6 Arizona opinions name it 2 courts 1987–2017 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Moodygreen1 sentence2017Thus, where it appeal’s a party may have an unavoidable, recurring conflict with any attorney—for ex- ample, because he insists on an impermissible defense—a trial court must make “very clear” that if “another irreconcilable conflict develops as a result,” he “will have to choose between his [presently assigned] lawyer or self-representation.” Moody, 192 Ariz. 505, ¶ 26 , 968 P.2d at 582 (Martone, J., concurring), cited with approval in Daniel Y., 206 Ariz. 257, ¶ 17 , 77 P.3d at 59 . ¶ 18 In Daniel Y., we noted the supreme court’s approval of the choice afforded in Henry , requiring a defenda | 1 | 1 |
State v. Holsingergreen2 sentences2011See United States v. Cochran, 770 F.2d 850, 852 (9th Cir.1985) (“retrospective inquiries to determine the validity of waivers are likely to be futile”); cf. State v. Holsinger, 124 Ariz. 18, 22 , 601 P.2d 1054, 1058 (1979) (A client “should be able to speak freely without any fear and in full confidence that what is said by him or to him by his attorney will not be subsequently subject to disclosure____”) (quoting People v. Shapiro, 308 N.Y. 453 , 126 N.E.2d 559, 562 (1955)). ¶ 14 The State, however, argues that we should follow State v. Morales, 215 Ariz. 59 , 157 P.3d 479 (2007), in ordering 2011See United States v. Cochran, 770 F.2d 850, 852 (9th Cir.1985) (“retrospective inquiries to determine the validity of waivers are likely to be futile”); cf. State v. Holsinger, 124 Ariz. 18, 22 , 601 P.2d 1054, 1058 (1979) (A client “should be able to speak freely without any fear and in full confidence that what is said by him or to him by his attorney will not be subsequently subject to disclosure____”) (quoting People v. Shapiro, 308 N.Y. 453 , 126 N.E.2d 559, 562 (1955)). ¶ 14 The State, however, argues that we should follow State v. Morales, 215 Ariz. 59 , 157 P.3d 479 (2007), in ordering | 1 | 1 |
United States v. David Cochrangreen1 sentence2011See United States v. Cochran, 770 F.2d 850, 852 (9th Cir.1985) (“retrospective inquiries to determine the validity of waivers are likely to be futile”); cf. State v. Holsinger, 124 Ariz. 18, 22 , 601 P.2d 1054, 1058 (1979) (A client “should be able to speak freely without any fear and in full confidence that what is said by him or to him by his attorney will not be subsequently subject to disclosure____”) (quoting People v. Shapiro, 308 N.Y. 453 , 126 N.E.2d 559, 562 (1955)). ¶ 14 The State, however, argues that we should follow State v. Morales, 215 Ariz. 59 , 157 P.3d 479 (2007), in ordering | 1 | 1 |
People v. Shapirogreen2 sentences2011See United States v. Cochran, 770 F.2d 850, 852 (9th Cir.1985) (“retrospective inquiries to determine the validity of waivers are likely to be futile”); cf. State v. Holsinger, 124 Ariz. 18, 22 , 601 P.2d 1054, 1058 (1979) (A client “should be able to speak freely without any fear and in full confidence that what is said by him or to him by his attorney will not be subsequently subject to disclosure____”) (quoting People v. Shapiro, 308 N.Y. 453 , 126 N.E.2d 559, 562 (1955)). ¶ 14 The State, however, argues that we should follow State v. Morales, 215 Ariz. 59 , 157 P.3d 479 (2007), in ordering 2011See United States v. Cochran, 770 F.2d 850, 852 (9th Cir.1985) (“retrospective inquiries to determine the validity of waivers are likely to be futile”); cf. State v. Holsinger, 124 Ariz. 18, 22 , 601 P.2d 1054, 1058 (1979) (A client “should be able to speak freely without any fear and in full confidence that what is said by him or to him by his attorney will not be subsequently subject to disclosure____”) (quoting People v. Shapiro, 308 N.Y. 453 , 126 N.E.2d 559, 562 (1955)). ¶ 14 The State, however, argues that we should follow State v. Morales, 215 Ariz. 59 , 157 P.3d 479 (2007), in ordering | 1 | 1 |
McKaney v. Foremangreen2 sentences2007County of Maricopa, 209 Ariz. 268 , 271 ¶¶ 13, 15, 100 P.3d 18, 21 (2004). (3) Tucker’s sentences constitute an impermissible violation of the Ex Post Fac-to application of the law offending the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. 2007County of Maricopa, 209 Ariz. 268 , 271 ¶¶ 13, 15, 100 P.3d 18, 21 (2004). (3) Tucker’s sentences constitute an impermissible violation of the Ex Post Fac-to application of the law offending the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. | 1 | 1 |
State, City of Mankato v. Chirpichgreen1 sentence1991See State v. Chirpich, supra (statute with similar two-hour provision did not raise an impermissible presumption regarding the accused’s BAC). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arizona. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Moody
green
1 sentence2017Thus, where it appeal’s a party may have an unavoidable, recurring conflict with any attorney—for ex- ample, because he insists on an impermissible defense—a trial court must make “very clear” that if “another irreconcilable conflict develops as a result,” he “will have to choose between his [presently assigned] lawyer or self-representation.” Moody, 192 Ariz. 505, ¶ 26 , 968 P.2d at 582 (Martone, J., concurring), cited with approval in Daniel Y., 206 Ariz. 257, ¶ 17 , 77 P.3d at 59 . ¶ 18 In Daniel Y., we noted the supreme court’s approval of the choice afforded in Henry , requiring a defenda | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Daniel Y. v. Arizona Department of Economic Security
green
2 sentences2017Thus, where it appeal’s a party may have an unavoidable, recurring conflict with any attorney—for ex- ample, because he insists on an impermissible defense—a trial court must make “very clear” that if “another irreconcilable conflict develops as a result,” he “will have to choose between his [presently assigned] lawyer or self-representation.” Moody, 192 Ariz. 505, ¶ 26 , 968 P.2d at 582 (Martone, J., concurring), cited with approval in Daniel Y., 206 Ariz. 257, ¶ 17 , 77 P.3d at 59 . ¶ 18 In Daniel Y., we noted the supreme court’s approval of the choice afforded in Henry , requiring a defenda 2017Thus, where it appeal’s a party may have an unavoidable, recurring conflict with any attorney—for ex- ample, because he insists on an impermissible defense—a trial court must make “very clear” that if “another irreconcilable conflict develops as a result,” he “will have to choose between his [presently assigned] lawyer or self-representation.” Moody, 192 Ariz. 505, ¶ 26 , 968 P.2d at 582 (Martone, J., concurring), cited with approval in Daniel Y., 206 Ariz. 257, ¶ 17 , 77 P.3d at 59 . ¶ 18 In Daniel Y., we noted the supreme court’s approval of the choice afforded in Henry , requiring a defenda | 1 | 2017–2017 |
State v. Henry
green
2 sentences2017Thus, where it appeal’s a party may have an unavoidable, recurring conflict with any attorney—for ex- ample, because he insists on an impermissible defense—a trial court must make “very clear” that if “another irreconcilable conflict develops as a result,” he “will have to choose between his [presently assigned] lawyer or self-representation.” Moody, 192 Ariz. 505, ¶ 26 , 968 P.2d at 582 (Martone, J., concurring), cited with approval in Daniel Y., 206 Ariz. 257, ¶ 17 , 77 P.3d at 59 . ¶ 18 In Daniel Y., we noted the supreme court’s approval of the choice afforded in Henry , requiring a defenda 2017Thus, where it appeal’s a party may have an unavoidable, recurring conflict with any attorney—for ex- ample, because he insists on an impermissible defense—a trial court must make “very clear” that if “another irreconcilable conflict develops as a result,” he “will have to choose between his [presently assigned] lawyer or self-representation.” Moody, 192 Ariz. 505, ¶ 26 , 968 P.2d at 582 (Martone, J., concurring), cited with approval in Daniel Y., 206 Ariz. 257, ¶ 17 , 77 P.3d at 59 . ¶ 18 In Daniel Y., we noted the supreme court’s approval of the choice afforded in Henry , requiring a defenda | 1 | 2017–2017 |
State v. Innes
green
1 sentence2013To ascertain whether Becerra had understood fully his rights based on that discussion “likely would require an impermissible inquiry into privileged communications between him and his counsel.” Id. ¶ 18 Becerra also contends the state may not retry him because jeopardy has attached. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
State v. Morales
green
2 sentences2011See United States v. Cochran, 770 F.2d 850, 852 (9th Cir.1985) (“retrospective inquiries to determine the validity of waivers are likely to be futile”); cf. State v. Holsinger, 124 Ariz. 18, 22 , 601 P.2d 1054, 1058 (1979) (A client “should be able to speak freely without any fear and in full confidence that what is said by him or to him by his attorney will not be subsequently subject to disclosure____”) (quoting People v. Shapiro, 308 N.Y. 453 , 126 N.E.2d 559, 562 (1955)). ¶ 14 The State, however, argues that we should follow State v. Morales, 215 Ariz. 59 , 157 P.3d 479 (2007), in ordering 2011See United States v. Cochran, 770 F.2d 850, 852 (9th Cir.1985) (“retrospective inquiries to determine the validity of waivers are likely to be futile”); cf. State v. Holsinger, 124 Ariz. 18, 22 , 601 P.2d 1054, 1058 (1979) (A client “should be able to speak freely without any fear and in full confidence that what is said by him or to him by his attorney will not be subsequently subject to disclosure____”) (quoting People v. Shapiro, 308 N.Y. 453 , 126 N.E.2d 559, 562 (1955)). ¶ 14 The State, however, argues that we should follow State v. Morales, 215 Ariz. 59 , 157 P.3d 479 (2007), in ordering | 1 | 2011–2011 |
State v. Ellison
green
2 sentences2007This Court rejected this argument in Ellison, 213 Ariz. at 146 , 140 P.3d 899 app. 2007This Court rejected this argument in Ellison, 213 Ariz. at 146 , 140 P.3d 899 app. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Morrison v. California
green
2 sentences1991Nor do we find persuasive petitioners’ argument, which relies on Morrison v. California, 291 U.S. 82 , 54 S.Ct. 281 , 78 L.Ed. 664 (1934), that the statute impermissibly shifts the burden of proof by requiring the accused to prove facts that are more easily or conveniently demonstrated by the state. 1991Nor do we find persuasive petitioners’ argument, which relies on Morrison v. California, 291 U.S. 82 , 54 S.Ct. 281 , 78 L.Ed. 664 (1934), that the statute impermissibly shifts the burden of proof by requiring the accused to prove facts that are more easily or conveniently demonstrated by the state. | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Rose v. Clark
green
2 sentences1987The Court reasoned that the impermissible instruction error was “not ‘so basic to a fair trial’ that it can never be harmless.” Id. at -, 106 S.Ct. at 3107, 92 L.Ed.2d at 472 , quoting Chapman, 386 U.S. at 23 , 87 S.Ct. at 828 , 17 L.Ed.2d at 710 . 1987The Court reasoned that the impermissible instruction error was “not ‘so basic to a fair trial’ that it can never be harmless.” Id. at -, 106 S.Ct. at 3107, 92 L.Ed.2d at 472 , quoting Chapman, 386 U.S. at 23 , 87 S.Ct. at 828 , 17 L.Ed.2d at 710 . | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Chapman v. California
red
2 sentences1987The Court reasoned that the impermissible instruction error was “not ‘so basic to a fair trial’ that it can never be harmless.” Id. at -, 106 S.Ct. at 3107, 92 L.Ed.2d at 472 , quoting Chapman, 386 U.S. at 23 , 87 S.Ct. at 828 , 17 L.Ed.2d at 710 . 1987The Court reasoned that the impermissible instruction error was “not ‘so basic to a fair trial’ that it can never be harmless.” Id. at -, 106 S.Ct. at 3107, 92 L.Ed.2d at 472 , quoting Chapman, 386 U.S. at 23 , 87 S.Ct. at 828 , 17 L.Ed.2d at 710 . | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.