Strickland v. Washington test in Utah

2022The “two-part Strickland v. Washington test applies to challenges to guilty pleas based on ineffective assistance of counsel.” Id. at 58 ; see also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984).

2022The “two-part Strickland v. Washington test applies to challenges to guilty pleas based on ineffective assistance of counsel.” Id. at 58 ; see also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984).

2022The “two-part Strickland v. Washington test applies to challenges to guilty pleas based on ineffective assistance of counsel.” Id. at 58 ; see also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984).

2022The “two-part Strickland v. Washington test applies to challenges to guilty pleas based on ineffective assistance of counsel.” Id. at 58 ; see also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984).

2022To demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show (1) “that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness” and (2) “that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Hill, 474 U.S. at 57 (quotation simplified); see also State v. Scott, 2020 UT 13, ¶ 28 , 462 P.3d 350 .

2022To demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show (1) “that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness” and (2) “that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Hill, 474 U.S. at 57 (quotation simplified); see also State v. Scott, 2020 UT 13, ¶ 28 , 462 P.3d 350 .

2021See, e.g., Francis v. State, 529 So. 2d 670 , 673 n.9 (Fla. 1989) (observing that the judge who heard the post-trial ineffective assistance claim also presided over the trial, and posing the rhetorical question, “Who, better than he, could determine whether failure to introduce this evidence prejudiced [the defendant] sufficiently to meet the Strickland v. Washington test?”). ¶52 In other similar contexts, Utah appellate courts are instructed to give great deference to a trial court’s determination as to whether an impropriety that occurred during trial was prejudicial.

2021In the context of rule 24(a) motions for new trial, we recently recognized that the “substantial adverse effect” inquiry is one that “falls entirely within the discretion of the trial court due to its advantaged position to judge the impact of legal errors on the total proceedings.” See De La Rosa, 2019 UT App 110, ¶ 9 (quotation simplified). 17 And in a related context regarding 17.

2014With respect to noncitizen defendants, "the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel" also requires counsel to "inform her client whether his plea carries a risk of deportation." Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 373-74 , 130 S.Ct. 1473 , 176 L.Ed.2d 284 (2010) ("'The severity of deportation-the equivalent of banishment or exile-only underscores how critical it is for counsel to inform her noncitizen client that he faces a risk of deportation." (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); accord Jelashovic v. State, 2012 UT App 220, ¶ 7 , 285 P.3d 14 .

2014With respect to noncitizen defendants, "the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel" also requires counsel to "inform her client whether his plea carries a risk of deportation." Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 373-74 , 130 S.Ct. 1473 , 176 L.Ed.2d 284 (2010) ("'The severity of deportation-the equivalent of banishment or exile-only underscores how critical it is for counsel to inform her noncitizen client that he faces a risk of deportation." (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); accord Jelashovic v. State, 2012 UT App 220, ¶ 7 , 285 P.3d 14 .

2014The prejudice prong of an ineffective assistance claim raised in the context of a guilty plea requires a defendant to establish “that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58-59 , 106 S.Ct. 366 , 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985) (holding “that the two-part Strickland v. Washington test applies to challenges to guilty pleas based on ineffective assistance of counsel”); accord United States v. Kramer, 168 F.3d 1196, 1201 (10th Cir.1999); see also Person, 2006 UT App 288, ¶

2014The prejudice prong of an ineffective assistance claim raised in the context of a guilty plea requires a defendant to establish “that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58-59 , 106 S.Ct. 366 , 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985) (holding “that the two-part Strickland v. Washington test applies to challenges to guilty pleas based on ineffective assistance of counsel”); accord United States v. Kramer, 168 F.3d 1196, 1201 (10th Cir.1999); see also Person, 2006 UT App 288, ¶

2014The prejudice prong of an ineffective assistance claim raised in the context of a guilty plea requires a defendant to establish “that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58-59 , 106 S.Ct. 366 , 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985) (holding “that the two-part Strickland v. Washington test applies to challenges to guilty pleas based on ineffective assistance of counsel”); accord United States v. Kramer, 168 F.3d 1196, 1201 (10th Cir.1999); see also Person, 2006 UT App 288, ¶