industrial claim in Arizona

2008Addington, 441 U.S. at 426-30, 99 S.Ct. 1804 . ¶ 30 This is not to say that any mere recitation of the specific words "reasonable *428 degree of medical probability or certainty" is sufficient or the lack thereof is insufficient for admissibility of such testimony.

2008Addington, 441 U.S. at 426-30, 99 S.Ct. 1804 . ¶30 This is not to say that any mere recitation of the specific words “reasonable degree of medical probability or certainty” is sufficient or the lack thereof is insufficient for admissibility of such testimony.

2016A.R.S. § 23- 1061(H); Sneed v. Industrial Comm’n, 124 Ariz. 357 , 359, 604 P.2d 621 , 523 (1980).

2016A.R.S. § 23- 1061(H); Sneed v. Industrial Comm’n, 124 Ariz. 357 , 359, 604 P.2d 621 , 523 (1980).

1981The bunkhouse rule as applied in Arizona was summarized in the special concurring opinion in Hunley as follows: In order for such an accident to be compensable under the act, the occupancy of the employer’s premises must be shown to be required either expressly or by reason of the circumstances. 113 Ariz. at 189 , 549 P.2d at 161 .

1981The bunkhouse rule as applied in Arizona was summarized in the special concurring opinion in Hunley as follows: In order for such an accident to be compensable under the act, the occupancy of the employer’s premises must be shown to be required either expressly or by reason of the circumstances. 113 Ariz. at 189 , 549 P.2d at 161 .

1979In order to be compensable under our Workmen’s Compensation Statute, an industrial claim must “[arise] out of and in the course of . . . employment.” A.R.S. § 23-1021(A); Royall v. Industrial Commission, 106 Ariz. 346 , 476 P.2d 156 (1970).

1979In order to be compensable under our Workmen’s Compensation Statute, an industrial claim must “[arise] out of and in the course of . . . employment.” A.R.S. § 23-1021(A); Royall v. Industrial Commission, 106 Ariz. 346 , 476 P.2d 156 (1970).

1975Ruth v. The Industrial Commission of Arizona, 107 Ariz. 572 , 490 P.2d 828 (1971), recognized that with the change in the statutes an injured employee could accept compensation and at the same time sue the third party tort-feasor.

1975Ruth v. The Industrial Commission of Arizona, 107 Ariz. 572 , 490 P.2d 828 (1971), recognized that with the change in the statutes an injured employee could accept compensation and at the same time sue the third party tort-feasor.

1975In Hornback v. Industrial Commission of Arizona, 106 Ariz. 216 , 474 P.2d 807 (1970), a case governed by the statutes prior to the 1968 amendment, our Supreme Court held that where an employee had accepted compensation [minimal as it was], later sued the third party tort-feasor, and thereafter effected a settlement without the approval of the party responsible for the payment of workmen’s compensation, the injured employee could not, at a later date, seek to reopen the industrial claim.

1975In Hornback v. Industrial Commission of Arizona, 106 Ariz. 216 , 474 P.2d 807 (1970), a case governed by the statutes prior to the 1968 amendment, our Supreme Court held that where an employee had accepted compensation [minimal as it was], later sued the third party tort-feasor, and thereafter effected a settlement without the approval of the party responsible for the payment of workmen’s compensation, the injured employee could not, at a later date, seek to reopen the industrial claim.