license revocation hearing in Alaska

2022Safety, Div. of Motor Vehicles, 20 P.3d 1130, 1138 (Alaska 2001) (holding that where the credibility of an individual in a driver’s license revocation hearing was at issue, due process requirds that individual be permitted to testify in person).

2007Safety, Div. of Motor Vehicles, 741 P.2d 226, 228 (Alaska 1987) (citing Champion, 721 P.2d at 133 ); see also Whitesides, 20 P.3d at 1135-36, 1138-39 (noting that DMV must permit the accused to test the reliability of evidence and may not consider evidence obtained in violation of the right to counsel, and holding that an in-person hearing must be provided on request where the credibility of a party is at issue). [37] Thorne, 774 P.2d at 1330 (holding that the State's failure to preserve a videotape of field sobriety tests taken an hour after a DWI arrest violated the driver's right to due pro

2007Safety, Div. of Motor Vehicles, 741 P.2d 226, 228 (Alaska 1987) (citing Champion, 721 P.2d at 133 ); see also Whitesides, 20 P.3d at 1135-36, 1138-39 (noting that DMV must permit the accused to test the reliability of evidence and may not consider evidence obtained in violation of the right to counsel, and holding that an in-person hearing must be provided on request where the credibility of a party is at issue). [37] Thorne, 774 P.2d at 1330 (holding that the State's failure to preserve a videotape of field sobriety tests taken an hour after a DWI arrest violated the driver's right to due pro

2007Thorne, 774 P.2d at 1330 (holding that the State's failure to preserve a videotape of field sobriety tests taken an hour after a DWI arrest violated the driver's right to due process in a license revocation hearing); see also Snyder v. State (Snyder I), 930 P.2d 1274, 1282 (Alaska 1996) (noting, in the context of a criminal prosecution for driving while intoxicated, that "[i]t is a fundamental tenet of due process of law that a person accused of a crime has a right to attempt to obtain exculpatory evidence.

2020STANDARD OF REVIEW When the decision of a hearing officer in a driver’s license revocation hearing is appealed to us from a decision of the superior court sitting as an intermediate court of appeal, we independently review the hearing officer’s decision.4 We review it “under AS 28.15.166(m), which provides that the court ‘may reverse the department’s determination if the court finds that the department misinterpreted the law, acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner, or made a determination unsupported by the evidence in the record.’ ”5 We apply our independent judgment to questions of law,

2020STANDARD OF REVIEW When the decision of a hearing officer in a driver’s license revocation hearing is appealed to us from a decision of the superior court sitting as an intermediate court of appeal, we independently review the hearing officer’s decision.4 We review it “under AS 28.15.166(m), which provides that the court ‘may reverse the department’s determination if the court finds that the department misinterpreted the law, acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner, or made a determination unsupported by the evidence in the record.’ ”5 We apply our independent judgment to questions of law,

2020Safety, 942 P.2d 1151 , 1152 & n.2 (Alaska 1997) (holding that supreme court and superior courts apply same standard of review)). 6 See State v. Schmidt, 323 P.3d 647, 655 (Alaska 2014). 7 Valentine v. State, 215 P.3d 319, 322 (Alaska 2009) (quoting State v. Murtagh, 169 P.3d 602, 606 (Alaska 2007)). -5- 7438 allowing or prohibiting an [attorney’s fees] award.”8 We review “the hearing officer’s factual findings under the substantial evidence test, ‘determining “whether the findings are supported by such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” ’ ”9 IV.

2020Safety, 942 P.2d 1151 , 1152 & n.2 (Alaska 1997) (holding that supreme court and superior courts apply same standard of review)). 6 See State v. Schmidt, 323 P.3d 647, 655 (Alaska 2014). 7 Valentine v. State, 215 P.3d 319, 322 (Alaska 2009) (quoting State v. Murtagh, 169 P.3d 602, 606 (Alaska 2007)). -5- 7438 allowing or prohibiting an [attorney’s fees] award.”8 We review “the hearing officer’s factual findings under the substantial evidence test, ‘determining “whether the findings are supported by such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” ’ ”9 IV.

2020Safety, 942 P.2d 1151 , 1152 & n.2 (Alaska 1997) (holding that supreme court and superior courts apply same standard of review)). 6 See State v. Schmidt, 323 P.3d 647, 655 (Alaska 2014). 7 Valentine v. State, 215 P.3d 319, 322 (Alaska 2009) (quoting State v. Murtagh, 169 P.3d 602, 606 (Alaska 2007)). -5- 7438 allowing or prohibiting an [attorney’s fees] award.”8 We review “the hearing officer’s factual findings under the substantial evidence test, ‘determining “whether the findings are supported by such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” ’ ”9 IV.

2012Safety, Div. of Motor Vehicles, 921 P.2d 620, 622-23 (Alaska 1996) (providing that due process requires the accused at a driver's license revocation hearing "must be granted the opportunity to fully contest issues of 'central importance' to the revocation decision)). .

2007Safety, Div. of Motor Vehicles, 741 P.2d 226, 228 (Alaska 1987) (citing Champion, 721 P.2d at 133 ); see also Whitesides, 20 P.3d at 1135-36, 1138-39 (noting that DMV must permit the accused to test the reliability of evidence and may not consider evidence obtained in violation of the right to counsel, and holding that an in-person hearing must be provided on request where the credibility of a party is at issue). [37] Thorne, 774 P.2d at 1330 (holding that the State's failure to preserve a videotape of field sobriety tests taken an hour after a DWI arrest violated the driver's right to due pro

2007Safety, Div. of Motor Vehicles, 741 P.2d 226, 228 (Alaska 1987) (citing Champion, 721 P.2d at 133 ); see also Whitesides, 20 P.3d at 1135-36, 1138-39 (noting that DMV must permit the accused to test the reliability of evidence and may not consider evidence obtained in violation of the right to counsel, and holding that an in-person hearing must be provided on request where the credibility of a party is at issue). [37] Thorne, 774 P.2d at 1330 (holding that the State's failure to preserve a videotape of field sobriety tests taken an hour after a DWI arrest violated the driver's right to due pro

2007Thorne, 774 P.2d at 1330 (holding that the State's failure to preserve a videotape of field sobriety tests taken an hour after a DWI arrest violated the driver's right to due process in a license revocation hearing); see also Snyder v. State (Snyder I), 930 P.2d 1274, 1282 (Alaska 1996) (noting, in the context of a criminal prosecution for driving while intoxicated, that "[i]t is a fundamental tenet of due process of law that a person accused of a crime has a right to attempt to obtain exculpatory evidence.

2006In North Slope Borough v. Barraza, we stated in dicta that a "delay of four months between [a post-termination] decision and the issuance of ... findings was not so unreasonable as to create an independent due process violation." 906 P.2d 1377, 1381 (Alaska 1995).

2006Safety, Div. of Motor Vehicles, 20 P.3d 1130 , 1134 n. 4 (Alaska 2001) (holding that an eight-month delay in a driver's license revocation hearing was not a violation of due process, but noting that it could have been if Whitesides had been deprived of his license in the interim); see also United States v. $8,850 in United States Currency, 461 U.S. 555, 564 , 103 S.Ct. 2005 , 76 L.Ed.2d 143 (1983) (holding that a delay in a civil forfeiture case where the claimant has been deprived of the property at issue can constitute a due process violation, and drawing an analogy between the right to due

2006Safety, Div. of Motor Vehicles, 20 P.3d 1130 , 1134 n. 4 (Alaska 2001) (holding that an eight-month delay in a driver's license revocation hearing was not a violation of due process, but noting that it could have been if Whitesides had been deprived of his license in the interim); see also United States v. $8,850 in United States Currency, 461 U.S. 555, 564 , 103 S.Ct. 2005 , 76 L.Ed.2d 143 (1983) (holding that a delay in a civil forfeiture case where the claimant has been deprived of the property at issue can constitute a due process violation, and drawing an analogy between the right to due

1999See Thorne v. State, Dep't of Public Safety, 774 P.2d 1326, 1329 (Alaska 1989) (due process in a license revocation hearing requires a "meaningful hearing"); Frontier, 524 P.2d at 659 (due process requires notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to the taking of a valuable property right). 34 . 900 P.2d 744, 753 (Alaska App.1995). 35 . 524 P.2d at 659 . 36 .

1999See Thorne v. State, Dep't of Public Safety, 774 P.2d 1326, 1329 (Alaska 1989) (due process in a license revocation hearing requires a "meaningful hearing"); Frontier, 524 P.2d at 659 (due process requires notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to the taking of a valuable property right). 34 . 900 P.2d 744, 753 (Alaska App.1995). 35 . 524 P.2d at 659 . 36 .

1999See Thorne v. State, Dep't of Public Safety, 774 P.2d 1326, 1329 (Alaska 1989) (due process in a license revocation hearing requires a "meaningful hearing"); Frontier, 524 P.2d at 659 (due process requires notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to the taking of a valuable property right). 34 . 900 P.2d 744, 753 (Alaska App.1995). 35 . 524 P.2d at 659 . 36 .