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7 Utah opinions name it 2 courts 2004–2022 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Utah courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Murray v. Utah Labor Commissiongreen2 sentences2015This is why a mixed finding of reasonableness is typically subject to a non-deferential standard of review. 2012 UT 35, ¶ 44 , 308 P.3d 382 (footnote omitted); accord Murray, 2013 UT 38 , ¶ 39, 308 P.3d 461 (a search and seizure determination "is not 'fact-like' because the ultimate determination will often rest on the 'general reasonableness' of the facts"). 19 Ms. Sawyer's interpretation of these cases is incorrect, Baby B.'s reasoning did not depend on a simple rule that all determinations of reasonableness are law-like. 2015This is why a mixed finding of reasonableness is typically subject to a non-deferential standard of review. 2012 UT 35, ¶ 44 , 308 P.3d 382 (footnote omitted); accord Murray, 2013 UT 38 , ¶ 39, 308 P.3d 461 (a search and seizure determination "is not 'fact-like' because the ultimate determination will often rest on the 'general reasonableness' of the facts"). 19 Ms. Sawyer's interpretation of these cases is incorrect, Baby B.'s reasoning did not depend on a simple rule that all determinations of reasonableness are law-like. | 3 | 3 |
Manzanares v. Byingtongreen2 sentences2021Accordingly, “a mixed finding of reasonableness is typically subject to a non-deferential standard of review,” because it is more law-like than fact-like and lends itself “to consistent resolution by uniform precedent.” See id. ¶51 But in my view the calculus changes for the second Strickland prong: prejudice. 2015This is why a mixed finding of reasonableness is typically subject to a non-deferential standard of review. 2012 UT 35, ¶ 44 , 308 P.3d 382 (footnote omitted); accord Murray, 2013 UT 38 , ¶ 39, 308 P.3d 461 (a search and seizure determination "is not 'fact-like' because the ultimate determination will often rest on the 'general reasonableness' of the facts"). 19 Ms. Sawyer's interpretation of these cases is incorrect, Baby B.'s reasoning did not depend on a simple rule that all determinations of reasonableness are law-like. | 1 | 3 |
STEVENSEN 3RD EAST, LC v. Wattsgreen2 sentences2022Keystone, however, points to cases that, in its view, suggest that a “district court’s finding that compensable claims overlapped significantly with non- compensable claims . . . is reviewed for ‘patent error or clear abuse of discretion.’” (Citing Stevensen 3rd East, LC v. Watts, 2009 UT App 137, ¶¶ 27, 61 , 210 P.3d 977 .) ¶94 We need not resolve this dispute here, however, because, even applying the non-deferential standard of review, we still affirm the district court’s decision. 2022Keystone, however, points to cases that, in its view, suggest that a “district court’s finding that compensable claims overlapped significantly with non- compensable claims . . . is reviewed for ‘patent error or clear abuse of discretion.’” (Citing Stevensen 3rd East, LC v. Watts, 2009 UT App 137, ¶¶ 27, 61 , 210 P.3d 977 .) ¶94 We need not resolve this dispute here, however, because, even applying the non-deferential standard of review, we still affirm the district court’s decision. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Utah. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Patterson v. Knight
green
2 sentences2022In contrast, “whether the parties had a meeting of the minds sufficient to create a binding contract is an issue of fact, which we review for clear error, reversing only where the finding is against the clear weight of the evidence, or if we otherwise reach a firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” Patterson v. Knight, 2017 UT App 22, ¶ 5 , 391 P.3d 1075 (cleaned up). ¶18 Some cases have suggested that a non-deferential standard of review applies—even to questions of fact—where the district court’s decision to enforce a settlement agreement rests solely on documentary evidence. 2022In contrast, “whether the parties had a meeting of the minds sufficient to create a binding contract is an issue of fact, which we review for clear error, reversing only where the finding is against the clear weight of the evidence, or if we otherwise reach a firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” Patterson v. Knight, 2017 UT App 22, ¶ 5 , 391 P.3d 1075 (cleaned up). ¶18 Some cases have suggested that a non-deferential standard of review applies—even to questions of fact—where the district court’s decision to enforce a settlement agreement rests solely on documentary evidence. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Sackler v. Savin
green
1 sentence2022In Sackler, for example, our supreme court reviewed the enforcement of a settlement agreement for correctness because “the trial court based its decision solely on the documents constituting the correspondence between the parties” and “took no extrinsic evidence.” 897 P.2d at 1220 . | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Strickland v. Washington
green
1 sentence2021Like the majority, see supra note 10, I find it “perplexing” that we are instructed not to defer to trial court determinations regarding prejudice in this specific context—at least where the same judge who presided over the trial made the prejudice determination—and I wonder whether our law ought to develop a standard of review in ineffective assistance of counsel cases that requires some level of deference to such determinations—that is, to a trial court’s determination that there is (or is not) a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different had counsel not p | 1 | 2021–2021 |
State v. Warren
green
1 sentence2004We then announced our intention to apply a non-deferential standard in reviewing the reasonableness of a traffic stop and protective search, or "Terry frisk." State v. Warren, 2003 UT 86 , ¶ 1, 78 P.3d 590 . | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.