continuing tort doctrine in Washington

2024In Fradkin, the court explained that the continuing tort doctrine stems from reasoning that “[i]t would be inequitable . . . to estop a person from obtaining damages ‘for injuries which might eventually become burdensome, because [they were] not litigious enough to plunge into a lawsuit over a trifling matter’” when the tort first arose. 96 Wn.

2015We decline to extend the continuing tort doctrine to the facts presented here. -11- No. 73632-9-1/12 Further, even when a tort arguably constitutes a continuing tort, courts will not allow the suit to continue if the plaintiff fails to show successive manifestations of "actual and substantial damages." Fradkin, 96 Wn.

2026Feltmeier v. Feltmeier, an Illinois Supreme Court case, presented circumstances analogous to those here: whether a spouse’s claim of IIED involving domestic violence was barred by the applicable statute of limitations. 207 Ill. 2d 263, 277 , 798 N.E.2d 75 , 278 Ill.

2026Feltmeier v. Feltmeier, an Illinois Supreme Court case, presented circumstances analogous to those here: whether a spouse’s claim of IIED involving domestic violence was barred by the applicable statute of limitations. 207 Ill. 2d 263, 277 , 798 N.E.2d 75 , 278 Ill.

2026Continuing Tort Doctrine The continuing tort doctrine is an equitable exception to a statute of limitations, applying “when no single incident in a chain of tortious activity can fairly or realistically be identified as the cause of significant harm.” M.R. v. State, 4 Wn.3d 702 , 721, 568 P.3d 299 (2025); Antonius v. King County, 153 Wn.2d 256, 262 , 103 P.3d 729 (2004).

2026“The tort of outrage is synonymous with a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress.” Christian v. Tohmeh, 191 Wn.

2026Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress To survive summary judgment on claims of IIED, also known as the tort of outrage, a party must show: “(1) extreme and outrageous conduct, (2) intentional or reckless infliction of emotional distress, and (3) actual result to the plaintiff of severe emotional distress.” Christian v. Tohmeh, 191 Wn.

2026Continuing Tort Doctrine The continuing tort doctrine is an equitable exception to a statute of limitations, applying “when no single incident in a chain of tortious activity can fairly or realistically be identified as the cause of significant harm.” M.R. v. State, 4 Wn.3d 702 , 721, 568 P.3d 299 (2025); Antonius v. King County, 153 Wn.2d 256, 262 , 103 P.3d 729 (2004).

2025Samuelson v. Freeman, 75 Wn.2d 894, 900 , 454 P.2d 406 (1969) (holding that for medical malpractice of a continuous and uninterrupted nature, the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the treatment for that particular illness or condition has been terminated); see also Gazija v. Nicholas Jerns Co., 86 Wn.2d 215, 220 , 543 P.2d 338 (1975) (explaining that in circumstances where some harm is sustained but the plaintiff is unaware of it, a literal application of the statute of limitations may result in grave injustice).

2025Samuelson v. Freeman, 75 Wn.2d 894, 900 , 454 P.2d 406 (1969) (holding that for medical malpractice of a continuous and uninterrupted nature, the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the treatment for that particular illness or condition has been terminated); see also Gazija v. Nicholas Jerns Co., 86 Wn.2d 215, 220 , 543 P.2d 338 (1975) (explaining that in circumstances where some harm is sustained but the plaintiff is unaware of it, a literal application of the statute of limitations may result in grave injustice).

2024App. 631 , 887 P.2d 476 (1995), a case the Carters discuss in their briefing, Division One declined to expand the continuing tort doctrine where Hill brought maritime claims based in part on ongoing symptoms he experienced as a result of his ferry working conditions.

2024Id. at 643 . 21 No. 58608-8-II A claim for negligent investigation is available to a parent or child when the Department conducts a biased or incomplete investigation that results in a harmful placement decision.

2024App. at 124 -25 (quoting Doran, 24 Wash. at 188-89 ).

2021The court stated that “no Washington court has applied the continuing tort doctrine outside of property claims and employment discrimination 2 In Segaline v. Department of Labor & Industries, the Supreme Court declined to address whether a claim was timely under the continuing violation theory because the issue had not been raised below. 169 Wn.2d 467 , 476 n.8, 238 P.3d 1107 (2010). 12 No. 54984-1-II claims.

2015App. 728, 734 , 274 P.3d 1070 , review denied, 175 Wn.2d 1018 ( 2012). 14 WVII argues, and the County does not dispute, that the 10 -year statute of limitations for its taking claim has not run. 15 Accordingly, we do not reach WVII' s alternative theory that the continuing tort doctrine prevented the statute of limitations from running until the County' s allegedly tortious conduct ended. 16 The County does not appear to dispute that the hearing examiner' s failure to timely make a decision on the SDAP appeal fell within the statute of limitations. 14 No. 44404 -6 -II Here, WVII completed its

1995Ed. 2d 30 , 115 S. Ct. 75 (1994).

1995Consequently, Fletcher’s 1977 suit was not time barred. 621 F.2d at 908 .

1995However, in Kichline v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 800 F.2d 356 (3d Cir. 1986), the Third Circuit refused to apply the continuing tort doctrine in a FELA case which it distinguished from its earlier decision in Fowkes .

1995Fowkes, 264 F.2d at 398 .

1995With regard to the application of the continuing tort doctrine, the court noted, "[t]he important thing is not whether trauma is involved, but whether attributing significant harm to a single incident in a series is reasonable.” 264 F.2d at 399 .

1995Ed. 2d 278 , 112 S. Ct. 337 (1991) that the employee’s suit against his employer under the Jones Act was barred by the 3-year statute of limitations and that the continuing tort doctrine did not apply. 932 F.2d at 418 .