premises defect, not special defect); City of Houston v. Rushing, 7 S.W.3d 909, 916 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet.) (stopped pickup truck blocking traffic as result of accident was not defect or da