impermissible presumption in Michigan

2017And the Court specifically disavowed “dicta in our proportionality cases [that] could be read to have urg[ed] that the guidelines should almost always control” and that thus could be interpreted as “creating an impermissible presumption of unreasonableness for sentences outside the Guidelines range.” Id. at __, slip op at 11 (quotation marks and citations omitted).

2017And the Court specifically disavowed “dicta in our proportionality cases [that] could be read to have urg[ed] that the guidelines should almost always control” and that thus could be interpreted as “creating an impermissible presumption of unreasonableness for sentences outside the Guidelines range.” Id. at __, slip op at 11 (quotation marks and citations omitted).

2023In particular, we explained that our proportionality test—the same test we applied in Steanhouse, and the same one we apply here—comports with the Supreme Court’s warning that reasonableness review may “ ‘come too close to creating an impermissible presumption of unreasonableness for sentences outside the Guidelines range.’ ” Steanhouse, 500 Mich at 474, quoting Gall v United States, 552 US 38, 47 ; 128 S Ct 586 ; 169 L Ed 2d 445 (2007).

2023In particular, we explained that our proportionality test—the same test we applied in Steanhouse, and the same one we apply here—comports with the Supreme Court’s warning that reasonableness review may “ ‘come too close to creating an impermissible presumption of unreasonableness for sentences outside the Guidelines range.’ ” Steanhouse, 500 Mich at 474, quoting Gall v United States, 552 US 38, 47 ; 128 S Ct 586 ; 169 L Ed 2d 445 (2007).

2018Rather than impermissibly measuring proportionality by reference to deviations from the guidelines, our principle of proportionality requires “sentences imposed by the trial court to be proportionate to the seriousness of the circumstances surrounding the offense and the offender.” Milbourn, 435 Mich at 636 . [Steanhouse II, 500 Mich at 474.] Thus, “[w]hen making this determination and sentencing a defendant, a trial court must ‘ “justify the sentence imposed in order to facilitate appellate review,” ’ Steanhouse [II], [500 Mich at 470], quoting Lockridge, 498 Mich at 392 , which ‘includes an

2018Rather than impermissibly measuring proportionality by reference to deviations from the guidelines, our principle of proportionality requires “sentences imposed by the trial court to be proportionate to the seriousness of the circumstances surrounding the offense and the offender.” Milbourn, 435 Mich at 636 . [Steanhouse II, 500 Mich at 474.] Thus, “[w]hen making this determination and sentencing a defendant, a trial court must ‘ “justify the sentence imposed in order to facilitate appellate review,” ’ Steanhouse [II], [500 Mich at 470], quoting Lockridge, 498 Mich at 392 , which ‘includes an

2018Rather than impermissibly measuring proportionality by reference to deviations from the guidelines, our principle of proportionality requires “sentences imposed by the trial court to be proportionate to the seriousness of the circumstances surrounding the offense and the offender.” Milbourn, 435 Mich at 636 . [Steanhouse II, 500 Mich at 474.] Thus, “[w]hen making this determination and sentencing a defendant, a trial court must ‘ “justify the sentence imposed in order to facilitate appellate review,” ’ Steanhouse [II], [500 Mich at 470], quoting Lockridge, 498 Mich at 392 , which ‘includes an

2018Rather than impermissibly measuring proportionality by reference to deviations from the guidelines, our principle of proportionality requires “sentences imposed by the trial court to be proportionate to the seriousness of the circumstances surrounding the offense and the offender.” Milbourn, 435 Mich at 636 . [Steanhouse II, 500 Mich at 474.] Thus, “[w]hen making this determination and sentencing a defendant, a trial court must ‘ “justify the sentence imposed in order to facilitate appellate review,” ’ Steanhouse [II], [500 Mich at 470], quoting Lockridge, 498 Mich at 392 , which ‘includes an

2021Accordingly, when a statute and court rule conflict, a reviewing court is tasked with determining whether the statute “is an impermissible rule governing the practice and procedure of the courts or a valid enactment of substantive law.” Watkins, 491 Mich at 473 .

2020Hecht v Nat’l Heritage Academies, Inc, 499 Mich 586, 604 ; 886 NW2d 135 (2016) (a court abuses its discretion when its decision falls outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes).

2020Hecht v Nat’l Heritage Academies, Inc, 499 Mich 586, 604 ; 886 NW2d 135 (2016) (a court abuses its discretion when its decision falls outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes).

2016“It is not enough,” our Supreme Court aptly noted more than 50 years ago, “for an appellant in his brief simply to announce a position or assert an error and then leave it up to this Court to discover and rationalize the basis for his claims, or unravel and elaborate for him his arguments, and then search for authority either to sustain or reject his position.” Mitcham v Detroit, 355 Mich 182, 203 ; 94 NW2d 388 (1959).

2016“It is not enough,” our Supreme Court aptly noted more than 50 years ago, “for an appellant in his brief simply to announce a position or assert an error and then leave it up to this Court to discover and rationalize the basis for his claims, or unravel and elaborate for him his arguments, and then search for authority either to sustain or reject his position.” Mitcham v Detroit, 355 Mich 182, 203 ; 94 NW2d 388 (1959).

2015Lamont, 285 Mich App at 617 .

2014While the Constitution provides for three separate branches of government, Const 1963, art 3, § 2, the boundaries between these branches need not be “airtight,” Kent Co Prosecutor v Kent Co Sheriff (On Rehearing), 428 Mich 314, 322 ; 409 NW2d 202 (1987), quoting Nixon v Administrator of Gen Servs, 433 US 425, 443 ; 97 S Ct 2777 ; 53 L Ed 2d 867 (1977).

2014While the Constitution provides for three separate branches of government, Const 1963, art 3, § 2, the boundaries between these branches need not be “airtight,” Kent Co Prosecutor v Kent Co Sheriff (On Rehearing), 428 Mich 314, 322 ; 409 NW2d 202 (1987), quoting Nixon v Administrator of Gen Servs, 433 US 425, 443 ; 97 S Ct 2777 ; 53 L Ed 2d 867 (1977).

2014While the Constitution provides for three separate branches of government, Const 1963, art 3, § 2, the boundaries between these branches need not be “airtight,” Kent Co Prosecutor v Kent Co Sheriff (On Rehearing), 428 Mich 314, 322 ; 409 NW2d 202 (1987), quoting Nixon v Administrator of Gen Servs, 433 US 425, 443 ; 97 S Ct 2777 ; 53 L Ed 2d 867 (1977).

2014While the Constitution provides for three separate branches of government, Const 1963, art 3, § 2, the boundaries between these branches need not be “airtight,” Kent Co Prosecutor v Kent Co Sheriff (On Rehearing), 428 Mich 314, 322 ; 409 NW2d 202 (1987), quoting Nixon v Administrator of Gen Servs, 433 US 425, 443 ; 97 S Ct 2777 ; 53 L Ed 2d 867 (1977).

1986Robertson v City of Detroit, 131 Mich App 594 ; 345 NW2d 695 (1983).

1986Robertson v City of Detroit, 131 Mich App 594 ; 345 NW2d 695 (1983).

1986Defendants claim this was impermissible under the rule of Blackwell, supra. However, where the lower court reaches the right result for the wrong reason, we will not disturb the results on appeal.

1984People v Taylor, 73 Mich App 139 ; 250 NW2d *801 570 (1977), approved testimony as to a defendant’s refusal to take a blood test in a rape case, citing Schmerber v California, 384 US 757 ; 86 S Ct 1826 ; 16 L Ed 2d 908 (1966), which holds that such testimony does not constitute an impermissible violation of defendant’s right against compulsory self-incrimination.

1984People v Taylor, 73 Mich App 139 ; 250 NW2d *801 570 (1977), approved testimony as to a defendant’s refusal to take a blood test in a rape case, citing Schmerber v California, 384 US 757 ; 86 S Ct 1826 ; 16 L Ed 2d 908 (1966), which holds that such testimony does not constitute an impermissible violation of defendant’s right against compulsory self-incrimination.

1984People v Taylor, 73 Mich App 139 ; 250 NW2d *801 570 (1977), approved testimony as to a defendant’s refusal to take a blood test in a rape case, citing Schmerber v California, 384 US 757 ; 86 S Ct 1826 ; 16 L Ed 2d 908 (1966), which holds that such testimony does not constitute an impermissible violation of defendant’s right against compulsory self-incrimination.

1984In People v Terrien, 93 Mich App 802 ; 286 NW2d 924 (1979), a majority of this Court approved an action by a district judge who denied admission of evidence of refusal to take a Breathalyzer test and who instructed the jury, over defense objection, that there would be no testimony about a Breathalyzer test and that lack of such test was a "non issue”.

1984In People v Terrien, 93 Mich App 802 ; 286 NW2d 924 (1979), a majority of this Court approved an action by a district judge who denied admission of evidence of refusal to take a Breathalyzer test and who instructed the jury, over defense objection, that there would be no testimony about a Breathalyzer test and that lack of such test was a "non issue”.