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6 California opinions name it 2 courts 1968–2021 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Williams v. Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authoritygreen2 sentences2021J. 68 Cal.2d 599, 602 [explaining that § 352, subd. (a) “effectuate[s] a deep and long recognized principle of the common law and of this state: children are to be protected during their minority from the destruction of their rights by the running of the statute of limitations”]; Barker v. Garza (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 1449, 1462 [recognizing “the strong public policy in protecting minors from the sometimes harsh application of statutes of limitations”]; see also Inclusion or Exclusion of First and Last Day for Purposes of Statute of Limitations (1952) 20 A.L.R.2d 1249 , § 2 [“The general polic 2018(See § 352; Williams , supra , 68 Cal.2d at p. 602 , 68 Cal.Rptr. 297 , 440 P.2d 497 .) Nearly 50 years ago, we observed it was "a deep and long recognized principle of the common law and of this state" that "children are to be protected during their minority from the destruction of their rights by the running *866 of the statute of limitations." ( Williams , at p. 602, 68 Cal.Rptr. 297 , 440 P.2d 497 .) Yet, aware of this general tolling principle, the Legislature chose not to include section 340.4 among the enumerated exceptions to the toxic exposure statute. | 3 | 4 |
West Shield Investigations & Security Consultants v. Superior Courtgreen1 sentence2021J. 68 Cal.2d 599, 602 [explaining that § 352, subd. (a) “effectuate[s] a deep and long recognized principle of the common law and of this state: children are to be protected during their minority from the destruction of their rights by the running of the statute of limitations”]; Barker v. Garza (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 1449, 1462 [recognizing “the strong public policy in protecting minors from the sometimes harsh application of statutes of limitations”]; see also Inclusion or Exclusion of First and Last Day for Purposes of Statute of Limitations (1952) 20 A.L.R.2d 1249 , § 2 [“The general polic | 1 | 1 |
Barker v. Garzagreen1 sentence2021J. 68 Cal.2d 599, 602 [explaining that § 352, subd. (a) “effectuate[s] a deep and long recognized principle of the common law and of this state: children are to be protected during their minority from the destruction of their rights by the running of the statute of limitations”]; Barker v. Garza (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 1449, 1462 [recognizing “the strong public policy in protecting minors from the sometimes harsh application of statutes of limitations”]; see also Inclusion or Exclusion of First and Last Day for Purposes of Statute of Limitations (1952) 20 A.L.R.2d 1249 , § 2 [“The general polic | 1 | 1 |
Amie v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences1993Proc., § 372), special safeguards [i.e., tolling provisions] are required to protect the minor’s right of action.” (Amie v. Superior Court (1979) 99 Cal.App.3d 421, 426 [ 160 Cal.Rptr. 271 ], italics added.) We are persuaded that section 5408’s tolling provision has this historic purpose of protecting minors by putting them on an equal footing with competent adult litigants, and was never intended to give minors substantive rights that are not available to any adult. 1993Proc., § 372), special safeguards [i.e., tolling provisions] are required to protect the minor’s right of action.” (Amie v. Superior Court (1979) 99 Cal.App.3d 421, 426 [ 160 Cal.Rptr. 271 ], italics added.) We are persuaded that section 5408’s tolling provision has this historic purpose of protecting minors by putting them on an equal footing with competent adult litigants, and was never intended to give minors substantive rights that are not available to any adult. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Hennessy v. County of San Bernardino
green
2 sentences1969This principle became a part of California statutory law as long ago as 1863 (Stats. 1863, ch. 250, pp. 325, 326) and has since been applied in actions against governmental entities as well as those against private persons (see for instance Hennessey v. County of San Bernardino (1941) 47 Cal. App.2d 183 ..." (8a) In following these established rules of interpretation, we have concluded that a triable issue of fact exists as to the time of the accrual of Christine's cause of action. 1969This principle became a part of California statutory law as long ago as 1863 (Stats. 1863, ch. 250, pp. 325, 326) and has since been applied in actions against governmental entities as well as those against private persons (see for instance Hennessey v. County of San Bernardino (1941) 47 Cal.App.2d 183 . . .” In following these established rules of interpretation, we have concluded that a triable issue of fact exists as to the time of the accrual of Christine’s cause of action. | 2 | 1968–1969 |