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6 Arizona opinions name it 2 courts 1978–1998 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Stewartgreen2 sentences1998In State v. Stewart, 118 Ariz. 281, 283 , 576 P.2d 140, 142 (App.1978), the court rejected the defendant’s claim that the former fraudulent scheme and artifice statute was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad, noting that, to withstand a constitutional challenge, “[a]n offense must be defined in terms that [people] of average intelligence understand and the due process clause requires only that the law give sufficient warning that [they] may conform their conduct to its dictates.” It then found: . [persons] of average intelligence would understand that a “scheme to defraud” is a plan or deci 1998In State v. Stewart, 118 Ariz. 281, 283 , 576 P.2d 140, 142 (App.1978), the court rejected the defendant’s claim that the former fraudulent scheme and artifice statute was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad, noting that, to withstand a constitutional challenge, “[a]n offense must be defined in terms that [people] of average intelligence understand and the due process clause requires only that the law give sufficient warning that [they] may conform their conduct to its dictates.” It then found: . [persons] of average intelligence would understand that a “scheme to defraud” is a plan or deci | 2 | 2 |
Rose v. Lockegreen2 sentences1984The United States Supreme Court has held that “[a]ll the Due Process Clause requires is that the law give sufficient warning that men may conduct themselves so as to avoid that which is forbidden.” Rose v. Locke, 423 U.S. 48, 50 , 96 S.Ct. 243, 244 , 46 L.Ed.2d 185, 188 (1975). 1984The United States Supreme Court has held that “[a]ll the Due Process Clause requires is that the law give sufficient warning that men may conduct themselves so as to avoid that which is forbidden.” Rose v. Locke, 423 U.S. 48, 50 , 96 S.Ct. 243, 244 , 46 L.Ed.2d 185, 188 (1975). | 1 | 2 |
Hammerschmidt v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1998In State v. Stewart, 118 Ariz. 281, 283 , 576 P.2d 140, 142 (App.1978), the court rejected the defendant’s claim that the former fraudulent scheme and artifice statute was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad, noting that, to withstand a constitutional challenge, “[a]n offense must be defined in terms that [people] of average intelligence understand and the due process clause requires only that the law give sufficient warning that [they] may conform their conduct to its dictates.” It then found: . [persons] of average intelligence would understand that a “scheme to defraud” is a plan or deci 1998In State v. Stewart, 118 Ariz. 281, 283 , 576 P.2d 140, 142 (App.1978), the court rejected the defendant’s claim that the former fraudulent scheme and artifice statute was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad, noting that, to withstand a constitutional challenge, “[a]n offense must be defined in terms that [people] of average intelligence understand and the due process clause requires only that the law give sufficient warning that [they] may conform their conduct to its dictates.” It then found: . [persons] of average intelligence would understand that a “scheme to defraud” is a plan or deci | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Dextergreen1 sentence1998In State v. Stewart, 118 Ariz. 281, 283 , 576 P.2d 140, 142 (App.1978), the court rejected the defendant’s claim that the former fraudulent scheme and artifice statute was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad, noting that, to withstand a constitutional challenge, “[a]n offense must be defined in terms that [people] of average intelligence understand and the due process clause requires only that the law give sufficient warning that [they] may conform their conduct to its dictates.” It then found: . [persons] of average intelligence would understand that a “scheme to defraud” is a plan or deci | 1 | 1 |
State v. Haasgreen2 sentences1998It is characterized by ‘trick, deceit, chicane, or overreaching ... [and] dishonest methods or schemes.’ ” In Haas, the supreme court noted the fraudulent scheme and artifice statute must be broad enough to “cover all of the varieties made possible by boundless human ingenuity,” 138 Ariz. at 424, 675 P.2d at 684 , including the use of “deceitful statements or half-truths or even the concealment of material facts.” Id. at 418 , 675 P.2d at 678 . 1998It is characterized by ‘trick, deceit, chicane, or overreaching ... [and] dishonest methods or schemes.’ ” In Haas, the supreme court noted the fraudulent scheme and artifice statute must be broad enough to “cover all of the varieties made possible by boundless human ingenuity,” 138 Ariz. at 424, 675 P.2d at 684 , including the use of “deceitful statements or half-truths or even the concealment of material facts.” Id. at 418 , 675 P.2d at 678 . | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Kevin M. Coyle, A/K/A David Winchestergreen1 sentence1998In State v. Stewart, 118 Ariz. 281, 283 , 576 P.2d 140, 142 (App.1978), the court rejected the defendant’s claim that the former fraudulent scheme and artifice statute was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad, noting that, to withstand a constitutional challenge, “[a]n offense must be defined in terms that [people] of average intelligence understand and the due process clause requires only that the law give sufficient warning that [they] may conform their conduct to its dictates.” It then found: . [persons] of average intelligence would understand that a “scheme to defraud” is a plan or deci | 1 | 1 |
State v. Jacobsgreen2 sentences1988Id. at 32-33 , 579 P.2d at 70-71 (citations omitted). 1988Id. at 32-33 , 579 P.2d at 70-71 (citations omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Johnson v. Phoenix City Courtgreen2 sentences1978See also, Johnson v. Phoenix City Court, 24 Ariz.App. 63 , 535 P.2d 1067 (1975); State v. Cole, 18 Ariz.App. 237 , 501 P.2d 413 (1972), which pointed out that the difficulty encountered by a legislative body in expressing certain concepts is a proper consideration in resolving a vagueness challenge. 1978See also, Johnson v. Phoenix City Court, 24 Ariz.App. 63 , 535 P.2d 1067 (1975); State v. Cole, 18 Ariz.App. 237 , 501 P.2d 413 (1972), which pointed out that the difficulty encountered by a legislative body in expressing certain concepts is a proper consideration in resolving a vagueness challenge. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arizona. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Cole
green
2 sentences1978See also, Johnson v. Phoenix City Court, 24 Ariz.App. 63 , 535 P.2d 1067 (1975); State v. Cole, 18 Ariz.App. 237 , 501 P.2d 413 (1972), which pointed out that the difficulty encountered by a legislative body in expressing certain concepts is a proper consideration in resolving a vagueness challenge. 1978See also, Johnson v. Phoenix City Court, 24 Ariz.App. 63 , 535 P.2d 1067 (1975); State v. Cole, 18 Ariz.App. 237 , 501 P.2d 413 (1972), which pointed out that the difficulty encountered by a legislative body in expressing certain concepts is a proper consideration in resolving a vagueness challenge. | 1 | 1978–1978 |
State v. Bateman
green
2 sentences1978State v. Bateman, 113 Ariz. 107 , 547 P.2d 6 (1976). 1978State v. Bateman, 113 Ariz. 107 , 547 P.2d 6 (1976). | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.