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6 California opinions name it 2 courts 2007–2026 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Sanjiv Goel, M.D., Inc. v. Regal Medical Group, Inc.green2 sentences2026(Id. at p. 1276.) Indeed, this differing standard was recognized by Kaiser at trial, as the quantum meruit jury instruction it requested did not track the language of Regulation 1300.71, subdivision (a)(3)(B), but instead outlined a typical quantum meruit valuation, incorporating “reasonable value, or fair market value, of the services,” and the “price that a hypothetical willing buyer of medical services would pay a 22 hypothetical willing seller for the services.” (See Long Beach Memorial, supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at pp. 345–346.) Kaiser argues for a broad reading of section 3(G) of the 2004 Co 2026(Id. at p. 1276.) Indeed, this differing standard was recognized by Kaiser at trial, as the quantum meruit jury instruction it requested did not track the language of Regulation 1300.71, subdivision (a)(3)(B), but instead outlined a typical quantum meruit valuation, incorporating “reasonable value, or fair market value, of the services,” and the “price that a hypothetical willing buyer of medical services would pay a 22 hypothetical willing seller for the services.” (See Long Beach Memorial, supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at pp. 345–346.) Kaiser argues for a broad reading of section 3(G) of the 2004 Co | 2 | 2 |
Sierra Club v. County of Napagreen2 sentences2013(Gilroy Citizens for Responsible Planning v. City of Gilroy (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 911, 917, fn. 5 [ 45 Cal.Rptr.3d 102 ]; Guidelines § 15083.) The determination of whether to include an alternative during the scoping process is based on whether the alternative is potentially feasible (Mira Mar Mobile Community v. City of Oceanside (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 477, 489 [ 14 Cal.Rptr.3d 308 ] (Mira Mar)), and the EIR “is required to make an in-depth discussion of those alternatives identified as at least potentially feasible.” (Sierra Club v. County of Napa (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 1490, 1505, fn. 5 [ 2013(Gilroy Citizens for Responsible Planning v. City of Gilroy (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 911, 917, fn. 5 ; Guidelines § 15083.) The determination of whether to include an alternative during the scoping process is whether the alternative is potentially feasible (Mira Mar Mobile Community v. City of Oceanside (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 477, 489 (Mira Mar)), and the EIR “is required to make an in-depth discussion of those alternatives identified as at least potentially feasible.” (Sierra Club v. County of Napa (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 1490, 1504, fn. 5 , italics omitted.) Differing factors come into play whe | 2 | 2 |
Mira Mar Mobile Community v. City of Oceansidegreen2 sentences2013(Gilroy Citizens for Responsible Planning v. City of Gilroy (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 911, 917, fn. 5 [ 45 Cal.Rptr.3d 102 ]; Guidelines § 15083.) The determination of whether to include an alternative during the scoping process is based on whether the alternative is potentially feasible (Mira Mar Mobile Community v. City of Oceanside (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 477, 489 [ 14 Cal.Rptr.3d 308 ] (Mira Mar)), and the EIR “is required to make an in-depth discussion of those alternatives identified as at least potentially feasible.” (Sierra Club v. County of Napa (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 1490, 1505, fn. 5 [ 2013(Gilroy Citizens for Responsible Planning v. City of Gilroy (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 911, 917, fn. 5 ; Guidelines § 15083.) The determination of whether to include an alternative during the scoping process is whether the alternative is potentially feasible (Mira Mar Mobile Community v. City of Oceanside (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 477, 489 (Mira Mar)), and the EIR “is required to make an in-depth discussion of those alternatives identified as at least potentially feasible.” (Sierra Club v. County of Napa (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 1490, 1504, fn. 5 , italics omitted.) Differing factors come into play whe | 2 | 2 |
Gilroy Citizens for Responsible Planning v. City of Gilroygreen2 sentences2013(Gilroy Citizens for Responsible Planning v. City of Gilroy (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 911, 917, fn. 5 [ 45 Cal.Rptr.3d 102 ]; Guidelines § 15083.) The determination of whether to include an alternative during the scoping process is based on whether the alternative is potentially feasible (Mira Mar Mobile Community v. City of Oceanside (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 477, 489 [ 14 Cal.Rptr.3d 308 ] (Mira Mar)), and the EIR “is required to make an in-depth discussion of those alternatives identified as at least potentially feasible.” (Sierra Club v. County of Napa (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 1490, 1505, fn. 5 [ 2013(Gilroy Citizens for Responsible Planning v. City of Gilroy (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 911, 917, fn. 5 ; Guidelines § 15083.) The determination of whether to include an alternative during the scoping process is whether the alternative is potentially feasible (Mira Mar Mobile Community v. City of Oceanside (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 477, 489 (Mira Mar)), and the EIR “is required to make an in-depth discussion of those alternatives identified as at least potentially feasible.” (Sierra Club v. County of Napa (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 1490, 1504, fn. 5 , italics omitted.) Differing factors come into play whe | 2 | 2 |
California Native Plant Society v. City of Santa Cruzgreen2 sentences2013(Guidelines, § 15091, subd. (a)(3).) “[T]he decision makers may reject as infeasible alternatives that were identified in the EIR as potentially feasible.” (California Native Plant Society v. City of Santa Cruz (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 957, 981 [ 99 Cal.Rptr.3d 572 ].) *328 The feasibility of a new alternative proffered after the scoping process, and after the draft EIR is circulated, is one of the factors to be considered in determining whether to recirculate an EIR, but not the only factor. 2013(Guidelines, § 15091, subd. (a)(3).) “[T]he decision makers may reject as infeasible alternatives that were identified in the EIR as potentially feasible.” (California Native Plant Society v. City of Santa Cruz (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 957, 981 .) The feasibility of a new alternative proffered after the scoping process, and after the draft EIR is circulated, is one of the factors to be considered in determining whether to recirculate an EIR, but not the only factor. | 1 | 2 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Children's Hospital Central California v. Blue Cross of California
green
2 sentences2026(Id. at p. 1276.) Indeed, this differing standard was recognized by Kaiser at trial, as the quantum meruit jury instruction it requested did not track the language of Regulation 1300.71, subdivision (a)(3)(B), but instead outlined a typical quantum meruit valuation, incorporating “reasonable value, or fair market value, of the services,” and the “price that a hypothetical willing buyer of medical services would pay a 22 hypothetical willing seller for the services.” (See Long Beach Memorial, supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at pp. 345–346.) Kaiser argues for a broad reading of section 3(G) of the 2004 Co 2026(Id. at p. 1276.) Indeed, this differing standard was recognized by Kaiser at trial, as the quantum meruit jury instruction it requested did not track the language of Regulation 1300.71, subdivision (a)(3)(B), but instead outlined a typical quantum meruit valuation, incorporating “reasonable value, or fair market value, of the services,” and the “price that a hypothetical willing buyer of medical services would pay a 22 hypothetical willing seller for the services.” (See Long Beach Memorial, supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at pp. 345–346.) Kaiser argues for a broad reading of section 3(G) of the 2004 Co | 2 | 2026–2026 |
People v. Seijas
green
1 sentence2013However, since the 16 admission of preliminary hearing testimony is “ ‘routinely allowed’ ” without offending statutory and constitutional rights (People v. Seijas (2005) 36 Cal.4th 291, 303 ), the differing standard of proof is clearly not enough, alone, to constitute error. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
People v. Champion
green
2 sentences2007Defendant invokes People v. Champion (1995) 9 Cal.4th 879 [ 39 Cal.Rptr.2d 547 , 891 P.2d 93 ], for the principle that “trial courts should be evenhanded in their questions to prospective jurors during the ‘death-qualification’ portion of the voir dire, and should inquire into the jurors’ attitudes both for and against the death penalty to determine whether these views will impair their ability to serve as jurors.” (Id. at pp. 908-909.) But the court followed the rule of Champion here. 2007Defendant invokes People v. Champion (1995) 9 Cal.4th 879 [ 39 Cal.Rptr.2d 547 , 891 P.2d 93 ], for the principle that “trial courts should be evenhanded in their questions to prospective jurors during the ‘death-qualification’ portion of the voir dire, and should inquire into the jurors’ attitudes both for and against the death penalty to determine whether these views will impair their ability to serve as jurors.” (Id. at pp. 908-909.) But the court followed the rule of Champion here. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.