defendant to obtain defense (California) · Go Syfert
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defendant to obtain defense in California

6 California opinions name it 2 courts 1966–2021 1 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (4)

CaseFollowedCited
Stiles v. Wallisgreen
calctapp · 1983 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2007–2007
1 sentence

2007(See Weitz, supra, 63 Cal.2d at p. 855 [reliance on third party must be “reasonably justified”]; Stiles v. Wallis, supra, 147 Cal.App.3d at p. 1148 [although defendant believed his employer would provide a defense, he “failed to present evidence which would cause a reasonable person to sustain such a belief’].) “With regard to whether the circumstances warranted reliance by the defendant on a third party, the efforts made by the defendant to obtain a defense by the third party are, of course, relevant.” (Weitz, supra, 63 Cal.2d at p. 856 .) The defendant cannot reasonably rely on the third par

11
Weitz v. Yankoskygreen
cal · 1966 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2007–2007
2 sentences

2007(See Weitz, supra, 63 Cal.2d at p. 855 [reliance on third party must be “reasonably justified”]; Stiles v. Wallis, supra, 147 Cal.App.3d at p. 1148 [although defendant believed his employer would provide a defense, he “failed to present evidence which would cause a reasonable person to sustain such a belief’].) “With regard to whether the circumstances warranted reliance by the defendant on a third party, the efforts made by the defendant to obtain a defense by the third party are, of course, relevant.” (Weitz, supra, 63 Cal.2d at p. 856 .) The defendant cannot reasonably rely on the third par

2007(See Weitz, supra, 63 Cal.2d at p. 855 [reliance on third party must be “reasonably justified”]; Stiles v. Wallis, supra, 147 Cal.App.3d at p. 1148 [although defendant believed his employer would provide a defense, he “failed to present evidence which would cause a reasonable person to sustain such a belief’].) “With regard to whether the circumstances warranted reliance by the defendant on a third party, the efforts made by the defendant to obtain a defense by the third party are, of course, relevant.” (Weitz, supra, 63 Cal.2d at p. 856 .) The defendant cannot reasonably rely on the third par

11
McCreadie v. Arquesgreen
calctapp · 1967 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2007–2007
2 sentences

2007(McCreadie v. Arques (1967) 248 Cal.App.2d 39, 46 [ 56 Cal.Rptr. 188 ] (McCreadie) [once defendant received notice of entry of default, reliance “upon the representations of the attorney that all was well” was unreasonable].) The record in this case does not support the conclusion that Fagor’s reliance on its broker and/or insurance carrier was reasonable.

2007(McCreadie v. Arques (1967) 248 Cal.App.2d 39, 46 [ 56 Cal.Rptr. 188 ] (McCreadie) [once defendant received notice of entry of default, reliance “upon the representations of the attorney that all was well” was unreasonable].) The record in this case does not support the conclusion that Fagor’s reliance on its broker and/or insurance carrier was reasonable.

11
Medina v. Californiagreen
scotus · 1992 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2000–2000
2 sentences

2000Because a state has the power to adopt and regulate criminal procedures under which its laws are carried out, “ ‘its decision in this regard is not subject to proscription under the Due Process Clause unless “it offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.” [Citations.]’ . . . [B]ecause the States have considerable expertise in matters of criminal procedure and the criminal process is grounded in centuries of common-law tradition, it is appropriate to exercise substantial deference to legislative judgments in this ar

2000Because a state has the power to adopt and regulate criminal procedures under which its laws are carried out, “ ‘its decision in this regard is not subject to proscription under the Due Process Clause unless “it offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.” [Citations.]’ . . . [B]ecause the States have considerable expertise in matters of criminal procedure and the criminal process is grounded in centuries of common-law tradition, it is appropriate to exercise substantial deference to legislative judgments in this ar

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (3)

CaseCitedYears
Pelegrinelli v. McCloud River Lumber Co. green
calctapp · 1905
2 sentences

2008(Pelegrinelli v. McCloud River [etc.] Co. [(1905)] 1 Cal.App. 593 , 594 et seq. [ 82 P. 695 ].) [f] With regard to whether the circumstances warranted reliance by the defendant on a third party, the efforts made by the defendant to obtain a defense by the third party are, of course, relevant. ...[][] In the present case defendant acted reasonably in assuming that Trinity would defend and in following the instructions in his insurance policy to mail any summons and complaint to Trinity at Dallas, and the trial court could properly conclude that the failure of these documents to arrive was neith

2008(Pelegrinelli v. McCloud River [etc.] Co. [(1905)] 1 Cal.App. 593 , 594 et seq. [ 82 P. 695 ].) [f] With regard to whether the circumstances warranted reliance by the defendant on a third party, the efforts made by the defendant to obtain a defense by the third party are, of course, relevant. ...[][] In the present case defendant acted reasonably in assuming that Trinity would defend and in following the instructions in his insurance policy to mail any summons and complaint to Trinity at Dallas, and the trial court could properly conclude that the failure of these documents to arrive was neith

21966–2008
Cruz v. Fagor America, Inc. green
calctapp · 2007
1 sentence

2021Satisfactory Excuse “ ‘Where a default is entered because defendant has relied upon a codefendant or other interested party to defend, the question is whether the defendant was reasonably justified under the circumstances in his reliance or whether his neglect to attend to the matter was inexcusable. [Citations.]’ [Citation.] . . . [¶] Reliance on a third party constitutes a satisfactory excuse only if it is reasonable. [Citations.] ‘With regard to whether the circumstances warranted reliance by the defendant on a third party, the efforts made by the defendant to obtain a defense by the third

12021–2021
People v. Broome green
calctapp · 1988
2 sentences

1990As the People would have it, the catch-22 predicament[ [6] ] ... would apply here to defeat any effort by the defendant to obtain a hearing, since he could rarely make anything other than a conclusory statement about inaccuracies in the affidavit (and thus never be entitled to a hearing) if he is not allowed access to matters within the prosecution's control without more than a necessarily conclusory statement as to his need for the data." (201 Cal. App.3d at pp. 1493-1494.) In the matter before us, the Court of Appeal's reasoning was similar to that of Broome, supra, 201 Cal. App.3d 1479 .

1990As the People would have it, the catch-22 predicamento 6 . . . would apply here to defeat any effort by the defendant to obtain a hearing, since he could rarely make anything other than a conclusory statement about inaccuracies in the affidavit (and thus never be entitled to a hearing) if he is not allowed access to matters within the prosecution’s control without more than a necessarily conclusory statement as to his need for the data.” (201 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1493-1494.) In the matter before us, the Court of Appeal’s reasoning was similar to that of Broome, supra, 201 Cal.App.3d 1479 .

11990–1990

Where else courts name it

CA 6 (1966–2021) OH 4 (1992–2022) TX 3 (2010–2022) NV 3 (1985–2021) WV 2 (1980–2023) NY 2 (2000–2011)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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