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6 California opinions name it 3 courts 1968–2018 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Quesada v. Orrgreen1 sentence2013(See White v. Department of Motor Vehicles (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 794, 800 [where driver was incapable of completing breath test and refused to submit to blood test, “she placed herself within the ambit of the sanction required under the implied consent law”]; Quesada v. Orr, supra, 14 Cal.App.3d at p. 871 [where driver was incapable of completing urine test and refused to submit to remaining available tests, he “brought upon himself the penalty of the statute”].) Contrary to Ellis‟s contention on appeal, there was also substantial evidence to support the trial court‟s finding that Ellis was n | 1 | 1 |
White v. Department of Motor Vehiclesgreen1 sentence2013(See White v. Department of Motor Vehicles (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 794, 800 [where driver was incapable of completing breath test and refused to submit to blood test, “she placed herself within the ambit of the sanction required under the implied consent law”]; Quesada v. Orr, supra, 14 Cal.App.3d at p. 871 [where driver was incapable of completing urine test and refused to submit to remaining available tests, he “brought upon himself the penalty of the statute”].) Contrary to Ellis‟s contention on appeal, there was also substantial evidence to support the trial court‟s finding that Ellis was n | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Harris
green
2 sentences2018Defendant responded, 'okay,' and [the officer] testified that at no time did defendant appear unwilling to provide a blood sample." ( Id . at p. 678, 184 Cal.Rptr.3d 198 .) On appeal of the denial of the defendant's motion to suppress, the Court of Appeal rejected the defendant's argument that his consent was not voluntary because the arresting officer's statements concerning the implied consent law were false. 2015(Harris, supra, 234 Cal.App.4th at p. 678 .) The officer did tell the defendant that he did not have the right to talk to a lawyer when deciding to submit to the chemical test, that refusal to submit to the test would result in the suspension of his driver’s license, and that refusal could be used against him in court. | 3 | 2015–2018 |
Petricka v. Department of Motor Vehicles
green
1 sentence2013(Petricka, supra, 89 Cal.App.4th at p. 1348 .) The DMV introduced 14 these documents at the hearing over the objection of Patel’s counsel. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
State v. Muzzy
green
2 sentences1968(See State v. Muzzy, 124 Vt. 222 [ 202 A.2d 267 ].) The rule with regard to such proceedings for suspension or revocation of a license for refusal to submit to a chemical blood test is that such proceedings are civil in nature and are unaffected by the fact of the commencement of a criminal prosecution for driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor or by the result of such prosecution. 1968(See State v. Muzzy, 124 Vt. 222 [ 202 A.2d 267 ].) The rule with regard to such proceedings for suspension or revocation of a license for refusal to submit to a chemical blood test is that such proceedings are civil in nature and are unaffected by the fact of the commencement of a criminal prosecution for driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor or by the result of such prosecution. | 1 | 1968–1968 |
Beare v. Smith
green
2 sentences1968(Beare v. Smith, 82 S.D. 20 [ 140 N.W.2d 603, 606 ]; Prucha v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 172 Neb. 415 [ 110 N.W.2d 75 , 88 A.L.R.2d 1055 ].) Licensee in the instant case testified he had told the hearing officer he had pleaded guilty to driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor and that the judge who received that plea had recommended against suspension of licensee’s privileges in his employment. 1968(Beare v. Smith, 82 S.D. 20 [ 140 N.W.2d 603, 606 ]; Prucha v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 172 Neb. 415 [ 110 N.W.2d 75 , 88 A.L.R.2d 1055 ].) Licensee in the instant case testified he had told the hearing officer he had pleaded guilty to driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor and that the judge who received that plea had recommended against suspension of licensee’s privileges in his employment. | 1 | 1968–1968 |
Prucha v. Department of Motor Vehicles
green
2 sentences1968(Beare v. Smith, 82 S.D. 20 [ 140 N.W.2d 603, 606 ]; Prucha v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 172 Neb. 415 [ 110 N.W.2d 75 , 88 A.L.R.2d 1055 ].) Licensee in the instant case testified he had told the hearing officer he had pleaded guilty to driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor and that the judge who received that plea had recommended against suspension of licensee’s privileges in his employment. 1968(Beare v. Smith, 82 S.D. 20 [ 140 N.W.2d 603, 606 ]; Prucha v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 172 Neb. 415 [ 110 N.W.2d 75 , 88 A.L.R.2d 1055 ].) Licensee in the instant case testified he had told the hearing officer he had pleaded guilty to driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor and that the judge who received that plea had recommended against suspension of licensee’s privileges in his employment. | 1 | 1968–1968 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.