impermissible presumption in Texas

2008Brown v. State, 79 S.W.3d 140, 141 (Tex.App.–Texarkana 2002, no pet.); Cooper v. State, 2 S.W.3d 500, 504 (Tex.App.–Texarkana 1999, pet. ref’d).

2008Brown v. State, 79 S.W.3d 140, 141 (Tex.App.–Texarkana 2002, no pet.); Cooper v. State, 2 S.W.3d 500, 504 (Tex.App.–Texarkana 1999, pet. ref’d).

2008Brown v. State, 79 S.W.3d 140, 141 (Tex.App.–Texarkana 2002, no pet.); Cooper v. State, 2 S.W.3d 500, 504 (Tex.App.–Texarkana 1999, pet. ref’d).

2008Brown v. State, 79 S.W.3d 140, 141 (Tex.App.–Texarkana 2002, no pet.); Cooper v. State, 2 S.W.3d 500, 504 (Tex.App.–Texarkana 1999, pet. ref’d).

2014Dist. v. Hughes, 734 S.W.2d 675, 680 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1987, orig. proceeding) (holding that the disclosure of blood donors' identities was not an impermissible violation of constitutional right to privacy).

2006Dist., 734 S.W.2d at 680 (holding that compelling disclosure of blood donors’ identities was not an impermissible violation of constitutional right to privacy).

2000See Casey, 505 U.S. at 879 , 112 S.Ct. 2791 ; Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 164-65 , 93 S.Ct. 705 .

2000See Casey, 505 U.S. at 879 , 112 S.Ct. 2791 ; Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 164-65 , 93 S.Ct. 705 .

2024See Lawrence v. State, 240 S.W.3d 912, 916 (Tex. Crim.

2021Mission Bd. of the S. Baptist Convention, Inc., 966 F.3d 346, 349 (5th Cir. 2020) (holding First Amendment did not bar defamation claim brought by executive director of church’s local mission board against church’s national mission board, based on alleged statements accusing director of refusing to meet with national board’s president, because resolution of claim would not “require the court to address purely ecclesiastical questions”); Drevlow v. Lutheran Church, 991 F.2d 468 , 471–72 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding First Amendment did not bar minister’s libel claim against church based on false sta

2021Mission Bd. of the S. Baptist Convention, Inc., 966 F.3d 346, 349 (5th Cir. 2020) (holding First Amendment did not bar defamation claim brought by executive director of church’s local mission board against church’s national mission board, based on alleged statements accusing director of refusing to meet with national board’s president, because resolution of claim would not “require the court to address purely ecclesiastical questions”); Drevlow v. Lutheran Church, 991 F.2d 468 , 471–72 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding First Amendment did not bar minister’s libel claim against church based on false sta

2021Mission Bd. of the S. Baptist Convention, Inc., 966 F.3d 346, 349 (5th Cir. 2020) (holding First Amendment did not bar defamation claim brought by executive director of church’s local mission board against church’s national mission board, based on alleged statements accusing director of refusing to meet with national board’s president, because resolution of claim would not “require the court to address purely ecclesiastical questions”); Drevlow v. Lutheran Church, 991 F.2d 468 , 471–72 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding First Amendment did not bar minister’s libel claim against church based on false sta

2021Mission Bd. of the S. Baptist Convention, Inc., 966 F.3d 346, 349 (5th Cir. 2020) (holding First Amendment did not bar defamation claim brought by executive director of church’s local mission board against church’s national mission board, based on alleged statements accusing director of refusing to meet with national board’s president, because resolution of claim would not “require the court to address purely ecclesiastical questions”); Drevlow v. Lutheran Church, 991 F.2d 468 , 471–72 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding First Amendment did not bar minister’s libel claim against church based on false sta

2017See RSUI, 466 S.W.3d at 137 (“[W]e may not consider extrinsic evidence to contradict or vary the meaning of the explicit language of the parties’ written agreement.” (internal quotations omitted)).

2013When a defamation claim arises entirely out of a church’s relationship with its pastor, the claim is almost always deemed to be beyond the reach of civil courts because resolution of the claim would require an impermissible inquiry into the church’s bases for its action.”) (quoting Heard v. Johnson, 810 A.2d 871, 875 (D.C.App.2002)).

2012Cf. Accelerated Christian Education, Inc. v. Oracle Corp., 925 S.W.2d 66, 74 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1996, no pet.) (concluding that forum-selection clause specifying that parties would litigate in a forum other than Texas did not constitute an impermissible waiver of rights under the DTPA), overruled in part on other grounds by In re Tyco Electronics Power Systems, Inc., No. 05–04–01808–CV, 2005 WL 237232 (Tex. App.—Dallas Feb.2, 2005, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.).

2008See Fiesta Mart, Inc. , 233 S.W.3d at 55 B 56.

2008See Fiesta Mart, Inc. , 233 S.W.3d at 55 B 56.

2006N.J. 1999) (flyer distributed to organization of rabbis about Jewish parishioner’s failure to comply with orthodox divorce procedures not actionable defamation because truth or falsity of statements was grounded in religious doctrine); Schoenhals v. Mains, 504 N.W.2d 233, 236 (Minn. App. 1993) (defamatory statements made to congregation about dismissed members were not actionable, even though content of statements was not explicitly religious and statements were made after dismissal was complete); Rasmussen v. Bennett, 741 P.2d 755, 756, 759 (Mont. 1987) (same). 16 a church’s relationship with

2006N.J. 1999) (flyer distributed to organization of rabbis about Jewish parishioner’s failure to comply with orthodox divorce procedures not actionable defamation because truth or falsity of statements was grounded in religious doctrine); Schoenhals v. Mains, 504 N.W.2d 233, 236 (Minn. App. 1993) (defamatory statements made to congregation about dismissed members were not actionable, even though content of statements was not explicitly religious and statements were made after dismissal was complete); Rasmussen v. Bennett, 741 P.2d 755, 756, 759 (Mont. 1987) (same). 16 a church’s relationship with

2004See Lehman v. Har-Con Corp. , 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001). [5] Alief and the Intervenors contend that Walsh could not properly raise his affirmative defense of A non-ownership @ in the district court because (1) the district court lacked jurisdiction because Walsh failed to exhaust his administrative remedies in protesting his ownership, and (2) although Walsh couches his affirmative defense in terms of A non-ownership, @ his defense is actually an impermissible challenge to the appraised value of his property.

2002See id.

2000See Davis v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, 258 Mont. 286 , 852 P.2d 640 (1993) (Court held it was impossible to evaluate church discipline because it would involve an impermissible analysis of religious beliefs and practices.); Guinn v. Church of Christ of Collinsville, 775 P.2d 766, 772 (Okla.1989) ("If members of religious organizations could freely pursue their doctrinal grievances in civil courts, ... ecclesiastical liberty would be subjected to governmental interference and the 'unmolested and unobstructed' development of opinion and belief which the First Amendment was des

2000See Davis v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, 258 Mont. 286 , 852 P.2d 640 (1993) (Court held it was impossible to evaluate church discipline because it would involve an impermissible analysis of religious beliefs and practices.); Guinn v. Church of Christ of Collinsville, 775 P.2d 766, 772 (Okla.1989) ("If members of religious organizations could freely pursue their doctrinal grievances in civil courts, ... ecclesiastical liberty would be subjected to governmental interference and the 'unmolested and unobstructed' development of opinion and belief which the First Amendment was des

2000See Davis v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, 258 Mont. 286 , 852 P.2d 640 (1993) (Court held it was impossible to evaluate church discipline because it would involve an impermissible analysis of religious beliefs and practices.); Guinn v. Church of Christ of Collinsville, 775 P.2d 766, 772 (Okla.1989) ("If members of religious organizations could freely pursue their doctrinal grievances in civil courts, ... ecclesiastical liberty would be subjected to governmental interference and the 'unmolested and unobstructed' development of opinion and belief which the First Amendment was des

1999See Perry v. S.N., 973 S.W.2d 301, 306 (Tex.1998) (op. on reh’g) (holding when conduct that is also governed by common-law duty is criminalized by statute, standard of conduct is usually common-law reasonableness); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Ellender, 968 S.W.2d 917, 921 (Tex.1998) (holding gross negligence includes an examination of the events and circumstances from the viewpoint of the defendant at the time the events occurred, without viewing the matter in hindsight).

1999See Perry v. S.N., 973 S.W.2d 301, 306 (Tex.1998) (op. on reh’g) (holding when conduct that is also governed by common-law duty is criminalized by statute, standard of conduct is usually common-law reasonableness); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Ellender, 968 S.W.2d 917, 921 (Tex.1998) (holding gross negligence includes an examination of the events and circumstances from the viewpoint of the defendant at the time the events occurred, without viewing the matter in hindsight).

1998See Gordon v. State, 707 S.W.2d at 629-30 .

1996See Hoffman, 571 F.Supp. at 550 .

1996See Wydel Assocs., 452 F.Supp. at 742 . 2.