Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
6 California opinions name it 2 courts 1928–2014 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Steketee v. Lintz, Williams & Rothberggreen2 sentences2014(Fogarty v. Superior Court (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 316, 320 [ 172 Cal.Rptr. 594 ].) Thus, the Legislature sought in MICRA to reduce the cost of malpractice in a reasonable manner, balancing “ ‘concern over the extended exposure of medical practitioners to malpractice liability’ ” with “ ‘a desire not to bar potentially worthy plaintiffs from court before they have a fair chance to bring suit.’ ” (Steketee v. Lintz, Williams & Rothberg (1985) 38 Cal.3d 46, 56 [ 210 Cal.Rptr. 781 , 694 P.2d 1153 ] (Steketee), quoting Larcher, supra, 18 *1349 Cal.3d at p. 655, italics added.) 6 At the same time, th 2014(Fogarty v. Superior Court (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 316, 320 [ 172 Cal.Rptr. 594 ].) Thus, the Legislature sought in MICRA to reduce the cost of malpractice in a reasonable manner, balancing “ ‘concern over the extended exposure of medical practitioners to malpractice liability’ ” with “ ‘a desire not to bar potentially worthy plaintiffs from court before they have a fair chance to bring suit.’ ” (Steketee v. Lintz, Williams & Rothberg (1985) 38 Cal.3d 46, 56 [ 210 Cal.Rptr. 781 , 694 P.2d 1153 ] (Steketee), quoting Larcher, supra, 18 *1349 Cal.3d at p. 655, italics added.) 6 At the same time, th | 1 | 2 |
Fogarty v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2014(Fogarty v. Superior Court (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 316, 320 [ 172 Cal.Rptr. 594 ].) Thus, the Legislature sought in MICRA to reduce the cost of malpractice in a reasonable manner, balancing “ ‘concern over the extended exposure of medical practitioners to malpractice liability’ ” with “ ‘a desire not to bar potentially worthy plaintiffs from court before they have a fair chance to bring suit.’ ” (Steketee v. Lintz, Williams & Rothberg (1985) 38 Cal.3d 46, 56 [ 210 Cal.Rptr. 781 , 694 P.2d 1153 ] (Steketee), quoting Larcher, supra, 18 *1349 Cal.3d at p. 655, italics added.) 6 At the same time, th 2014(Fogarty v. Superior Court (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 316, 320 [ 172 Cal.Rptr. 594 ].) Thus, the Legislature sought in MICRA to reduce the cost of malpractice in a reasonable manner, balancing “ ‘concern over the extended exposure of medical practitioners to malpractice liability’ ” with “ ‘a desire not to bar potentially worthy plaintiffs from court before they have a fair chance to bring suit.’ ” (Steketee v. Lintz, Williams & Rothberg (1985) 38 Cal.3d 46, 56 [ 210 Cal.Rptr. 781 , 694 P.2d 1153 ] (Steketee), quoting Larcher, supra, 18 *1349 Cal.3d at p. 655, italics added.) 6 At the same time, th | 1 | 1 |
People v. Milnergreen2 sentences2009In People v. Milner (1988) 45 Cal.3d 227, 246 [ 246 Cal.Rptr. 713 , 753 P.2d 669 ] (Milner), a unanimous court rejected a defendant’s “novel” assertion of prejudice arising out of the prosecution’s references to the defendant’s reluctance to pursue a diminished capacity defense. 2009In People v. Milner (1988) 45 Cal.3d 227, 246 [ 246 Cal.Rptr. 713 , 753 P.2d 669 ] (Milner), a unanimous court rejected a defendant’s “novel” assertion of prejudice arising out of the prosecution’s references to the defendant’s reluctance to pursue a diminished capacity defense. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Edwardsgreen2 sentences1928(People v. Edwards, 163 Cal. 752, 754 [ 127 Pac. 58 ].) Furthermore, the defense did not exhaust its peremptory challenges, excusing only two jurors when accorded that opportunity. 1928(People v. Edwards, 163 Cal. 752, 754 [ 127 Pac. 58 ].) Furthermore, the defense did not exhaust its peremptory challenges, excusing only two jurors when accorded that opportunity. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Hills v. Aronsohn
green
2 sentences2007However, this goal was to be accomplished in a ‘reasonable’ manner. . . . ‘[T]he statute appears to have been a compromise between concern over the extended exposure of medical practitioners to malpractice liability and a desire not to bar potentially worthy plaintiffs from court before they have a fair chance to bring suit. . . .’ [Citation.]” (Steketee v. Lintz, Williams & Rothberg, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 56 .) *1546 Hills v. Aronsohn (1984) 152 Cal.App.3d 753 [ 199 Cal.Rptr. 816 ] (Hills) provides an illustration. 2007However, this goal was to be accomplished in a ‘reasonable’ manner. . . . ‘[T]he statute appears to have been a compromise between concern over the extended exposure of medical practitioners to malpractice liability and a desire not to bar potentially worthy plaintiffs from court before they have a fair chance to bring suit. . . .’ [Citation.]” (Steketee v. Lintz, Williams & Rothberg, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 56 .) *1546 Hills v. Aronsohn (1984) 152 Cal.App.3d 753 [ 199 Cal.Rptr. 816 ] (Hills) provides an illustration. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Larcher v. Wanless
green
1 sentence1985Instead, as originally worded, the statute appears to have been a compromise between concern over the extended exposure of medical practitioners to malpractice liability and a desire not to bar potentially worthy plaintiffs from court before they have a fair chance to bring suit. . . . [If] In the absence of any explicit statutory provision or persuasive legislative history it would be groundless speculation to assume . . . that the sole purpose of section 340.5 was to reduce the potential malpractice liability of doctors . . . .” (Larcher v. Wanless, supra, 18 Cal.3d at pp. 655-656.) That sta | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Bigelow v. Virginia
green
2 sentences1977We build into this construction of rule 2 a belief that the speech interest prevails over the desire of the bar to minimize solicitation of legal business both because the former is anchored in the federal Constitution and because it is properly accorded a fundamental position within that document.” (Fn. omitted; italics in original.) {Id., at p. 833.) Despite this strong First Amendment statement, the State Bar urges a narrow construction of the principles affirmed in Belli , asserting that a communication is outside the scope of First Amendment protection if it contains any language that can 1977We build into this construction of rule 2 a belief that the speech interest prevails over the desire of the bar to minimize solicitation of legal business both because the former is anchored in the federal Constitution and because it is properly accorded a fundamental position within that document.” (Fn. omitted; italics in original.) {Id., at p. 833.) Despite this strong First Amendment statement, the State Bar urges a narrow construction of the principles affirmed in Belli , asserting that a communication is outside the scope of First Amendment protection if it contains any language that can | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.