doctrines waiver in Illinois

2005In People v. McGhee, 337 Ill.App.3d 992 , 272 Ill.Dec. 509 , 787 N.E.2d 324 (2003), and People v. Blair, 338 Ill.App.3d 429 , 272 Ill.Dec. 936 , 788 N.E.2d 240 (2003), appeal allowed, 205 Ill.2d 594 , 281 Ill.Dec. 82 , 803 N.E.2d 486 (2003), the third division of the First District held that, based on our supreme court's decision in People v. Boclair, 202 Ill.2d 89 , 273 Ill.Dec. 560 , 789 N.E.2d 734 (2002), trial courts are prohibited from considering the doctrines of waiver, procedural default and res judicata in deciding whether a postconviction petition should be summarily dismissed.

2005In People v. McGhee, 337 Ill.App.3d 992 , 272 Ill.Dec. 509 , 787 N.E.2d 324 (2003), and People v. Blair, 338 Ill.App.3d 429 , 272 Ill.Dec. 936 , 788 N.E.2d 240 (2003), appeal allowed, 205 Ill.2d 594 , 281 Ill.Dec. 82 , 803 N.E.2d 486 (2003), the third division of the First District held that, based on our supreme court's decision in People v. Boclair, 202 Ill.2d 89 , 273 Ill.Dec. 560 , 789 N.E.2d 734 (2002), trial courts are prohibited from considering the doctrines of waiver, procedural default and res judicata in deciding whether a postconviction petition should be summarily dismissed.

2020In reaching this conclusion, we stated that “the doctrines of waiver and res judicata apply to appeals from the denial of post-conviction petitions only in cases ‘where a petitioner has previously taken a direct appeal from a judgment of conviction.’ ” Id. at 842 (quoting People v. Flores, 153 Ill. 2d 264, 274 (1992)).Further, while the defendant “could have waived—by failure to appeal—issues of mere trial error, she is ‘still entitled to assert those constitutional rights which the *** Act is designed to protect and preserve.’ ” Id. (quoting People v. Rose, 43 Ill. 2d 273, 279 (1969)). 2 2 As

2020In reaching this conclusion, we stated that “the doctrines of waiver and res judicata apply to appeals from the denial of post-conviction petitions only in cases ‘where a petitioner has previously taken a direct appeal from a judgment of conviction.’ ” Id. at 842 (quoting People v. Flores, 153 Ill. 2d 264, 274 (1992)).Further, while the defendant “could have waived—by failure to appeal—issues of mere trial error, she is ‘still entitled to assert those constitutional rights which the *** Act is designed to protect and preserve.’ ” Id. (quoting People v. Rose, 43 Ill. 2d 273, 279 (1969)). 2 2 As

2020In reaching this conclusion, we stated that “the doctrines of waiver and res judicata apply to appeals from the denial of post-conviction petitions only in cases ‘where a petitioner has previously taken a direct appeal from a judgment of conviction.’ ” Id. at 842 (quoting People v. Flores, 153 Ill. 2d 264, 274 (1992)).Further, while the defendant “could have waived—by failure to appeal—issues of mere trial error, she is ‘still entitled to assert those constitutional rights which the *** Act is designed to protect and preserve.’ ” Id. (quoting People v. Rose, 43 Ill. 2d 273, 279 (1969)). 2 2 As

2007Although defendant could have waived, by failure to appeal, issues of mere trial error, he is "still entitled to assert those constitutional rights which the Post-Conviction Act is designed to protect and preserve." Rose, 43 Ill. 2d at 279 .

2000People v. Neal, 142 Ill.2d 140, 146 , 154 Ill.Dec. 587 , 568 N.E.2d 808 (1990).

2000People v. Neal, 142 Ill. 2d 140, 146 (1990).

2019See In re Shermaine S. , 2015 IL App (1st) 142421 , ¶ 32, 389 Ill.Dec. 78 , 25 N.E.3d 723 .

2019See In re Shermaine S. , 2015 IL App (1st) 142421 , ¶ 32, 389 Ill.Dec. 78 , 25 N.E.3d 723 .

2002The law is clear that the doctrines of waiver and res judicata apply to appeals from the denial of postconviction petitions only in cases “where a petitioner has previously taken a direct appeal from a judgment of conviction.” People v. Flores, 153 Ill. 2d 264, 274 (1992); People v. Barrow, 195 Ill. 2d 506, 519 (2001).

2002The law is clear that the doctrines of waiver and res judicata apply to appeals from the denial of post-conviction petitions only in cases "where a petitioner has previously taken a direct appeal from a judgment of conviction." People v. Barrow , 195 Ill. 2d 506, 519 (2001); People v. Flores , 153 Ill. 2d 264, 274 (1992).

2005In People v. Jefferson, 345 Ill.App.3d 60, 70 , 279 Ill.Dec. 878 , 801 N.E.2d 552 (2003), the fourth division of the First District disagreed with the holdings in McGhee and Blair and held that trial courts could consider both waiver and res judicata at the summary dismissal stage.

2005In People v. Jefferson, 345 Ill.App.3d 60, 70 , 279 Ill.Dec. 878 , 801 N.E.2d 552 (2003), the fourth division of the First District disagreed with the holdings in McGhee and Blair and held that trial courts could consider both waiver and res judicata at the summary dismissal stage.

2025Whether laches is applicable depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case (Tillman, 2021 IL 126387, ¶ 25 ) and is generally a discretionary decision to be made by the trial court (Van Milligan v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners of Village of Glenview, 158 Ill. 2d 85, 91 (1994)). ¶ 19 In the present case, after reviewing the record and considering the legal principles set forth above, we conclude that Angela was barred by the doctrines of waiver and laches from asserting or maintaining her fee waiver as to GAL Covert’s fees.

2024A reviewing court as a “matter of grace” may consider an unpreserved error, but only in the most exceptional circumstances “involving deprivation of life or liberty” or an egregious error compromising a party’s right to “a fair and impartial trial.” People v. De La Paz, 204 Ill. 2d 426, 432 (2003) (quoting People v. Burson, 11 Ill. 2d 360, 370-71 (1957)).

2024A reviewing court as a “matter of grace” may consider an unpreserved error, but only in the most exceptional circumstances “involving deprivation of life or liberty” or an egregious error compromising a party’s right to “a fair and impartial trial.” People v. De La Paz, 204 Ill. 2d 426, 432 (2003) (quoting People v. Burson, 11 Ill. 2d 360, 370-71 (1957)).

2021People v. Brown, 2017 IL App (2d) 160971, ¶¶ 23-24 (explaining that law-of-the-case doctrine applies, rather than res judicata, on second appeal following earlier remand). 17 ¶ 61 To be sure, we recognize that the circuit court initially indicated on remand that it would “make sure” the State produced the hair and fiber affidavit.

2021“The rule is that no question which was raised or could have been raised in a prior appeal on the merits can be urged on subsequent appeal and those not raised are considered waived. [Citations.] *** In such a case it is presumed that appellant has no objections to urge against the record except those which have been presented and he will not be permitted to assign such errors on a second appeal.” Kazubowski v. Kazubowski, 45 Ill. 2d 405, 413-14 (1970) Accordingly, defendant was barred by the doctrines of waiver and law-of-the-case from raising the issue and is similarly barred from raising th

2021See People v. Schoonover, 2019 IL App (4th) 160882, ¶ 15 . ¶ 32 Although often conflated or used interchangeably, the doctrines of waiver and forfeiture are distinct.

2020See People v. Thompson, 2015 IL 118151, ¶ 32 (challenge to a final judgment based on a facially unconstitutional statute that is void ab initio may be raised at any time).