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7 Utah opinions name it 2 courts 1995–2022 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Utah courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Levingreen2 sentences2022In Levin, we refined the Pena test by “dropp[ing] the ‘novelty’ factor” and by “rephras[ing] the factors . . . in a manner that better reflects their usefulness in selecting a standard of review from somewhere along the spectrum of deference.” 2006 UT 50 , ¶¶ 28–29. 13 RANDOLPH v. STATE Opinion of the Court should have some discretion in making their bindover determinations.” Id. ¶ 34. 2022In Levin, we refined the Pena test by “dropp[ing] the ‘novelty’ factor” and by “rephras[ing] the factors . . . in a manner that better reflects their usefulness in selecting a standard of review from somewhere along the spectrum of deference.” 2006 UT 50 , ¶¶ 28–29. 13 RANDOLPH v. STATE Opinion of the Court should have some discretion in making their bindover determinations.” Id. ¶ 34. | 1 | 2 |
State v. Penagreen2 sentences2006See, e.g., Desert Miriah, Inc. v. B & L Auto, Inc., 2000 UT 83, ¶¶ 10, 12 , 12 P.3d 580 (quoting and applying the original three Pena factors and then mentioning in a later paragraph that there are "no policy reasons outweighing” the first three factors suggesting a deferential standard). 37 . 2004 UT 95, ¶¶ 14-15 , 103 P.3d 699 . 38 . 2006 UT 29, ¶ 28 , 137 P.3d 787 . 39 . 869 P.2d at 939 . 40 . 2006Pena, 869 P.2d at 938-39 . ¶ 17 In the present case, consideration of the three Pena factors leads us to conclude that at least some deference should be granted to the district court’s application of the law to the facts. | 1 | 2 |
Osman Home Improvement v. Industrial Commissiongreen2 sentences2012See Osman Home Improvement v. Industrial Comm'n, 958 P.2d 240 , 243 n. 4 (Utah Ct.App.1998) ("[NJlothing in Drake indicates an intention by the court to displace its own precedent on [the standard of review when a statute explicitly grants an ageney discretion]...."). 2012See Osman Home Improvement v. Industrial Comm'n, 958 P.2d 240 , 243 n. 4 (Utah Ct.App.1998) ("[NJlothing in Drake indicates an intention by the court to displace its own precedent on [the standard of review when a statute explicitly grants an ageney discretion]...."). | 1 | 1 |
State, Department of Human Services Ex Rel. Parker v. Irizarrygreen2 sentences2009Parker v. Irizarry, 945 P.2d 676, 678 (Utah 1997) (applying the Pena factors and determining the appropriate standard of review for equitable estoppel determinations). 5 . 2009Parker v. Irizarry, 945 P.2d 676, 678 (Utah 1997) (applying the Pena factors and determining the appropriate standard of review for equitable estoppel determinations). 5 . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Brakegreen2 sentences2006See, e.g., Desert Miriah, Inc. v. B & L Auto, Inc., 2000 UT 83, ¶¶ 10, 12 , 12 P.3d 580 (quoting and applying the original three Pena factors and then mentioning in a later paragraph that there are "no policy reasons outweighing” the first three factors suggesting a deferential standard). 37 . 2004 UT 95, ¶¶ 14-15 , 103 P.3d 699 . 38 . 2006 UT 29, ¶ 28 , 137 P.3d 787 . 39 . 869 P.2d at 939 . 40 . 2006See, e.g., Desert Miriah, Inc. v. B & L Auto, Inc., 2000 UT 83, ¶¶ 10, 12 , 12 P.3d 580 (quoting and applying the original three Pena factors and then mentioning in a later paragraph that there are "no policy reasons outweighing” the first three factors suggesting a deferential standard). 37 . 2004 UT 95, ¶¶ 14-15 , 103 P.3d 699 . 38 . 2006 UT 29, ¶ 28 , 137 P.3d 787 . 39 . 869 P.2d at 939 . 40 . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Virgingreen2 sentences2006See, e.g., Desert Miriah, Inc. v. B & L Auto, Inc., 2000 UT 83, ¶¶ 10, 12 , 12 P.3d 580 (quoting and applying the original three Pena factors and then mentioning in a later paragraph that there are "no policy reasons outweighing” the first three factors suggesting a deferential standard). 37 . 2004 UT 95, ¶¶ 14-15 , 103 P.3d 699 . 38 . 2006 UT 29, ¶ 28 , 137 P.3d 787 . 39 . 869 P.2d at 939 . 40 . 2006See, e.g., Desert Miriah, Inc. v. B & L Auto, Inc., 2000 UT 83, ¶¶ 10, 12 , 12 P.3d 580 (quoting and applying the original three Pena factors and then mentioning in a later paragraph that there are "no policy reasons outweighing” the first three factors suggesting a deferential standard). 37 . 2004 UT 95, ¶¶ 14-15 , 103 P.3d 699 . 38 . 2006 UT 29, ¶ 28 , 137 P.3d 787 . 39 . 869 P.2d at 939 . 40 . | 1 | 1 |
Desert Miriah, Inc. v. B & L AUTO, INC.green2 sentences2006See, e.g., Desert Miriah, Inc. v. B & L Auto, Inc., 2000 UT 83, ¶¶ 10, 12 , 12 P.3d 580 (quoting and applying the original three Pena factors and then mentioning in a later paragraph that there are "no policy reasons outweighing” the first three factors suggesting a deferential standard). 37 . 2004 UT 95, ¶¶ 14-15 , 103 P.3d 699 . 38 . 2006 UT 29, ¶ 28 , 137 P.3d 787 . 39 . 869 P.2d at 939 . 40 . 2006See, e.g., Desert Miriah, Inc. v. B & L Auto, Inc., 2000 UT 83, ¶¶ 10, 12 , 12 P.3d 580 (quoting and applying the original three Pena factors and then mentioning in a later paragraph that there are "no policy reasons outweighing” the first three factors suggesting a deferential standard). 37 . 2004 UT 95, ¶¶ 14-15 , 103 P.3d 699 . 38 . 2006 UT 29, ¶ 28 , 137 P.3d 787 . 39 . 869 P.2d at 939 . 40 . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Goddardgreen2 sentences1995See State v. Lopez, 886 P.2d 1105, 1113-14 (Utah 1994); State v. Goddard, 871 P.2d 540, 545-46 (Utah 1994). 1995See State v. Lopez, 886 P.2d 1105, 1113-14 (Utah 1994); State v. Goddard, 871 P.2d 540, 545-46 (Utah 1994). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Lopezgreen2 sentences1995See State v. Lopez, 886 P.2d 1105, 1113-14 (Utah 1994); State v. Goddard, 871 P.2d 540, 545-46 (Utah 1994). 1995See State v. Lopez, 886 P.2d 1105, 1113-14 (Utah 1994); State v. Goddard, 871 P.2d 540, 545-46 (Utah 1994). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Utah. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Drake v. Industrial Commission of Utah
green
2 sentences2013We further stated that “we believe the Pena standard is a more accurate measure of the degree of deference to be given to an agency . . . rather than using undefinable labels such as ‘reasonableness.’” Id. 2013We further stated that “we believe the Pena standard is a more accurate measure of the degree of deference to be given to an agency . . . rather than using undefinable labels such as ‘reasonableness.’” Id. | 2 | 2012–2013 |
Westside Dixon Associates LLC v. Utah Power & Light Co.
green
2 sentences2012In Westside Dixon Associates, LLC v. Utah Power & Light Co./Pacificorp, 2002 UT 31 , 44 P.3d 775 , the supreme court disclaimed any relevance that Drake might have to UAPA standard-of-review cases: "We note that all parties to this petition cite Drake v. Industrial Comm'n, 939 P.2d 177 (Utah 1997), regarding appropriate agency standards of review. 2012In Westside Dixon Associates, LLC v. Utah Power & Light Co./Pacificorp, 2002 UT 31 , 44 P.3d 775 , the supreme court disclaimed any relevance that Drake might have to UAPA standard-of-review cases: "We note that all parties to this petition cite Drake v. Industrial Comm'n, 939 P.2d 177 (Utah 1997), regarding appropriate agency standards of review. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Dahl Investment Co. v. Hughes
neutral
2 sentences2009For example, Dahl Investment Co. v. Hughes, 2004 UT App 391 , 101 P.3d 830 , quotes CECO Corp. v. Concrete Specialists, Inc., 772 P.2d 967 (Utah 1989), in describing the elements of equitable estoppel. 2009For example, Dahl Investment Co. v. Hughes, 2004 UT App 391 , 101 P.3d 830 , quotes CECO Corp. v. Concrete Specialists, Inc., 772 P.2d 967 (Utah 1989), in describing the elements of equitable estoppel. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
CECO Corp. v. Concrete Specialists, Inc.
green
2 sentences2009For example, Dahl Investment Co. v. Hughes, 2004 UT App 391 , 101 P.3d 830 , quotes CECO Corp. v. Concrete Specialists, Inc., 772 P.2d 967 (Utah 1989), in describing the elements of equitable estoppel. 2009For example, Dahl Investment Co. v. Hughes, 2004 UT App 391 , 101 P.3d 830 , quotes CECO Corp. v. Concrete Specialists, Inc., 772 P.2d 967 (Utah 1989), in describing the elements of equitable estoppel. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
State v. Mincy
green
2 sentences1995Under the "totality of the circumstances in the present case," id. at 781 ; Mincy, 838 P.2d at 658 , and under the broad discretion and less than de novo Pena standard of review, we affirm the trial court's conclusion that the eyewitness identification was reliable. 1995Under the “totality of the circumstances in the present case,” id. at 781 ; Mincy, 838 P.2d at 658 , and under the broad discretion and less than de novo Pena standard of review, we affirm the trial court’s conclusion that the eyewitness identification was reliable. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
State v. Long
green
2 sentences1995Under the "totality of the circumstances in the present case," id. at 781 ; Mincy, 838 P.2d at 658 , and under the broad discretion and less than de novo Pena standard of review, we affirm the trial court's conclusion that the eyewitness identification was reliable. 1995Under the “totality of the circumstances in the present case,” id. at 781 ; Mincy, 838 P.2d at 658 , and under the broad discretion and less than de novo Pena standard of review, we affirm the trial court’s conclusion that the eyewitness identification was reliable. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
State v. Ramirez
green
2 sentences1995Id. at 784 . [6] See supra pp. 1235-36 for a more detailed discussion of the Pena standard of review. [7] Moreover, subsequent to its opinion in Pena , Utah Supreme Court decisions on ineffective assistance of counsel have applied the legal principles as set forth in Strickland , but have shown no deference to whatever action the trial court took in its application of the law. 1995Id. at 784 . [6] See supra pp. 1235-36 for a more detailed discussion of the Pena standard of review. [7] Moreover, subsequent to its opinion in Pena , Utah Supreme Court decisions on ineffective assistance of counsel have applied the legal principles as set forth in Strickland , but have shown no deference to whatever action the trial court took in its application of the law. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.