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51 Louisiana opinions name it 2 courts 1984–2004 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Louisiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Rosieregreen2 sentences2001LSA-R.S. 15:438 provides that when evidence is circumstantial, the applicable rule is that, "assuming every fact to be proved that the evidence tends to prove, in order to convict, it must exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence." In Rosiere, 488 So.2d at 965, 968 , the Louisiana Supreme Court explained: This is not a purely separate test from the Jackson sufficiency standard to be applied instead of a sufficiency of the evidence test whenever circumstantial evidence forms the basis of the conviction. 2000LSA-R.S. 15:438 provides that when evidence is circumstantial, the applicable rule is that, “assuming every fact to be proved that the evidence tends to prove, in order to convict, it must exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.” In State v. Rosiere, supra, 488 So.2d at 965, 968 , the Louisiana Supreme Court explained: This is not a purely separate test from the Jackson sufficiency standard to be applied instead of a sufficiency of the evidence test whenever circumstantial evidence forms the basis of the conviction. | 5 | 5 |
State v. Wrightgreen2 sentences1991State v. Wright, 445 So.2d 1198 (La.1984). 1985The following passage from State v. Wright, 445 So.2d 1198, 1201 (La.1984) explains how Jackson and LSA-R.S. 15:438 apply to a case: This Court has recognized that R.S. 15:438 is not a purely separate test from the Jackson standard to be applied instead of a sufficiency of the evidence test whenever circumstantial evidence forms the basis for the conviction. | 1 | 22 |
State v. Porrettogreen2 sentences2004State v. Porretto, 468 So.2d 1142 (La. 1985). 1993State v. Porretto, 468 So.2d 1142, 1146 (La.1985), concluded that § 15:438 does not establish “a purely separate test from the Jackson standard,” that Court has also held that a “merger [of the Jackson constitutional standard and the circumstantial evidence rule] does not appear to promote clarity but could lead to a distortion of the standards .... [A]n in-tandem articulation may seem improperly to diminish the requirement of the circumstantial evidence rule by implying that, in a close case, this court will defer to the jury’s finding rather than follow its own determination of whether there | 1 | 7 |
State v. Shapirogreen1 sentence1993Although in many instances separate and dual applications of the rules will yield the same result, out of an abundance of caution we will proceed to apply each standard separately.” State v. Shapiro, 431 So.2d 372, 385 (La.1983). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Louisiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Austin
green
2 sentences1987State v. Austin, 399 So.2d 158 (La.1981). 1985State v. Austin, 399 So.2d 158 (La.1981). | 17 | 1984–1987 |
State v. Eason
green
2 sentences1991This court has explained in State v. Fluitt, 482 So.2d 906 (La.App. 2d Cir.1986) citing State v. Eason, 460 So.2d 1139 (La.App. 2d Cir.1984), writ denied 463 So.2d 1317 (1985), the interaction of the Jackson standard of review with this state’s statutory circumstantial evidence rule as follows: This statutory rule is not a purely separate test from the Jackson standard to be applied instead of a sufficiency of the evidence test whenever the state relies on circumstantial evidence to prove an element of the crime. 1987When circumstantial evidence is relied upon, in whole or in part, the court has explained, in State v. Eason, 460 So.2d 1139 (La.App. 2d Cir. 1984), writ denied 463 So.2d 1317 (La.1985), the interaction of the Jackson standard with this state's statutory rule concerning circumstantial evidence, as follows: *946 This statutory rule is not a purely separate test from the Jackson standard to be applied instead of a sufficiency of the evidence test whenever the state relies on circumstantial evidence to prove an element of the crime. | 6 | 1985–1991 |
State v. Eason
green
2 sentences1991This court has explained in State v. Fluitt, 482 So.2d 906 (La.App. 2d Cir.1986) citing State v. Eason, 460 So.2d 1139 (La.App. 2d Cir.1984), writ denied 463 So.2d 1317 (1985), the interaction of the Jackson standard of review with this state’s statutory circumstantial evidence rule as follows: This statutory rule is not a purely separate test from the Jackson standard to be applied instead of a sufficiency of the evidence test whenever the state relies on circumstantial evidence to prove an element of the crime. 1987When circumstantial evidence is relied upon, in whole or in part, the court has explained, in State v. Eason, 460 So.2d 1139 (La.App. 2d Cir. 1984), writ denied 463 So.2d 1317 (La.1985), the interaction of the Jackson standard with this state's statutory rule concerning circumstantial evidence, as follows: *946 This statutory rule is not a purely separate test from the Jackson standard to be applied instead of a sufficiency of the evidence test whenever the state relies on circumstantial evidence to prove an element of the crime. | 4 | 1987–1991 |
State v. Myers
green
1 sentence2000State v. Porretto, 468 So.2d 1142 (La.1985); State v. Myers, 584 So.2d at 249 . | 1 | 2000–2000 |
State v. Fluitt
green
1 sentence1991This court has explained in State v. Fluitt, 482 So.2d 906 (La.App. 2d Cir.1986) citing State v. Eason, 460 So.2d 1139 (La.App. 2d Cir.1984), writ denied 463 So.2d 1317 (1985), the interaction of the Jackson standard of review with this state’s statutory circumstantial evidence rule as follows: This statutory rule is not a purely separate test from the Jackson standard to be applied instead of a sufficiency of the evidence test whenever the state relies on circumstantial evidence to prove an element of the crime. | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Jackson v. Virginia
red
2 sentences1990LSA-R.S. 15:438 is not a purely separate test from the Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 , 99 S.Ct. 2781 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979), standard of review. 1990LSA-R.S. 15:438 is not a purely separate test from the Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 , 99 S.Ct. 2781 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979), standard of review. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
State v. Scott
green
1 sentence1985Defendant cites State v. Scott, 456 So.2d 1383 (La.1984) for the proposition that “since this is a circumstantial evidence case, the court must determine whether assuming every fact to be proved that the evidence tends to prove, every reasonable hypothesis of innocence is excluded.” In State v. Eason, 460 So.2d 1139 (La.App.2d Cir.1984) this court recently clarified the standard to be applied in a circumstantial evidence case, stating “the statutory rule [for circumstantial evidence] is not a purely separate test from the Jackson standard.” The Jackson Standard 1 is ultimately still “the objec | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.