dominant jurisdiction doctrine in Texas

2024The dominant-jurisdiction rule is inapplicable when “a party’s conduct estops him from asserting dominant jurisdiction, if joinder of parties is infeasible or impossible, or if the plaintiff in the first case is not intent on prosecuting his claims.” Id. 7 interrelated or arise out of the same transaction or occurrence, courts apply the “logical relationship test,” which “is met when the same facts, which may or may not be disputed, are significant and logically relevant to both claims.” Id. at 389– 90.

2024The dominant-jurisdiction rule is inapplicable when “a party’s conduct estops him from asserting dominant jurisdiction, if joinder of parties is infeasible or impossible, or if the plaintiff in the first case is not intent on prosecuting his claims.” Id. 7 interrelated or arise out of the same transaction or occurrence, courts apply the “logical relationship test,” which “is met when the same facts, which may or may not be disputed, are significant and logically relevant to both claims.” Id. at 389– 90.

2012Griffith v. Griffith, 341 S.W.3d 43, 54 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2011, no pet.); Ex parte Jabara, 556 S.W.2d 592, 596 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1977, orig. proceeding) (“We conclude the doctrine of dominant jurisdiction does not apply to suits pending in other states.”).

2011See Ex parte Jabara, 556 S.W.2d 592, 596 (Tex.Civ.App.-Dallas 1977, orig. proceeding) (“We conclude that the doctrine of dominant jurisdiction does not apply to suits pending in other states.

2025Cases are considered in- herently interrelated based on, in part, if the different parties could “be joined” in the case, id., the “compulsory counterclaim rule,” id., and whether there is a risk of conflicting rulings creating “inconsistent obligations” for the parties and subpoena respondents, Encore Enterprises, Inc. v. Borderplex Realty Tr., 583 S.W.3d 713 , 724 (Tex. App. 2019) (applying Rule 39(a) in a dominant jurisdiction analysis).

2025Cases are considered in- herently interrelated based on, in part, if the different parties could “be joined” in the case, id., the “compulsory counterclaim rule,” id., and whether there is a risk of conflicting rulings creating “inconsistent obligations” for the parties and subpoena respondents, Encore Enterprises, Inc. v. Borderplex Realty Tr., 583 S.W.3d 713 , 724 (Tex. App. 2019) (applying Rule 39(a) in a dominant jurisdiction analysis).

2015In re Sims, 88 S.W.3d 297, 302 (Tex. App.─San Antonio 2002, orig. proceeding).

2015See Wyatt v. Shaw Plumbing Co., 760 S.W.2d 245, 248 (Tex. 1988) ("It is well settled that when suit would be proper in more than one COUllty, the court in which suit is first filed acquires dominant jurisdiction to the exclusion of other courts"); see also Perry v. Del Rio, 66 S.W.3d 239, 252 (Tex. 2001) (orig. proceeding) (citing Wyatt for the first-filed rule in a case where there were four proceedings pending in different Texas counties); In re Sims, 88 S.W.3d 297, 302 (Tex. App.?San Antonio 2002, orig. proceeding) (liAs a general rule, when suit would be proper in more than one county, the

2015In Curtis v. Gibbs, the supreme court addressed a trial court’s violation of the dominant jurisdiction rule and said, “If the second court refuses to sustain a proper plea in abatement, or attempts to interfere with the prior action, this court has the power to act by mandamus or other appropriate writ to settle the conflict of jurisdictions.” 511 S.W.2d 263, 267 (Tex. 1974) (orig. proceeding) (emphasis added).

2015In Curtis v. Gibbs, i the supreme court addressed.-a trial .court’s violation of the dominant jurisdiction rule and said, “If the second court refuses to sustain a proper plea in abatement, or attempts to interfere with the prior action, this court has the power to act by mandamus or other appropriate writ to settle the conflict of jurisdictions.” 511 S.W.2d 263, 267 (Tex.1974) (orig.proceeding) (emphasis added). : But in Abor v. Black, the court discussed Curtis and effectively changed Curtis’s “or”, to an “and.” See 695 S.W.2d 564, 567 (Tex.1985) (orig.proceeding).

2025See id.

2015Gonzalez v. Reliant Energy, Inc., 159 S.W.3d 615, 622 (Tex.2005) (noting that the concept of dominant jurisdiction is not applicable in cases where venue is not proper in more than one Texas county); Wyatt, 760 S.W.2d at 248 .

2020Gordon v. Jones, 196 S.W.3d 376 , 382–83 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.).

2020See Gordon v. Jones, 196 S.W.3d 376, 383 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.) (“Venue pertains solely to where a suit may be brought and is a different question from whether the court has jurisdiction of the property or thing in controversy.” (internal quotation omitted)).

2012Discussion The doctrine of dominant jurisdiction provides that "when cases involving the same subject matter are brought in different courts, the court with the first-filed case has dominant jurisdiction and should proceed, and the other case should be abated." Ashton Grove L.C. v. Jackson Walker L.L.P. , 366 S.W.3d 790, 794 (Tex. App.--Dallas 2012, no pet.).

2012Discussion The doctrine of dominant jurisdiction provides that “when cases involving the same subject matter are brought in different courts, the court with the first-filed case has dominant jurisdiction and should proceed, and the other case should be abated.” Ashton Grove L.C. v. Jackson Walker L.L.P., 366 S.W.3d 790, 794 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, no pet.).

2025Hunt Transport, Inc., 492 S.W.3d 287, 294 (Tex. 2016) (applying the dominant jurisdiction rule when a claim was not the subject of a pending action at the time of filing and the subject matter of the claim in the other suits otherwise satisfied the compulsory counterclaim rule); see also TEX.

2022Hunt, 492 S.W.3d at 299-300 . 10 We have found no cases in which the dominant jurisdiction rule was applied when the cases before the appellate court both involved cases filed and pending in the same District Court.

2024Sys., Inc., 504 S.W.3d 320, 322 (Tex. 2016) (orig. proceeding)).

2017Hunt, the supreme court overturned its prior decision holding that mandamus relief was not available unless the second-filed court “actively interferes with the exercise of jurisdiction” in the other court.16 Instead, the supreme court held that regardless of whether the second court is actively interfering with the dominant court, “a relator need only establish a trial court’s abuse of discretion to demonstrate entitlement to mandamus relief with regard to a plea in abatement in a dominant-jurisdiction case.”17 Several of the later-filing counties argue that the doctrine of dominant jurisdict

2025Bank of Tex., N.A., 577 S.W.3d 336, 357 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2019, no pet.); see also In re Red Dot Bldg.

2024“The dominant jurisdiction analysis is applicable, however, only when multiple suits are inherently interrelated and venue is proper in each county.” Wyrick v. Business Bank of Tex., N.A., 577 S.W.3d 336, 357 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2019, no pet.) (citing In re Red Dot Bldg.

2025Under the doctrine of dominant jurisdiction, “a court of appeals ‘will not be permitted to interfere with the previously attached jurisdiction of another court of co-ordinate power.’” In re A.B., 676 S.W.3d 112 , 115 (Tex. 2023) (per curiam) (quoting Miles v. Ford Motor Co., 914 S.W.2d 135, 138 (Tex. 1995) (per curiam)).

2005See Miles v. Ford Motor Co., 914 S.W.2d 135, 138 (Tex.1995).

2013See Ashton Grove L.C. v. Jackson Walker L.L.P., 366 S.W.3d 790, 794 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, no pet.); Griffith v. Griffith, 341 S.W.3d 43, 54 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2011, no pet.); Ex parte Jabara, 556 S.W.2d 592, 596 (Tex. Civ.

2012Griffith v. Griffith, 341 S.W.3d 43, 54 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2011, no pet.); Ex parte Jabara, 556 S.W.2d 592, 596 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1977, orig. proceeding) (“We conclude the doctrine of dominant jurisdiction does not apply to suits pending in other states.”).

2013See, e.g., Perry v. Del Rio, 66 S.W.3d 239, 252 (Tex. 2001) (orig. proceeding); Curtis v. Gibbs, 511 S.W.2d 263, 267 (Tex. 1974) (orig. proceeding); Finlan v. Peavy, 205 S.W.3d 647, 651 (Tex. App.—Waco 2006, no pet.); Gordon v. Jones, 196 S.W.3d 376, 385 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.). 25 dominant jurisdiction does not apply to suits pending in other states.

2013See, e.g., Perry v. Del Rio, 66 S.W.3d 239, 252 (Tex.2001) (orig. proceeding); Curtis v. Gibbs, 511 S.W.2d 263, 267 (Tex.1974) (orig. proceeding); Finlan v. Peavy, 205 S.W.3d 647, 651 (Tex.App.-Waco 2006, no pet.); Gordon v. Jones, 196 S.W.3d 376, 385 (Tex.App.Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.).

2026See Musquiz v. Marroquin, 124 S.W.3d 906, 911 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2004, pet. denied) (rejecting appellants’ argument that statutory county court where probate case was pending had dominant jurisdiction over estate’s breach-of-fiduciary-duty and trespass-to-try-title claims “because no petition had been filed [in the statutory county court] raising the issue involving these parties”). 11 In sum, because CTCH’s district-court causes of action are statutorily barred and because the doctrine of dominant jurisdiction does not apply, the district court abused its discretion by denying

2026See Musquiz v. Marroquin, 124 S.W.3d 906, 911 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2004, pet. denied) (rejecting appellants’ argument that statutory county court where probate case was pending had dominant jurisdiction over estate’s breach-of-fiduciary-duty and trespass-to-try-title claims “because no petition had been filed [in the statutory county court] raising the issue involving these parties”). 11 In sum, because CTCH’s district-court causes of action are statutorily barred and because the doctrine of dominant jurisdiction does not apply, the district court abused its discretion by denying

2021Id. at 293–94; Street v. Honorable Second Court of Appeals, 756 S.W.2d 299, 300 (Tex. 1988) (orig. proceeding).

2017Co. of Bowie v. Superior Snubbing Servs., Inc., 236 S.W.3d 190, 194 (Tex. 2007)). 9 Tex. Gov’t Code § 74.162. 10 Curtis v. Gibbs, 511 S.W.2d 263, 267 (Tex. 1974) (emphasis added); see Warren v. Weiner, 462 S.W.3d 140 , 144–45 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, no pet.) (quoting Curtis for same proposition); Lopez v. Texas Workers’ Comp.

2017Dep’t v. Jarrell, 418 S.W.2d 486, 488 (Tex. 1967); Morgan v. City of Alvin, 175 S.W.3d 408, 421 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, no pet.). 53 See In re Puig, 351 S.W.3d 301, 305 (Tex. 2011) (explaining doctrine of dominant jurisdiction, including that it arises when two courts have concurrent jurisdiction); see also id. at 306 (holding that relators should have filed plea in abatement rather than plea to the jurisdiction because 13 The remainder of the State’s argument raises the specter of complicated and unwieldy litigation and results that will occur if the later-filing counties’ suits

2017Dep’t v. Jarrell, 418 S.W.2d 486, 488 (Tex. 1967); Morgan v. City of Alvin, 175 S.W.3d 408, 421 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, no pet.). 53 See In re Puig, 351 S.W.3d 301, 305 (Tex. 2011) (explaining doctrine of dominant jurisdiction, including that it arises when two courts have concurrent jurisdiction); see also id. at 306 (holding that relators should have filed plea in abatement rather than plea to the jurisdiction because 13 The remainder of the State’s argument raises the specter of complicated and unwieldy litigation and results that will occur if the later-filing counties’ suits

2017Dep’t v. Jarrell, 418 S.W.2d 486, 488 (Tex. 1967); Morgan v. City of Alvin, 175 S.W.3d 408, 421 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, no pet.). 53 See In re Puig, 351 S.W.3d 301, 305 (Tex. 2011) (explaining doctrine of dominant jurisdiction, including that it arises when two courts have concurrent jurisdiction); see also id. at 306 (holding that relators should have filed plea in abatement rather than plea to the jurisdiction because 13 The remainder of the State’s argument raises the specter of complicated and unwieldy litigation and results that will occur if the later-filing counties’ suits

2017The doctrine of dominant jurisdiction, by contrast, applies where cases are inherently interrelated because they “involv[e] the same parties and the same controversy,” and requires that the later-filed cases “be dismissed if a party to that suit calls the second court’s attention to the pendency of the prior suit by a plea in abatement.”10 “The 8 Dugger v. Arredondo, 408 S.W.3d 825, 828 (Tex. 2013) (quoting Energy Serv.

2017The doctrine of dominant jurisdiction, by contrast, applies where cases are inherently interrelated because they “involv[e] the same parties and the same controversy,” and requires that the later-filed cases “be dismissed if a party to that suit calls the second court’s attention to the pendency of the prior suit by a plea in abatement.”10 “The 8 Dugger v. Arredondo, 408 S.W.3d 825, 828 (Tex. 2013) (quoting Energy Serv.

2017Dep’t v. Jarrell, 418 S.W.2d 486, 488 (Tex. 1967); Morgan v. City of Alvin, 175 S.W.3d 408, 421 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, no pet.). 53 See In re Puig, 351 S.W.3d 301, 305 (Tex. 2011) (explaining doctrine of dominant jurisdiction, including that it arises when two courts have concurrent jurisdiction); see also id. at 306 (holding that relators should have filed plea in abatement rather than plea to the jurisdiction because 13 The remainder of the State’s argument raises the specter of complicated and unwieldy litigation and results that will occur if the later-filing counties’ suits

2017Co. of Bowie v. Superior Snubbing Servs., Inc., 236 S.W.3d 190, 194 (Tex. 2007)). 9 Tex. Gov’t Code § 74.162. 10 Curtis v. Gibbs, 511 S.W.2d 263, 267 (Tex. 1974) (emphasis added); see Warren v. Weiner, 462 S.W.3d 140 , 144–45 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, no pet.) (quoting Curtis for same proposition); Lopez v. Texas Workers’ Comp.

2015Starnes v. Holloway, 779 S.W.2d 86, 94 (Tex.App.–Dallas 1989, writ denied).

2015But in Abor v. Black, the court discussed Curtis and effectively changed Curtis’s “or” to an “and.” See 695 S.W.2d 564, 567 (Tex. 1985) (orig. proceeding).

2015In Curtis v. Gibbs, i the supreme court addressed.-a trial .court’s violation of the dominant jurisdiction rule and said, “If the second court refuses to sustain a proper plea in abatement, or attempts to interfere with the prior action, this court has the power to act by mandamus or other appropriate writ to settle the conflict of jurisdictions.” 511 S.W.2d 263, 267 (Tex.1974) (orig.proceeding) (emphasis added). : But in Abor v. Black, the court discussed Curtis and effectively changed Curtis’s “or”, to an “and.” See 695 S.W.2d 564, 567 (Tex.1985) (orig.proceeding).

2013See White v. Rupard, 788 S.W.2d 175, 178-79 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, writ denied).

2013See White, 788 S.W.2d at 178-79 .