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51 California opinions name it 2 courts 1980–2026 23 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Morenogreen2 sentences2026However, a “[d]efendant’s professed inability to recall the event, without more, [i]s insufficient to warrant an unconsciousness instruction.” (Rogers, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 888 ; see ibid. [“there is no ‘ineluctable rule’ that a defendant’s inability to remember supplies an evidentiary foundation for an unconsciousness instruction”], quoting parenthetically People v. Heffington (1973) 32 Cal.App.3d 1, 10 .) We note that S.A. testified that defendant’s eyes were dilated, and CalFIRE firefighter Aldrich testified defendant had the appearance of someone in shock. 2024A defendant’s “professed inability to recall the event, without more, [i]s insufficient to warrant an unconsciousness instruction.” (People v. Rogers (2006) 39 Cal.4th 826, 888 ; see also People v. Heffington (1973) 32 Cal.App.3d 1, 10 [there is no “ineluctable rule” that a defendant’s inability to 16 remember supplies an evidentiary foundation for an unconsciousness instruction].) “The complicated and purposive nature of his conduct” both before and after the stabbing “makes clear that he did not lack awareness of his actions during the course of the offenses.” (People v. Halvorsen (2007) 42 | 10 | 10 |
People v. Rogersgreen2 sentences2026However, a “[d]efendant’s professed inability to recall the event, without more, [i]s insufficient to warrant an unconsciousness instruction.” (Rogers, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 888 ; see ibid. [“there is no ‘ineluctable rule’ that a defendant’s inability to remember supplies an evidentiary foundation for an unconsciousness instruction”], quoting parenthetically People v. Heffington (1973) 32 Cal.App.3d 1, 10 .) We note that S.A. testified that defendant’s eyes were dilated, and CalFIRE firefighter Aldrich testified defendant had the appearance of someone in shock. 2026He saw Bonilla in his car, and “in his mind at the time it was still an ongoing fight and [he] really [didn’t] remember what transpired.” However, “[d]efendant’s . . . inability to recall [an] event, without more, [is] insufficient to warrant an unconsciousness instruction.” (People v. Rogers (2006) 39 Cal.4th 826, 888 ; People v. Halvorsen (2007) 42 Cal.4th 379, 418 (Halvorsen) [“That [the defendant] did not, by the time of trial, accurately recall certain details of the shootings does not support an inference he was unconscious when he committed them”].) We therefore turn to other evidence i | 6 | 19 |
People v. Halvorsengreen2 sentences2026He saw Bonilla in his car, and “in his mind at the time it was still an ongoing fight and [he] really [didn’t] remember what transpired.” However, “[d]efendant’s . . . inability to recall [an] event, without more, [is] insufficient to warrant an unconsciousness instruction.” (People v. Rogers (2006) 39 Cal.4th 826, 888 ; People v. Halvorsen (2007) 42 Cal.4th 379, 418 (Halvorsen) [“That [the defendant] did not, by the time of trial, accurately recall certain details of the shootings does not support an inference he was unconscious when he committed them”].) We therefore turn to other evidence i 2026He saw Bonilla in his car, and “in his mind at the time it was still an ongoing fight and [he] really [didn’t] remember what transpired.” However, “[d]efendant’s . . . inability to recall [an] event, without more, [is] insufficient to warrant an unconsciousness instruction.” (People v. Rogers (2006) 39 Cal.4th 826, 888 ; People v. Halvorsen (2007) 42 Cal.4th 379, 418 (Halvorsen) [“That [the defendant] did not, by the time of trial, accurately recall certain details of the shootings does not support an inference he was unconscious when he committed them”].) We therefore turn to other evidence i | 6 | 12 |
People v. Phamgreen2 sentences2024The court explained that the requirement that the victim be “ ‘unconscious of the nature of the act’ ” means that the victim must be “ ‘incapable of resisting’ ” because, inter alia, he or she “ ‘[w]as unconscious or asleep’ ” or “ ‘[w]as not aware, knowing, perceiving, or cognizant that the act occurred.’ ” (Miranda, at p. 177; see also People v. Pham (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 919, 928 [“The unconsciousness requirement does not require proof the victim was totally and physically unconscious during the acts in question”].) Similarly, here, there is substantial evidence to support the jury’s verdi 2023To prove sexual battery by fraud, the People must prove that (1) the defendant touched an intimate part of the victim’s body (which includes the groin, any “sexual organ,” or a woman’s “breast”); (2) the touching was done for the specific “purpose of sexual arousal, sexual gratification, or sexual abuse”; and (3) the victim was not “[]conscious of the [sexual] nature of the act” because of the fraudulent representation “that the touching served a professional”—here, a medical—“purpose” when, in fact, it did not. (§ 243.4, subds. (c), (f), (g)(1); CALCRIM No. 937; People v. Pham (2009) 180 Cal. | 4 | 5 |
People v. Wilsongreen2 sentences2015"The complicated and purposive nature of h[er] conduct" both before and after the stabbing "makes clear that [s]he did not lack awareness of h[er] actions during the course of the offense." (Halvorsen, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 418 ; see People v. Heffington (1973) 32 Cal.App.3d 1, 10 [no "ineluctable rule" that a defendant's inability to remember supplies an evidentiary foundation for an unconsciousness instruction].) Nor are we persuaded by the authorities on which defendant relies, People v. Bridgehouse (1956) 47 Cal.2d 406 and People v. Wilson (1967) 66 Cal.2d 749 . 2015"The complicated and purposive nature of h[er] conduct" both before and after the stabbing "makes clear that [s]he did not lack awareness of h[er] actions during the course of the offense." (Halvorsen, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 418 ; see People v. Heffington (1973) 32 Cal.App.3d 1, 10 [no "ineluctable rule" that a defendant's inability to remember supplies an evidentiary foundation for an unconsciousness instruction].) Nor are we persuaded by the authorities on which defendant relies, People v. Bridgehouse (1956) 47 Cal.2d 406 and People v. Wilson (1967) 66 Cal.2d 749 . | 3 | 4 |
People v. Ganagreen2 sentences2026Defendant alternatively argues that, “even if [his] statements about punching and kicking [the decedent] could reasonably be viewed as conflicting with his statements that he blacked out, he was still entitled to the unconsciousness instruction.” He relies on People v. Gana (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 598 for the premise that conflicting evidence as to whether a defendant was unconscious does not negate the requirement that the court instruct on the unconsciousness defense. 2026Defendant alternatively argues that, “even if [his] statements about punching and kicking [the decedent] could reasonably be viewed as conflicting with his statements that he blacked out, he was still entitled to the unconsciousness instruction.” He relies on People v. Gana (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 598 for the premise that conflicting evidence as to whether a defendant was unconscious does not negate the requirement that the court instruct on the unconsciousness defense. | 2 | 5 |
People v. Costongreen2 sentences2023(See Halvorsen, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 418 [“The complicated and 24 purposive nature of [defendant’s] conduct” suggested defendant “did not lack awareness of his actions during the course of the offenses”].) Indeed, a “defendant’s own testimony that he could not remember portions of the events, standing alone, [is] insufficient to warrant an unconsciousness instruction.” (Rogers, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 888 ; see also People v. Froom (1980) 108 Cal.App.3d 820 , 829–830 [evidence of defendant’s forgetfulness and statement to psychiatrist that he “awakened” after the crime was committed was ins 2006(People v. Froom (1980) 108 Cal.App.3d 820, 829-830 [ 166 Cal.Rptr. 786 ] [evidence defendant was forgetful and told a psychiatrist he “awakened” after the crime was committed did not entitle defendant to an unconsciousness instruction]; People v. Heffington (1973) 32 Cal.App.3d 1, 10 [ 107 Cal.Rptr. 859 ] [there is no “ineluctable rule” that a defendant’s inability to remember supplies an evidentiary foundation for an unconsciousness instruction]; cf. People v. Coston (1947) 82 Cal. App. 2d 23, 40 [ 185 P.2d 632 ] [“a defendant’s mere statement of forgetfulness, unsupported by any other evide | 2 | 3 |
People v. Bridgehousegreen2 sentences2015"The complicated and purposive nature of h[er] conduct" both before and after the stabbing "makes clear that [s]he did not lack awareness of h[er] actions during the course of the offense." (Halvorsen, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 418 ; see People v. Heffington (1973) 32 Cal.App.3d 1, 10 [no "ineluctable rule" that a defendant's inability to remember supplies an evidentiary foundation for an unconsciousness instruction].) Nor are we persuaded by the authorities on which defendant relies, People v. Bridgehouse (1956) 47 Cal.2d 406 and People v. Wilson (1967) 66 Cal.2d 749 . 2015"The complicated and purposive nature of h[er] conduct" both before and after the stabbing "makes clear that [s]he did not lack awareness of h[er] actions during the course of the offense." (Halvorsen, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 418 ; see People v. Heffington (1973) 32 Cal.App.3d 1, 10 [no "ineluctable rule" that a defendant's inability to remember supplies an evidentiary foundation for an unconsciousness instruction].) Nor are we persuaded by the authorities on which defendant relies, People v. Bridgehouse (1956) 47 Cal.2d 406 and People v. Wilson (1967) 66 Cal.2d 749 . | 2 | 3 |
People v. Froomgreen2 sentences2023(See Halvorsen, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 418 [“The complicated and 24 purposive nature of [defendant’s] conduct” suggested defendant “did not lack awareness of his actions during the course of the offenses”].) Indeed, a “defendant’s own testimony that he could not remember portions of the events, standing alone, [is] insufficient to warrant an unconsciousness instruction.” (Rogers, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 888 ; see also People v. Froom (1980) 108 Cal.App.3d 820 , 829–830 [evidence of defendant’s forgetfulness and statement to psychiatrist that he “awakened” after the crime was committed was ins 2006(People v. Froom (1980) 108 Cal.App.3d 820, 829-830 [ 166 Cal.Rptr. 786 ] [evidence defendant was forgetful and told a psychiatrist he “awakened” after the crime was committed did not entitle defendant to an unconsciousness instruction]; People v. Heffington (1973) 32 Cal.App.3d 1, 10 [ 107 Cal.Rptr. 859 ] [there is no “ineluctable rule” that a defendant’s inability to remember supplies an evidentiary foundation for an unconsciousness instruction]; cf. People v. Coston (1947) 82 Cal. App. 2d 23, 40 [ 185 P.2d 632 ] [“a defendant’s mere statement of forgetfulness, unsupported by any other evide | 2 | 2 |
People v. Ogunmolagreen2 sentences2021(Former § 288a, subd. (f)(1)-(2).) As cases interpreting this language have stated, “[i]t is settled that a victim need not be totally and physically unconscious.” (People v. Ogunmola (1987) 193 Cal.App.3d 274, 279 ; see also People v. Pham (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 919, 928 [“The unconsciousness requirement does not require proof the victim was totally and physically unconscious during the acts in question.”]; People v. Howard (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 53, 55 .) “In this context, unconsciousness is related to the issue of consent . . . .” (People v. Ogunmola, supra, at p. 279 .) S.C.’s testimony reg 2021(Former § 288a, subd. (f)(1)-(2).) As cases interpreting this language have stated, “[i]t is settled that a victim need not be totally and physically unconscious.” (People v. Ogunmola (1987) 193 Cal.App.3d 274, 279 ; see also People v. Pham (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 919, 928 [“The unconsciousness requirement does not require proof the victim was totally and physically unconscious during the acts in question.”]; People v. Howard (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 53, 55 .) “In this context, unconsciousness is related to the issue of consent . . . .” (People v. Ogunmola, supra, at p. 279 .) S.C.’s testimony reg | 1 | 2 |
People v. Bartongreen2 sentences2016(People v. Barton (1995) 12 Cal.4th 186, 196 .) Here, there is no evidence the unconsciousness instruction applies. 2013To be substantial, testimony supporting an unconsciousness instruction must be "evidence that a reasonable jury could find persuasive." (People v. Barton, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 201, fn. 8 .) Here, the evidence on which Segrest relies—specifically, his own testimony and that of his uncle, his mother, and his girlfriend—is not evidence a reasonable jury could find persuasive. | 1 | 2 |
People v. Carlsongreen2 sentences2016(Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 689 10 Halvorsen, supra, 42 Cal.4th at pp. 418-419 [holding that the trial court properly refused the requested unconsciousness instruction when the defendant’s testimony demonstrated purposeful action, despite expert’s opinion that the defendant’s blood-alcohol level approached .20 percent and that the defendant frequently experienced memory losses from excessive drinking]; People v. Carlson (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 695, 704 [holding that the evidence was insufficient to support an unconsciousness instruction in a murder case despite defendant’s testimony that 2015A “professed inability to recall the event, without more, [is] insufficient to warrant an unconsciousness instruction. [Citations.]” (People v. Rogers (2006) 39 Cal.4th 826, 888 .) “[W]hile ‘a reviewing court’ must ‘assume that [the defendant’s] selective recollection was natural, not feigned’ it is ‘far short of a claim or description of . . . coexistent unconsciousness.’” (People v. Carlson, supra, 200 Cal.App.4th at p. 704 .) Nevertheless, defendant remembered the event well enough to describe it in detail. | 1 | 2 |
People v. Heffingtongreen2 sentences2011A “[defendant's professed inability to recall the event, without more, [i]s insufficient to warrant an unconsciousness instruction. [Citations.]” (People v. Rogers (2006) 39 Cal.4th 826, 888 [ 48 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 , 141 P.3d 135 ]; see also People v. Heffington (1973) 32 Cal.App.3d 1, 10 [ 107 Cal.Rptr. 859 ] [while “a reviewing court” must “assume that [the defendant’s] selective recollection was natural, not feigned” it is “far short of a claim or description of . . . coexistent unconsciousness”].) Schneider’s testimony adds little weight since he acknowledged his opinion was “bas[ed] ... on the 2006(People v. Froom (1980) 108 Cal.App.3d 820, 829-830 [ 166 Cal.Rptr. 786 ] [evidence defendant was forgetful and told a psychiatrist he “awakened” after the crime was committed did not entitle defendant to an unconsciousness instruction]; People v. Heffington (1973) 32 Cal.App.3d 1, 10 [ 107 Cal.Rptr. 859 ] [there is no “ineluctable rule” that a defendant’s inability to remember supplies an evidentiary foundation for an unconsciousness instruction]; cf. People v. Coston (1947) 82 Cal. App. 2d 23, 40 [ 185 P.2d 632 ] [“a defendant’s mere statement of forgetfulness, unsupported by any other evide | 1 | 2 |
People v. Hillgreen1 sentence2025(People v. Berryman (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1048, 1081 , disapproved on another ground in People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 823, fn.1 .) An unconsciousness instruction was not required here, despite any speculation from the victim or Doe about defendant being asleep. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Burnickgreen1 sentence2023(Mathson, supra, 201 Cal.App.4th at p. 1323 & fn. 26.) Mathson is not authority for requiring the use of the term “legally unconscious.” (People v. Burnick (1975) 14 Cal.3d 306, 317 [“cases are not authority for propositions not considered”].) In sum, the unconsciousness instruction provided here was not erroneous or misleading. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Newtongreen1 sentence2022But the trial court concluded the additional language was appropriate. “[U]nconsciousness is a complete defense except where it is caused by voluntary intoxication.” (People v. Heffington (1973) 32 Cal.App.3d 1, 8 (Heffington); see also § 26.) It “need not reach the physical dimensions commonly associated with the term (coma, inertia, incapability of locomotion or manual action, and so on); it can exist . . . where the subject physically acts in fact but is not, at the time, conscious of acting.” (People v. Newton (1970) 8 Cal.App.3d 359, 376 (Newton).) The unconsciousness defense can be raise | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Raygreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Kittgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Cruzgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Freemangreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Babbittgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Smitheygreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Logginsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Patterson v. New Yorkgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Engle v. Isaacgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Martin v. Ohiogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Wright
green
2 sentences2024In such cases the issue should not be deemed to have been removed from the jury’s consideration since it has been resolved in another context, and there can be no prejudice to the defendant since the evidence that would support a finding [favorable to the defendant] has been rejected by the jury.”’” (People v. Gana, supra, 236 Cal.App.4th at p. 610 , quoting People v. Wright (2006) 40 Cal.4th 81, 98 .) 9 As to the charge of implied malice murder, defendant’s jury was instructed that crime required the prosecution to prove 1) defendant intentionally committed an act; 2) the natural and probable 2020But we need not address whether substantial evidence supported an unconsciousness defense, as any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because “ ‘the factual question posed by the omitted instruction was necessarily resolved adversely to the defendant under other, properly given instructions.’ ” (People v. Wright (2006) 40 Cal.4th 81, 98 .) Although the jury found that the attempted murder was not willful, deliberate, and premeditated, it did make findings of willfulness in connection with the other five convictions. | 2 | 2020–2024 |
People v. James
green
2 sentences2023(See Halvorsen, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 418 [“The complicated and 24 purposive nature of [defendant’s] conduct” suggested defendant “did not lack awareness of his actions during the course of the offenses”].) Indeed, a “defendant’s own testimony that he could not remember portions of the events, standing alone, [is] insufficient to warrant an unconsciousness instruction.” (Rogers, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 888 ; see also People v. Froom (1980) 108 Cal.App.3d 820 , 829–830 [evidence of defendant’s forgetfulness and statement to psychiatrist that he “awakened” after the crime was committed was ins 2023(See Halvorsen, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 418 [“The complicated and 24 purposive nature of [defendant’s] conduct” suggested defendant “did not lack awareness of his actions during the course of the offenses”].) Indeed, a “defendant’s own testimony that he could not remember portions of the events, standing alone, [is] insufficient to warrant an unconsciousness instruction.” (Rogers, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 888 ; see also People v. Froom (1980) 108 Cal.App.3d 820 , 829–830 [evidence of defendant’s forgetfulness and statement to psychiatrist that he “awakened” after the crime was committed was ins | 2 | 2021–2023 |
People v. Watson
green
2 sentences2016(See, People v. Boyer (2006) 38 Cal.4th 412, 475 .) Defendant contends that we must apply the federal constitutional harmless error standard from Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 , 24—i.e., the prosecution must show that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt—although he acknowledges that under People v. Beltran (2013) 56 Cal.4th 935, 955 , a nonconstitutional claim of misdirection of the jury is reviewed under the California harmless error standard as established in People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 . 2015Consequently, the error was not harmless under People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 [ 299 P.2d 243 ]. | 2 | 2015–2016 |
People v. Sedeno
green
2 sentences2015(See People v. Sedeno (1974) 10 Cal.3d 703, 717 , overruled on other grounds 10 in People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142 [―An unconscious act within the contemplation of the Penal Code is one committed by a person who because of somnambulism, a blow on the head, or similar cause is not conscious of acting and whose act therefore cannot be deemed volitional.‖]; People v. Freeman (1943) 61 Cal.App.2d 110, 118 [jury instruction required where the defendant‘s unconsciousness was due to epilepsy]; Cruz, supra, 83 Cal.App.3d at p. 330 [unconsciousness instruction should be given where there is e 2014(See People v. Mathson (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 1297, 1315-1316 .) “An unconscious act within the contemplation of the Penal Code is one committed by a person who because of somnambulism, a blow on the head, or similar cause is not conscious of acting and whose act therefore cannot be deemed volitional.” (People v. Sedeno (1974) 10 Cal.3d 703, 717 , overruled on another ground in People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 165 .) Unconsciousness is a complete defense to a criminal charge. (§ 26.) As previously discussed, the upshot of Dr. Howsepian’s testimony was that Rodriguez was asleep when h | 2 | 2014–2015 |
People v. Caldwell
green
2 sentences2015(Caldwell, supra, 102 Cal.App.3d at p. 477 .) “People v. Kitt discerned a subsequent trend in the high court to view the terms ‘sound mind’ and ‘legal sanity’ as not being synonymous (see People v. Baker[, supra,] 42 Cal.2d [at p. 568] [ 268 P.2d 705 ]), and concluded that, at present, Penal Code section 26 is properly interpreted as allowing a person of unsound mind to rely on the defense of unconsciousness. ([Kitt, supra,] 83 Cal.App.3d at p. 845. 2015(Caldwell, supra, 102 Cal.App.3d at p. 477 .) ―People v. Kitt discerned a subsequent trend in the high court to view the terms ‗sound mind‘ and ‗legal sanity‘ as not being synonymous (see People v. Baker[, supra,] 42 Cal.2d [at p. 568] . . . ), and concluded that, at present, Penal Code section 26 is properly interpreted as allowing a person of unsound mind to rely on the defense of unconsciousness. ([Kitt, supra,] 83 Cal.App.3d at p. 845 . | 2 | 2015–2015 |
People v. Breverman
green
2 sentences2015(See People v. Sedeno (1974) 10 Cal.3d 703, 717 , overruled on other grounds 10 in People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142 [―An unconscious act within the contemplation of the Penal Code is one committed by a person who because of somnambulism, a blow on the head, or similar cause is not conscious of acting and whose act therefore cannot be deemed volitional.‖]; People v. Freeman (1943) 61 Cal.App.2d 110, 118 [jury instruction required where the defendant‘s unconsciousness was due to epilepsy]; Cruz, supra, 83 Cal.App.3d at p. 330 [unconsciousness instruction should be given where there is e 2014(See People v. Mathson (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 1297, 1315-1316 .) “An unconscious act within the contemplation of the Penal Code is one committed by a person who because of somnambulism, a blow on the head, or similar cause is not conscious of acting and whose act therefore cannot be deemed volitional.” (People v. Sedeno (1974) 10 Cal.3d 703, 717 , overruled on another ground in People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 165 .) Unconsciousness is a complete defense to a criminal charge. (§ 26.) As previously discussed, the upshot of Dr. Howsepian’s testimony was that Rodriguez was asleep when h | 2 | 2014–2015 |
People v. Mathson
green
2 sentences2014(See People v. Mathson (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 1297, 1315-1316 .) “An unconscious act within the contemplation of the Penal Code is one committed by a person who because of somnambulism, a blow on the head, or similar cause is not conscious of acting and whose act therefore cannot be deemed volitional.” (People v. Sedeno (1974) 10 Cal.3d 703, 717 , overruled on another ground in People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 165 .) Unconsciousness is a complete defense to a criminal charge. (§ 26.) As previously discussed, the upshot of Dr. Howsepian’s testimony was that Rodriguez was asleep when h 2014Relying on People v. Mathson (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 1297 (Mathson), defendant contends that the portion of the instruction that states “ ‘[i]f there is proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant acted as if he were conscious, you should conclude that he was legally conscious,’ ” (id. at p. 1322) was misleading in the sense that the jury could conclude he was conscious merely because he acted as if he were conscious. | 2 | 2014–2014 |
People v. Millbrook
green
1 sentence2026Having considered the entire record in a light most favorable to defendant (see People v. Millbrook, supra, 222 Cal.App.4th at p. 1137 ), we conclude there is not substantial evidence that, when he beat the decedent to death, defendant was voluntarily intoxicated and unconscious as a result of his cocaine use. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Sullivan v. Louisiana
green
1 sentence2025(See Sullivan v. Louisiana (1993) 508 U.S. 275, 279 .) No rational juror who made the findings reflected in the verdict and heard the evidence at trial could have had reasonable doubt regarding the findings necessary to convict appellant absent this presumed instructional error. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
People v. Berryman
green
1 sentence2025(People v. Berryman (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1048, 1081 , disapproved on another ground in People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 823, fn.1 .) An unconsciousness instruction was not required here, despite any speculation from the victim or Doe about defendant being asleep. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
State v. Snyder
neutral
1 sentence2024(See generally State v. Snyder (N.C.Ct.App. 1984) 319 S.E.2d 668 [in a drunk driving homicide case, the defendant was entitled to raise the defense of unconsciousness based on evidence he had suffered a concussion in a fight before causing the fatal accident]; 2 LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law (2d ed. 2003) § 9.4 at pp. 34-35 [an unconsciousness defense may be available when the defendant’s condition is brought about by a concussion or other physical trauma].) However, even if unconsciousness instructions were required, “[t]he absence of an instruction on a defense is not prejudicial if ‘“the | 1 | 2024–2024 |
People v. Turk
green
1 sentence2023(Turk, supra, 164 Cal.App.4th at p. 1379 .) Evidence that Orozco was intoxicated before the killing (he had drunk multiple “strong beers” and had a blood alcohol level of two to three times the legal limit) and that he could not remember stabbing Victor was insufficient, by itself, to warrant an unconsciousness instruction. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
People v. Ghobrial
green
1 sentence2023We only ask whether the record as a whole “‘“discloses substantial evidence—that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”’” (People v. Ghobrial (2018) 5 Cal.5th 250, 277 .) In undertaking this inquiry, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, which includes “‘resolv[ing] conflicting inferences’” and credibility findings in favor of the verdict. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| People v. Howard green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| People v. Marshall green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
People v. Martin
green
1 sentence2021In denying the request, the trial court stated that “there was no evidence to show [Doane] was unconscious or disabled” or “in shock.” Doane does not challenge this ruling on appeal. 35 Thus, “[i]f the defense presents substantial evidence of unconsciousness, the trial court errs in refusing to instruct on its effect as a complete defense.” (Halvorsen, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 417 .) We review de novo “a claim that a court failed to properly instruct on the applicable principles of law.” (People v. Martin (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1107, 1111 .) Although Doane separately argues that (1) he actually | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| People v. Superior Court (Rodrigo O.) green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| People v. Superior Court (Jones) green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| People v. Beltran green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Strickland v. Washington green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Chapman v. California red | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| People v. Thomas green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| People v. Boyer red | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| People v. Mil green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| People v. Baker green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| People v. Weaver green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| People v. Ramirez green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| People v. Cole green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| People v. Waidla green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| People v. Velez green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| In Re Devon T. green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| People v. Mower green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| People v. Boyes green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| People v. Carmichael green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.