rest claim in Arizona

1971See In re Bette’s Estate, 171 Cal. 583 , 153 P. 949 (1915) ; Robison v. Robison, 63 Utah 68 , 222 P. 595 , 596 (1923), the court stating: “The rejection of the claim in part by the administrator starts the running of the statute from that date”, and Jones v. Walden, 145 Cal. 523 , 78 P. 1046, 1047 (1904), where the court held: “The allowance of the claim by the administrator for $343.58 was clearly, in law, a rejection of all the rest of the claim.” Admittedly, these cases concern a rejection regarding the amount of the claim, see A.R.S. § 14— 581, rather than the classification of particular

1971See In re Bette’s Estate, 171 Cal. 583 , 153 P. 949 (1915) ; Robison v. Robison, 63 Utah 68 , 222 P. 595 , 596 (1923), the court stating: “The rejection of the claim in part by the administrator starts the running of the statute from that date”, and Jones v. Walden, 145 Cal. 523 , 78 P. 1046, 1047 (1904), where the court held: “The allowance of the claim by the administrator for $343.58 was clearly, in law, a rejection of all the rest of the claim.” Admittedly, these cases concern a rejection regarding the amount of the claim, see A.R.S. § 14— 581, rather than the classification of particular

1971See In re Bette’s Estate, 171 Cal. 583 , 153 P. 949 (1915) ; Robison v. Robison, 63 Utah 68 , 222 P. 595 , 596 (1923), the court stating: “The rejection of the claim in part by the administrator starts the running of the statute from that date”, and Jones v. Walden, 145 Cal. 523 , 78 P. 1046, 1047 (1904), where the court held: “The allowance of the claim by the administrator for $343.58 was clearly, in law, a rejection of all the rest of the claim.” Admittedly, these cases concern a rejection regarding the amount of the claim, see A.R.S. § 14— 581, rather than the classification of particular

1971See In re Bette’s Estate, 171 Cal. 583 , 153 P. 949 (1915) ; Robison v. Robison, 63 Utah 68 , 222 P. 595 , 596 (1923), the court stating: “The rejection of the claim in part by the administrator starts the running of the statute from that date”, and Jones v. Walden, 145 Cal. 523 , 78 P. 1046, 1047 (1904), where the court held: “The allowance of the claim by the administrator for $343.58 was clearly, in law, a rejection of all the rest of the claim.” Admittedly, these cases concern a rejection regarding the amount of the claim, see A.R.S. § 14— 581, rather than the classification of particular

2024The court in Fish reversed the exclusion of the other act evidence to corroborate the defendant’s claim of self-defense in part because there was an evidentiary vacuum: “there was no other witness to the shooting who could testify.” See id.

2024See 6 222 Ariz. at 125 ¶ 49 (allowing admission of victim’s other acts unknown to defendant because defendant’s description of victim’s unknown other act was “very similar” to defendant’s claim of self-defense, and because there were no other witnesses to defendant’s actions). ¶21 The rest of the analysis in Fish shows the superior court did not abuse its discretion by precluding the AutoZone incident.

2022Warner, 39 Ariz. at 213-14; Garvey, 64 Ariz. at 353 .

1999Co., 158 Ariz. at *92 155, 761 P.2d at 1059 (when reconciling two statutory provisions, we must construe them to give effect to both). ¶ 16 Our interpretation is also in accord with the reasoning of prior judicial decisions that now have been codified by the enactment of the tolling provision of subsection C.