covenant claim in Vermont

2025See id. (“Although he adds that the negotiations were for a higher price, simply providing the motivations for VWSD’s alleged breach [of contract] is insufficient to establish that the two causes of action [breach of contract and the covenant] are premised on different conduct.”); Ferrisburgh Realty Invs. v. Schumacher, 2010 VT 6, ¶ 26 , 187 Vt. 309 (“FRI identifies no conduct distinct from that supporting the breach of contract claim; it focuses solely on Schumacher’s motivation for the breach [for purposes of the covenant claim].”).

2025See id. (“Although he adds that the negotiations were for a higher price, simply providing the motivations for VWSD’s alleged breach [of contract] is insufficient to establish that the two causes of action [breach of contract and the covenant] are premised on different conduct.”); Ferrisburgh Realty Invs. v. Schumacher, 2010 VT 6, ¶ 26 , 187 Vt. 309 (“FRI identifies no conduct distinct from that supporting the breach of contract claim; it focuses solely on Schumacher’s motivation for the breach [for purposes of the covenant claim].”).

2018It nonetheless bears repeating that a party may only pursue punitive damages on a breach of the covenant claim when the party has presented evidence *1202 that the other party acted with actual malice-as "shown by conduct manifesting personal ill will, evidencing insult or oppression, or showing a reckless or wanton disregard of plaintiff's rights." Monahan , 2005 VT 110 , ¶ 4, 179 Vt. 167 , 893 A.2d 298 (quotation omitted).

2018It nonetheless bears repeating that a party may only pursue punitive damages on a breach of the covenant claim when the party has presented evidence *1202 that the other party acted with actual malice-as "shown by conduct manifesting personal ill will, evidencing insult or oppression, or showing a reckless or wanton disregard of plaintiff's rights." Monahan , 2005 VT 110 , ¶ 4, 179 Vt. 167 , 893 A.2d 298 (quotation omitted).

2015The third clause, the covenant clause, is grounded in the language of nuisance law: the “deeming” that is prohibited is tied 3 directly to a “hindrance or nuisance to their possession and enjoyment of the land.” See, e.g., John Larkin, Inc. v. Marceau, 2008 VT 61, ¶ 8 , 184 Vt. 207 (“[T]respass is an invasion of the plaintiff’s interest in the exclusive possession of his land, while nuisance is an interference with his use and enjoyment of it.” (quoting W.

2015The third clause, the covenant clause, is grounded in the language of nuisance law: the “deeming” that is prohibited is tied 3 directly to a “hindrance or nuisance to their possession and enjoyment of the land.” See, e.g., John Larkin, Inc. v. Marceau, 2008 VT 61, ¶ 8 , 184 Vt. 207 (“[T]respass is an invasion of the plaintiff’s interest in the exclusive possession of his land, while nuisance is an interference with his use and enjoyment of it.” (quoting W.

1928So construed, the case in hand is ruled by Clement’s Admrs. v. Putnam, 68 Vt. 285, 287 , 35 Atl. 181 , and we hold the installation and use of the filling station equipment, being within the area of the grant, is a breach of the covenant and a violation of the plaintiff’s rights.

1894Pl. 314; Clarke v. Gray, 6 East 658: “If the covenant or clause in an agreement is absolute in itself, without any exception or proviso, nor reference to any, it may be stated as an absolute contract, although in a distinct part of the instrument there is a proviso defeating or qualifying it under certain circumstances \ such a proviso is in the nature of a defeasance, and must be set up, if the facts permit it, by the other side.” Bennett, J., in Woodstock Bank v. Downer, 27 Vt. 482 , speaks of provisions in an agreement as “matter in discharge of the contract which may be omitted in the decl

1894Tripp v. Vermont Life Ins Co., 55 Vt. 100 , is in point.