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7 Utah opinions name it 2 courts 2000–2015 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Utah courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Veasey v. Stategreen2 sentences2012See, eg., United States v. Straight, 42 M.J. 244, 250 (C.A.A.F.1995) ("Lay opinions about the possibility of parole, made as expressions of opinion or common knowledge, do not fall within the exceptions to [rule] 606(b)."); McWhorter v. State, - So.3d -, -, 2011 WL 4511231 (Ala.Crim.App.2011) (holding that juror's testimony regarding discussions of parole in jury deliberations was not considered extraneous information); Veasey v. State, 276 Ark. 457 , 637 S.W.2d 545, 547 (1982) (discussing jury's consideration of parole and noting that rule 606(b) "states plainly that a juror may not testify a 2012See, eg., United States v. Straight, 42 M.J. 244, 250 (C.A.A.F.1995) ("Lay opinions about the possibility of parole, made as expressions of opinion or common knowledge, do not fall within the exceptions to [rule] 606(b)."); McWhorter v. State, - So.3d -, -, 2011 WL 4511231 (Ala.Crim.App.2011) (holding that juror's testimony regarding discussions of parole in jury deliberations was not considered extraneous information); Veasey v. State, 276 Ark. 457 , 637 S.W.2d 545, 547 (1982) (discussing jury's consideration of parole and noting that rule 606(b) "states plainly that a juror may not testify a | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Benallygreen2 sentences2012Benally, 546 F.3d at 1237 ; see also id. ("[Thhe inquiry is not whether the jurors became witnesses in the sense that they discussed any matters not of record, but whether they discussed specific extra-record facts relating to the defendant, and if they did, whether there was a significant possibility that the defendant was prejudiced thereby." (internal quotation marks omitted)). . 2012Benally, 546 F.3d at 1237 ; see also id. ("[Thhe inquiry is not whether the jurors became witnesses in the sense that they discussed any matters not of record, but whether they discussed specific extra-record facts relating to the defendant, and if they did, whether there was a significant possibility that the defendant was prejudiced thereby." (internal quotation marks omitted)). . | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Straightgreen1 sentence2012See, eg., United States v. Straight, 42 M.J. 244, 250 (C.A.A.F.1995) ("Lay opinions about the possibility of parole, made as expressions of opinion or common knowledge, do not fall within the exceptions to [rule] 606(b)."); McWhorter v. State, - So.3d -, -, 2011 WL 4511231 (Ala.Crim.App.2011) (holding that juror's testimony regarding discussions of parole in jury deliberations was not considered extraneous information); Veasey v. State, 276 Ark. 457 , 637 S.W.2d 545, 547 (1982) (discussing jury's consideration of parole and noting that rule 606(b) "states plainly that a juror may not testify a | 1 | 1 |
Steven Harold Erikson v. James R. Rowlandgreen1 sentence2012See, eg., United States v. Straight, 42 M.J. 244, 250 (C.A.A.F.1995) ("Lay opinions about the possibility of parole, made as expressions of opinion or common knowledge, do not fall within the exceptions to [rule] 606(b)."); McWhorter v. State, - So.3d -, -, 2011 WL 4511231 (Ala.Crim.App.2011) (holding that juror's testimony regarding discussions of parole in jury deliberations was not considered extraneous information); Veasey v. State, 276 Ark. 457 , 637 S.W.2d 545, 547 (1982) (discussing jury's consideration of parole and noting that rule 606(b) "states plainly that a juror may not testify a | 1 | 1 |
Berrier v. Thriftgreen2 sentences2012See, eg., United States v. Straight, 42 M.J. 244, 250 (C.A.A.F.1995) ("Lay opinions about the possibility of parole, made as expressions of opinion or common knowledge, do not fall within the exceptions to [rule] 606(b)."); McWhorter v. State, - So.3d -, -, 2011 WL 4511231 (Ala.Crim.App.2011) (holding that juror's testimony regarding discussions of parole in jury deliberations was not considered extraneous information); Veasey v. State, 276 Ark. 457 , 637 S.W.2d 545, 547 (1982) (discussing jury's consideration of parole and noting that rule 606(b) "states plainly that a juror may not testify a 2012See, eg., United States v. Straight, 42 M.J. 244, 250 (C.A.A.F.1995) ("Lay opinions about the possibility of parole, made as expressions of opinion or common knowledge, do not fall within the exceptions to [rule] 606(b)."); McWhorter v. State, - So.3d -, -, 2011 WL 4511231 (Ala.Crim.App.2011) (holding that juror's testimony regarding discussions of parole in jury deliberations was not considered extraneous information); Veasey v. State, 276 Ark. 457 , 637 S.W.2d 545, 547 (1982) (discussing jury's consideration of parole and noting that rule 606(b) "states plainly that a juror may not testify a | 1 | 1 |
Dunn v. Dunngreen1 sentence2011Some exceptions include where the property has been commingled so that it has lost its separate character or where it is fair, just and equitable to do otherwise." Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314, 1321 (Utah Ct.App.1990) (citation omitted). 1 13 Here, the majority of the trial consisted of testimony about Husband's investment accounts, and the trial court had the unenviable job of unraveling the transactions involving those accounts to determine what portion of the funds constituted separate property and what portion constituted marital property. | 1 | 1 |
Leggroan v. ZION'S SAVINGS BANK & TRUST, CO.green2 sentences2008Bank & Trust Co., 120 Utah 93 , 232 P.2d 746, 748 (1951) ("[Thhe test for determining whether a writing has effected a trust or is testamentary in character is whether the maker intended the instrument to have any effect until after his death, or whether he intended to transfer some present interest. 2008Bank & Trust Co., 120 Utah 93 , 232 P.2d 746, 748 (1951) ("[Thhe test for determining whether a writing has effected a trust or is testamentary in character is whether the maker intended the instrument to have any effect until after his death, or whether he intended to transfer some present interest. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Harmangreen1 sentence2003See Harman, 767 P.2d at 568 ("[Thhe standard for reversal is high" and we will reverse only if the evidence is so " "inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime."" (quoting State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983))). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Petreegreen1 sentence2003See Harman, 767 P.2d at 568 ("[Thhe standard for reversal is high" and we will reverse only if the evidence is so " "inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime."" (quoting State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983))). | 1 | 1 |
Allred v. Educators Mutual Insurance Ass'n of Utahgreen1 sentence2000Ass'n of Utah, 909 P.2d 1263, 1265 (Utah 1996). "[Thhe standard for reviewing an arbitration award is highly deferential to the arbitrator." Buzas, 925 P.2d at 946 ; see also Intermountain Power Agency, 961 P.2d at 323 . | 1 | 1 |
Intermountain Power Agency v. Union Pacific Railroadgreen1 sentence2000Ass'n of Utah, 909 P.2d 1263, 1265 (Utah 1996). "[Thhe standard for reviewing an arbitration award is highly deferential to the arbitrator." Buzas, 925 P.2d at 946 ; see also Intermountain Power Agency, 961 P.2d at 323 . | 1 | 1 |
Utah Medical Products, Inc. v. Searcygreen1 sentence2000Inc. v. Searcy, 958 P.2d 228, 233-34 (Utah 1998) ("[Thhe issue of attorney fees is not properly before this court because it was raised for the first time on appeal."); Larson v. Overland Thrift & Loan, 818 P.2d 1316 , 1321 n. 5 (Utah Ct.App.1991) (declining to consider issue of attorney fees when raised for first time in reply brief). | 1 | 1 |
DeVore v. IHC Hospitals, Inc.green1 sentence2000Generally, "'an arbitration award will not be disturbed ... because the court does not agree with the award as long as the proceeding was fair and honest and the substantial rights of the parties were respected."" Buzas, 925 *1100 P.2d at 947 (quoting DeVore v. IHC Hosps., Inc., 884 P.2d 1246, 1251 (Utah 1994). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Utah. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
In Re the Discipline of Ennenga
green
2 sentences2015On appeal, Mr. Lundgren appears to argue that he showed truly compelling mitigating cireumstances in two ways: (1) his conduct was not as bad as other disbarred attorneys and (2) he "repaid all amounts." We uphold the district court's determination that Mr. Lundgren has failed to show truly compelling cireumstances that would mitigate his misconduct. 5 {19 "[Thhe standard for departing from the presumptive sanction of disbarment is a 'truly compelling' mitigating factor in the cireumstances of [this] case, not the comparative seriousness of other cases." Emnenga, 2001 UT 111, ¶ 16 , 37 P.3d 11 2015On appeal, Mr. Lundgren appears to argue that he showed truly compelling mitigating cireumstances in two ways: (1) his conduct was not as bad as other disbarred attorneys and (2) he "repaid all amounts." We uphold the district court's determination that Mr. Lundgren has failed to show truly compelling cireumstances that would mitigate his misconduct. 5 {19 "[Thhe standard for departing from the presumptive sanction of disbarment is a 'truly compelling' mitigating factor in the cireumstances of [this] case, not the comparative seriousness of other cases." Emnenga, 2001 UT 111, ¶ 16 , 37 P.3d 11 | 1 | 2015–2015 |
McWhorter v. State
green
1 sentence2012See, eg., United States v. Straight, 42 M.J. 244, 250 (C.A.A.F.1995) ("Lay opinions about the possibility of parole, made as expressions of opinion or common knowledge, do not fall within the exceptions to [rule] 606(b)."); McWhorter v. State, - So.3d -, -, 2011 WL 4511231 (Ala.Crim.App.2011) (holding that juror's testimony regarding discussions of parole in jury deliberations was not considered extraneous information); Veasey v. State, 276 Ark. 457 , 637 S.W.2d 545, 547 (1982) (discussing jury's consideration of parole and noting that rule 606(b) "states plainly that a juror may not testify a | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Olsen v. Olsen
green
2 sentences2011Thus, Husband argues that the trial court exceeded its discretion in awarding Wife half of that amount, $136,525, in the property distribution. "'In Utah, marital property is ordinarily divided equally between the divorcing spouses and separate property, which may include premarital assets, inheritances, or similar assets, will be awarded to the acquiring spouse." " Id. 113 (quoting Olsen v. Olsen, 2007 UT App 296, 23 , 169 P.3d 765 ). "[Thhe rule for [separate] property is that each party retain the separate property he or she brought into the marriage. 2011Thus, Husband argues that the trial court exceeded its discretion in awarding Wife half of that amount, $136,525, in the property distribution. "'In Utah, marital property is ordinarily divided equally between the divorcing spouses and separate property, which may include premarital assets, inheritances, or similar assets, will be awarded to the acquiring spouse." " Id. 113 (quoting Olsen v. Olsen, 2007 UT App 296, 23 , 169 P.3d 765 ). "[Thhe rule for [separate] property is that each party retain the separate property he or she brought into the marriage. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Stonehocker v. Stonehocker
green
1 sentence2011Thus, Husband argues that the trial court exceeded its discretion in awarding Wife half of that amount, $136,525, in the property distribution. "'In Utah, marital property is ordinarily divided equally between the divorcing spouses and separate property, which may include premarital assets, inheritances, or similar assets, will be awarded to the acquiring spouse." " Id. 113 (quoting Olsen v. Olsen, 2007 UT App 296, 23 , 169 P.3d 765 ). "[Thhe rule for [separate] property is that each party retain the separate property he or she brought into the marriage. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Buzas Baseball, Inc. v. Salt Lake Trappers, Inc.
green
1 sentence2000Ass'n of Utah, 909 P.2d 1263, 1265 (Utah 1996). "[Thhe standard for reviewing an arbitration award is highly deferential to the arbitrator." Buzas, 925 P.2d at 946 ; see also Intermountain Power Agency, 961 P.2d at 323 . | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Larson v. Overland Thrift and Loan
green
1 sentence2000Inc. v. Searcy, 958 P.2d 228, 233-34 (Utah 1998) ("[Thhe issue of attorney fees is not properly before this court because it was raised for the first time on appeal."); Larson v. Overland Thrift & Loan, 818 P.2d 1316 , 1321 n. 5 (Utah Ct.App.1991) (declining to consider issue of attorney fees when raised for first time in reply brief). | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.