prosecutorial misconduct claim in Arizona

2025We have jurisdiction under A.R.S. § 13-4239(C) and Rule 32.16. ¶6 We review the superior court’s decision on a PCR petition for an abuse of discretion and will affirm if the decision “is legally correct for any reason.” State v. Roseberry, 237 Ariz. 507, 508, ¶ 7 (2015).

2023See State v. Murray, 250 Ariz. 543 , 548, ¶ 12 (2021). 9 STATE v. LOPEZ Decision of the Court ¶30 Whether based on allegations of inadvertent error or intentional misconduct, our analysis of a prosecutorial misconduct claim is the same.

2023Id.

2021Compare Morris, 215 Ariz. at 335 ¶ 46 (explaining that the second step of prosecutorial misconduct review is demonstrating a reasonable likelihood that the misconduct could have affected the jury’s verdict), with Escalante, 245 Ariz. at 144 ¶ 29 (stating that fundamental error is prejudicial if, absent the misconduct, a reasonable jury could have reached a different verdict). ¶16 Critically, Escalante’s prejudice prong is difficult to satisfy, Escalante, 245 Ariz. at 144 ¶ 31, and is a higher burden to overcome than in the inquiry conducted for objected-to prosecutorial misconduct, see Morris,

2021Compare Morris, 215 Ariz. at 335 ¶ 46 (explaining that the second step of prosecutorial misconduct review is demonstrating a reasonable likelihood that the misconduct could have affected the jury’s verdict), with Escalante, 245 Ariz. at 144 ¶ 29 (stating that fundamental error is prejudicial if, absent the misconduct, a reasonable jury could have reached a different verdict). ¶16 Critically, Escalante’s prejudice prong is difficult to satisfy, Escalante, 245 Ariz. at 144 ¶ 31, and is a higher burden to overcome than in the inquiry conducted for objected-to prosecutorial misconduct, see Morris,

2020See State v. Anderson, 210 Ariz. 327, 340, ¶ 45 (2005).

2016See Benson, 232 Ariz. at 463 ¶ 40, 307 P.3d at 30 ; see also Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 180-81 , 106 S.Ct. 2464 , 91 L.Ed.2d 144 (1986) (noting that it “is not enough that the prosecutors’ remarks were undesirable or even universally condemned”; to prevail on a prosecutorial misconduct claim, it must be shown that the prosecutors’ comments “so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

2016See Benson, 232 Ariz. at 463 ¶ 40, 307 P.3d at 30 ; see also Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 180-81 , 106 S.Ct. 2464 , 91 L.Ed.2d 144 (1986) (noting that it “is not enough that the prosecutors’ remarks were undesirable or even universally condemned”; to prevail on a prosecutorial misconduct claim, it must be shown that the prosecutors’ comments “so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

2016See Benson, 232 Ariz. at 463 ¶ 40, 307 P.3d at 30 ; see also Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 180-81 , 106 S.Ct. 2464 , 91 L.Ed.2d 144 (1986) (noting that it “is not enough that the prosecutors’ remarks were undesirable or even universally condemned”; to prevail on a prosecutorial misconduct claim, it must be shown that the prosecutors’ comments “so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

2016See Benson, 232 Ariz. at 463 ¶ 40, 307 P.3d at 30 ; see also Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 180-81 , 106 S.Ct. 2464 , 91 L.Ed.2d 144 (1986) (noting that it “is not enough that the prosecutors’ remarks were undesirable or even universally condemned”; to prevail on a prosecutorial misconduct claim, it must be shown that the prosecutors’ comments “so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

1998See id. at 466-68, 862 P.2d at 226-28 . ¶30 State v. Floyd, 120 Ariz. 358 , 586 P.2d 203 (App.1978), involved a prosecutorial misconduct claim that was as weak as those in Dickens and Duzan, but Floyd implicitly recognized the cumulative error doctrine while denying the claim, as follows: Ultimately, citing State v. Filipov, 118 Ariz. 319 , 576 P.2d 507 (App.1978), and State v. Woodward, 21 Ariz.App. 133 , 516 P.2d 589 (1973), appellant urges that the cumulative effect of the prosecutor’s statements requires reversal if the statements individually do not.

1998See id. at 466-68, 862 P.2d at 226-28 . ¶30 State v. Floyd, 120 Ariz. 358 , 586 P.2d 203 (App.1978), involved a prosecutorial misconduct claim that was as weak as those in Dickens and Duzan, but Floyd implicitly recognized the cumulative error doctrine while denying the claim, as follows: Ultimately, citing State v. Filipov, 118 Ariz. 319 , 576 P.2d 507 (App.1978), and State v. Woodward, 21 Ariz.App. 133 , 516 P.2d 589 (1973), appellant urges that the cumulative effect of the prosecutor’s statements requires reversal if the statements individually do not.

1998See id. at 466-68, 862 P.2d at 226-28 . ¶30 State v. Floyd, 120 Ariz. 358 , 586 P.2d 203 (App.1978), involved a prosecutorial misconduct claim that was as weak as those in Dickens and Duzan, but Floyd implicitly recognized the cumulative error doctrine while denying the claim, as follows: Ultimately, citing State v. Filipov, 118 Ariz. 319 , 576 P.2d 507 (App.1978), and State v. Woodward, 21 Ariz.App. 133 , 516 P.2d 589 (1973), appellant urges that the cumulative effect of the prosecutor’s statements requires reversal if the statements individually do not.