continuing tort doctrine in West Virginia

2020Additionally, even though respondent ended his representation of petitioner by the beginning of January 2013, petitioner argues that the continuing tort exception to the statute of limitation applies to this case pursuant to Syllabus Point 11 of Graham v. Beverage, 211 W.

2009In Graham v. Beverage, 211 W.Va. 466 , 566 S.E.2d 603 (2002), this Court formally adopted the continuing tort theory in a non-medical malpractice setting by holding that “[wjhere a tort involves a continuing or repeated injury, the cause of action accrues at and the statute of limitations begins to run from the date of the last injury or when the tortious overt acts or omissions cease.” However, in the earlier ease of Ricottilli v. Summersville Memorial Hospital, 188 W.Va. 674, 677 , 425 S.E.2d 629, 632 (1992), this Court recognized the continuing tort doctrine in a context similar to medical

2022Conversely, in Hall’s Park Motel this Court rejected an application of the continuing tort doctrine in finding that periodic construction was a “discrete and completed act of negligent commission, not a continuing negligent act of omission.” Id., 194 W.

2022Va. at 313 , 460 S.E.2d at 448 .

2020Workman 10 Petitioner also states, in passing, that (1) counsel for respondent acted as counsel for petitioner “at various times” and that “such representation has been held to extend a statute of limitations under the continuing representation doctrine[,]” and (2) the continuing tort doctrine should be applied to toll the statute of limitations in this case because petitioner alleged “continuing misconduct by [respondent], which resulted in damage to [petitioner].” Though petitioner generally cites, respectively, to Dunn and Copier World Processing Supply, Inc. v. WesBanco Bank, Inc., 220 W.

2020Va. 39 , 640 S.E.2d 102 (2006), in support of these statements, he fails to otherwise discuss them or their applicability to the facts of this case.

1998PER CURIAM: 1 The plaintiffs below and appellants herein, Nancy and Timothy Stephens, appeal the August 28,1997, order of the Circuit Court of Kanawha County that granted summary judgment to the defendants below and appel-lees herein, Associates in Counseling and Training, Inc.; Linda Geronilla; and Elizabeth Conrad [hereinafter collectively referred to as ACT or the defendants]. 2 On appeal to this Court, the Stephenses raise three challenges to the circuit court’s ruling: (1) the circuit court improperly-determined that the applicable statute of limitations barred their claims when their com

1998PER CURIAM: 1 The plaintiffs below and appellants herein, Nancy and Timothy Stephens, appeal the August 28,1997, order of the Circuit Court of Kanawha County that granted summary judgment to the defendants below and appel-lees herein, Associates in Counseling and Training, Inc.; Linda Geronilla; and Elizabeth Conrad [hereinafter collectively referred to as ACT or the defendants]. 2 On appeal to this Court, the Stephenses raise three challenges to the circuit court’s ruling: (1) the circuit court improperly-determined that the applicable statute of limitations barred their claims when their com

1998In support of this contention, they cite Harmon v. Higgins, 188 W.Va. 709 , 426 S.E.2d 344 (1992), for the proposition that the statute of limitations governing personal injuries does not begin to run until the last occurrence of offensive contact or threat thereof.

1998In support of this contention, they cite Harmon v. Higgins, 188 W.Va. 709 , 426 S.E.2d 344 (1992), for the proposition that the statute of limitations governing personal injuries does not begin to run until the last occurrence of offensive contact or threat thereof.