special mitigation instruction in Utah

2024“Ineffective assistance of counsel claims raised for the first time on appeal are issues of law that we review for correctness.” State v. Sessions, 2012 UT App 273, ¶ 11 , 287 P.3d 497 , aff’d, 2014 UT 44 , 342 P.3d 738 . ¶24 Lastly, Hernandez argues that the trial court erred in disallowing certain testimony under the rule against hearsay.

2024“Ineffective assistance of counsel claims raised for the first time on appeal are issues of law that we review for correctness.” State v. Sessions, 2012 UT App 273, ¶ 11 , 287 P.3d 497 , aff’d, 2014 UT 44 , 342 P.3d 738 . ¶24 Lastly, Hernandez argues that the trial court erred in disallowing certain testimony under the rule against hearsay.

2024“Ineffective assistance of counsel claims raised for the first time on appeal are issues of law that we review for correctness.” State v. Sessions, 2012 UT App 273, ¶ 11 , 287 P.3d 497 , aff’d, 2014 UT 44 , 342 P.3d 738 . ¶24 Lastly, Hernandez argues that the trial court erred in disallowing certain testimony under the rule against hearsay.

2024“Ineffective assistance of counsel claims raised for the first time on appeal are issues of law that we review for correctness.” State v. Sessions, 2012 UT App 273, ¶ 11 , 287 P.3d 497 , aff’d, 2014 UT 44 , 342 P.3d 738 . ¶24 Lastly, Hernandez argues that the trial court erred in disallowing certain testimony under the rule against hearsay.

2022The court denied Flynn’s motion, 20200685-CA 7 2022 UT App 89 State v. Flynn reasoning that counsel was not ineffective because objectively reasonable counsel could have concluded that the evidence was not strong enough to support an extreme emotional distress claim and that such a claim could undermine his self-defense claim.

2022Because the threshold level of evidence required for a special mitigation instruction is low and we ultimately determine that counsel’s decision to pursue a complete acquittal was reasonable, see infra ¶ 28, we assume without deciding that Flynn would have been entitled to such an instruction had he requested one. 20200685-CA 11 2022 UT App 89 State v. Flynn emotional distress, and “[w]e will conclude that counsel’s performance was deficient only if it can be said that no objectively competent attorney would have” made that decision.

2018Additionally, although the court of appeals incorrectly interpreted the applicable special mitigation standard when concluding the error was harmless, we reach the same conclusion as the court of appeals under the clarified standard we announced in State v. Lambdin , 2017 UT 46 , --- P.3d ----.

2017Attorneys are afforded "wide latitude" in making such decisions because "[e]ven the best criminal defense attorneys would not defend a particular client in the same way." Strickland , 466 U.S. at 689 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 .

2017Attorneys are afforded "wide latitude" in making such decisions because "[e]ven the best criminal defense attorneys would not defend a particular client in the same way." Strickland , 466 U.S. at 689 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 .

2017This is because, depending on the facts of a particular case, counsel may have perfectly valid tactical reasons to forgo the instruction and to instead present an "all or nothing" defense that entails avoiding a lesser-included-offense instruction in the hopes the jury will find the defendant "totally innocent of any wrongdoing." See State v. Dyer , 671 P.2d 142 , 145 (Utah 1983) ; cf. State v. Feldmiller , 2013 UT App 275 , ¶¶ 3-4, 316 P.3d 991 (per curiam) (holding that counsel did not perform deficiently by forgoing a special mitigation instruction, because the "wide latitude counsel is giv

2017This is because, depending on the facts of a particular case, counsel may have perfectly valid tactical reasons to forgo the instruction and to instead present an "all or nothing" defense that entails avoiding a lesser-included-offense instruction in the hopes the jury will find the defendant "totally innocent of any wrongdoing." See State v. Dyer , 671 P.2d 142 , 145 (Utah 1983) ; cf. State v. Feldmiller , 2013 UT App 275 , ¶¶ 3-4, 316 P.3d 991 (per curiam) (holding that counsel did not perform deficiently by forgoing a special mitigation instruction, because the "wide latitude counsel is giv

2017This is because, depending on the facts of a particular case, counsel may have perfectly valid tactical reasons to forgo the instruction and to instead present an "all or nothing" defense that entails avoiding a lesser-included-offense instruction in the hopes the jury will find the defendant "totally innocent of any wrongdoing." See State v. Dyer , 671 P.2d 142 , 145 (Utah 1983) ; cf. State v. Feldmiller , 2013 UT App 275 , ¶¶ 3-4, 316 P.3d 991 (per curiam) (holding that counsel did not perform deficiently by forgoing a special mitigation instruction, because the "wide latitude counsel is giv

2016Even though he was ‚enraged‛ and his feelings were hurt, the special mitigation standard, as explained, ‚requires a trier of fact to put herself in the shoes of a reasonable person in the defendant’s situation to determine whether the defendant’s reaction to a series of events was reasonable.‛ Id. ‚The standard is not whether the defendant thought her reaction was reasonable, but whether a reasonable 10.

2011ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 18 Featherhat first argues that various jury instructions at his trial were incomplete or incorrect because the jury should have been instructed that the State bore the burden of disproving Featherhat's mental capacity defense, the instruction on aggravated murder should not have identified Officer Thomas by name, and a special mitigation instruction should have been given. "'Because jury instructions are statements of law, we review challenges to jury instructions under a correctness standard'" State v. Steele, 2010 UT App 185, ¶ 13 , 236 P.3d 161 (quoting State

2011ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 18 Featherhat first argues that various jury instructions at his trial were incomplete or incorrect because the jury should have been instructed that the State bore the burden of disproving Featherhat's mental capacity defense, the instruction on aggravated murder should not have identified Officer Thomas by name, and a special mitigation instruction should have been given. "'Because jury instructions are statements of law, we review challenges to jury instructions under a correctness standard'" State v. Steele, 2010 UT App 185, ¶ 13 , 236 P.3d 161 (quoting State

2011However, the district court ruled that there were not "sufficient facts presented to justify instructing the jury with regard to that issue." On appeal, Featherhat argues simply that "the special mitigation instruction was appropriate to offer in light of the evidence presented by both alienists who found [Featherhat] suffered from delusion among other forms of mental illness." 16 The Utah Supreme Court has stated, "In enacting section 76-5-205.5, the legislature opted to permit a marrow class of mentally-ill defendants to argue for special mitigation in aggravated murder and murder cases." St

2011However, the district court ruled that there were not "sufficient facts presented to justify instructing the jury with regard to that issue." On appeal, Featherhat argues simply that "the special mitigation instruction was appropriate to offer in light of the evidence presented by both alienists who found [Featherhat] suffered from delusion among other forms of mental illness." 16 The Utah Supreme Court has stated, "In enacting section 76-5-205.5, the legislature opted to permit a marrow class of mentally-ill defendants to argue for special mitigation in aggravated murder and murder cases." St

2011ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 18 Featherhat first argues that various jury instructions at his trial were incomplete or incorrect because the jury should have been instructed that the State bore the burden of disproving Featherhat's mental capacity defense, the instruction on aggravated murder should not have identified Officer Thomas by name, and a special mitigation instruction should have been given. "'Because jury instructions are statements of law, we review challenges to jury instructions under a correctness standard'" State v. Steele, 2010 UT App 185, ¶ 13 , 236 P.3d 161 (quoting State

2011ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 18 Featherhat first argues that various jury instructions at his trial were incomplete or incorrect because the jury should have been instructed that the State bore the burden of disproving Featherhat's mental capacity defense, the instruction on aggravated murder should not have identified Officer Thomas by name, and a special mitigation instruction should have been given. "'Because jury instructions are statements of law, we review challenges to jury instructions under a correctness standard'" State v. Steele, 2010 UT App 185, ¶ 13 , 236 P.3d 161 (quoting State