Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
7 Washington opinions name it 2 courts 1999–2014 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Washington courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Gould v. Department of Health & Social Servicesgreen2 sentences2001Employees v. Udall, 111 N.M. 432 , 806 P.2d 572 (1991), but that case simply applied collateral estoppel to the state without discussing the Mendoza factors. 216 Wis. 2d 356 , 576 N.W.2d 292 (Ct. App. 1998). 2001Employees v. Udall, 111 N.M. 432 , 806 P.2d 572 (1991), but that case simply applied collateral estoppel to the state without discussing the Mendoza factors. 216 Wis. 2d 356 , 576 N.W.2d 292 (Ct. App. 1998). | 2 | 2 |
cluster 456170green2 sentences2001See Hercules Carriers, Inc. v. Florida, 768 F.2d 1558 , 1578 (11th Cir.1985). [19] We need not determine whether WRQ was correctly decided because collateral estoppel generally operates without regard to whether the first result was erroneous. 2001See Hercules Carriers, Inc. v. Florida, 768 F.2d 1558 , 1578 (11th Cir.1985). [19] We need not determine whether WRQ was correctly decided because collateral estoppel generally operates without regard to whether the first result was erroneous. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Washington. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Mendoza
green
2 sentences2010Mendoza then appealed directly from his judgment and sentence, “arguing his plea was involuntary because he was not informed of the correct standard range prior to pleading guilty.” Mendoza, 157 Wn.2d at 586 . ¶42 Although our Supreme Court indicated that Mendoza’s plea might not have been a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent one, Mendoza, 157 Wn.2d at 590-91 , it concluded that Mendoza had “waived his right to challenge the voluntariness of his guilty plea.” Mendoza, 157 Wn.2d at 592 . 2010Mendoza then appealed directly from his judgment and sentence, “arguing his plea was involuntary because he was not informed of the correct standard range prior to pleading guilty.” Mendoza, 157 Wn.2d at 586 . ¶42 Although our Supreme Court indicated that Mendoza’s plea might not have been a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent one, Mendoza, 157 Wn.2d at 590-91 , it concluded that Mendoza had “waived his right to challenge the voluntariness of his guilty plea.” Mendoza, 157 Wn.2d at 592 . | 3 | 2010–2014 |
Local 2839 of American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees v. Udall
green
2 sentences2001Employees v. Udall, 111 N.M. 432 , 806 P.2d 572 (1991), but that case simply applied collateral estoppel to the state without discussing the Mendoza factors. 216 Wis. 2d 356 , 576 N.W.2d 292 (Ct. App. 1998). 2001Employees v. Udall, 111 N.M. 432 , 806 P.2d 572 (1991), but that case simply applied collateral estoppel to the state without discussing the Mendoza factors. 216 Wis. 2d 356 , 576 N.W.2d 292 (Ct. App. 1998). | 2 | 2001–2001 |
Flemming v. Nestor
green
2 sentences1999Although the Supreme Court was not persuaded the monetary penalty at issue in Hudson was a criminal sanction in actual effect, the Hudson analysis, which relied upon the Mendoza factors, specifically distinguished punishment which “involve[s] an ‘affirmative disability or restraint,’ as that term is normally understood,” Hudson, 522 U.S. at 104 (quoting Flemming, 363 U.S. at 617 ), from monetary assessments. 1999Although the Supreme Court was not persuaded the monetary penalty at issue in Hudson was a criminal sanction in actual effect, the Hudson analysis, which relied upon the Mendoza factors, specifically distinguished punishment which “involve[s] an ‘affirmative disability or restraint,’ as that term is normally understood,” Hudson, 522 U.S. at 104 (quoting Flemming, 363 U.S. at 617 ), from monetary assessments. | 2 | 1999–1999 |
Hudson v. United States
green
2 sentences1999Although the Supreme Court was not persuaded the monetary penalty at issue in Hudson was a criminal sanction in actual effect, the Hudson analysis, which relied upon the Mendoza factors, specifically distinguished punishment which “involve[s] an ‘affirmative disability or restraint,’ as that term is normally understood,” Hudson, 522 U.S. at 104 (quoting Flemming, 363 U.S. at 617 ), from monetary assessments. 1999Although the Supreme Court was not persuaded the monetary penalty at issue in Hudson was a criminal sanction in actual effect, the Hudson analysis, which relied upon the Mendoza factors, specifically distinguished punishment which “involve[s] an ‘affirmative disability or restraint,’ as that term is normally understood,” Hudson, 522 U.S. at 104 (quoting Flemming, 363 U.S. at 617 ), from monetary assessments. | 2 | 1999–1999 |
State v. Mendoza
green
2 sentences2010Mendoza then appealed directly from his judgment and sentence, "arguing his plea was involuntary because he was not informed of the correct standard range prior to pleading guilty." Mendoza, 157 Wash.2d at 586 , 141 P.3d 49 . ¶ 42 Although our Supreme Court indicated that Mendoza's plea might not have been a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent one, Mendoza, 157 Wash.2d at 590-91 , 141 P.3d 49 , it concluded that Mendoza had "waived his right to challenge the voluntariness of his guilty plea." Mendoza, 157 Wash.2d at 592 , 141 P.3d 49 . 2010Mendoza then appealed directly from his judgment and sentence, "arguing his plea was involuntary because he was not informed of the correct standard range prior to pleading guilty." Mendoza, 157 Wash.2d at 586 , 141 P.3d 49 . ¶ 42 Although our Supreme Court indicated that Mendoza's plea might not have been a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent one, Mendoza, 157 Wash.2d at 590-91 , 141 P.3d 49 , it concluded that Mendoza had "waived his right to challenge the voluntariness of his guilty plea." Mendoza, 157 Wash.2d at 592 , 141 P.3d 49 . | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.