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6 Alabama opinions name it 2 courts 1932–2026 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Alabama courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
City of Gulfport v. Wilsongreen1 sentence2026See City of Gulfport v. Wilson, 603 So. 2d 295, 299 (Miss. 1992) (holding that, although an amendment to a restrictive covenant required a vote of subdivision members, circulating a petition among members constituted substantial compliance with the procedure); O'Neill-Marnecheck v. Val's Prop. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Alabama. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Lockhart v. Phenix City Inv. Co.
green
2 sentences1995In so holding, the Court explained: “A covenant of freedom from encumbrances, like a covenant of seizin and good right to convey, is a covenant in praesenti, and is broken as soon as made if there is an outstanding prior encumbrance diminishing the value of the property conveyed; and knowledge of the encumbrance at the time of the covenant does not bar the right of the covenantee, because such covenants are taken as indemnity against known, as well as unknown, encumbrances.” Id. 1989"In its opinion the Supreme Court of Alabama stated that Lockhart had notice of the prior encumbrance when he signed his mortgage, but 'such notice is not *Page 50 sufficient to overcome the covenant in the deed which warranted that there were no encumbrances on the property. . . . [K]nowledge of the encumbrance at the time of the covenant does not bar the right of the covenantee, because such covenants are taken as indemnity against known, as well as unknown, encumbrances.' 488 So.2d at p. 1355 . | 2 | 1989–1995 |
Colson v. Harden
neutral
2 sentences1986Colsen v. Harden , 141 So. 639 , 224 Ala. 665 (1932). 1986Colsen v. Harden , 141 So. 639 , 224 Ala. 665 (1932). | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Weil v. Hill
neutral
2 sentences1946But the doctrine is well settled in this state that an interest in lands, which the court of chancery will protect, may be acquired by estoppel notwithstanding the statute of frauds.” Weil v. Hill, 193 Ala. 407, 413 , 69 So. 438, 440 . 1946But the doctrine is well settled in this state that an interest in lands, which the court of chancery will protect, may be acquired by estoppel notwithstanding the statute of frauds.” Weil v. Hill, 193 Ala. 407, 413 , 69 So. 438, 440 . | 1 | 1946–1946 |
Copeland v. McAdory
green
1 sentence1932Copeland v. McAdory, 100 Ala. 553 , 13 So. 545 ; Anniston L. & Mfg. | 1 | 1932–1932 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.