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6 California opinions name it 2 courts 2000–2023 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Great Western Bank v. Konggreen2 sentences2017Code, § 954.) "Through such an assignment, the assignee ordinarily acquires all the rights and remedies possessed by the assignor for the enforcement of the debt, subject, however, to the defenses that the judgment debtor had against the assignor." ( Great Western Bank v. Kong (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 28 , 31-32, 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 266 ( Great Western ).) Nor does Duke challenge the notion that real parties were entitled to contribution from her. 2017Code, § 954.) "Through such an assignment, the assignee ordinarily acquires all the rights and remedies possessed by the assignor for the enforcement of the debt, subject, however, to the defenses that the judgment debtor had against the assignor." ( Great Western Bank v. Kong (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 28 , 31-32, 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 266 ( Great Western ).) Nor does Duke challenge the notion that real parties were entitled to contribution from her. | 1 | 2 |
People v. Jacobsgreen2 sentences2000The courts that have made substantial-compliance findings in knock-notice cases have always been careful to explain that substantial compliance in this context means “ ‘actual compliance in respect to the substance essential to every reasonable objective of the [knock-notice] statute,’ as distinguished from ‘mere technical imperfections of form.’ ” (People v. Jacobs (1987) 43 Cal.3d 472, 483 [ 233 Cal.Rptr. 323 , 729 P.2d 757 ] (Jacobs), italics in original.) The lead opinion claims to be finding nothing different today. 2000The courts that have made substantial-compliance findings in knock-notice cases have always been careful to explain that substantial compliance in this context means “ ‘actual compliance in respect to the substance essential to every reasonable objective of the [knock-notice] statute,’ as distinguished from ‘mere technical imperfections of form.’ ” (People v. Jacobs (1987) 43 Cal.3d 472, 483 [ 233 Cal.Rptr. 323 , 729 P.2d 757 ] (Jacobs), italics in original.) The lead opinion claims to be finding nothing different today. | 1 | 1 |
Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2000(Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 457 [ 20 Cal.Rptr. 321 , 369 P.2d 937 ].) The application of the “substantial compliance” doctrine to knock-notice does not mean that Duke’s rule of exclusion has been set aside. 2000(Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 457 [ 20 Cal.Rptr. 321 , 369 P.2d 937 ].) The application of the “substantial compliance” doctrine to knock-notice does not mean that Duke’s rule of exclusion has been set aside. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Patrick v. Alacer Corp.
green
1 sentence2023As explained above, section 1281.2 authorizes four options, including permitting the court to “refuse to enforce the arbitration agreement.” The court exercised its discretion to choose this option. 3 Duke’s argument that Patrick v. Alacer Corp. (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 995 prohibits the trial court’s ruling misapplies the case. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
People v. Clark
green
2 sentences2022The court further observed that according to Smutz’s alleged admissions to Mezey, Smutz’s involvement in Olivares’s kidnapping was “somewhat” significant, in light of factors articulated in People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788 and People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522 . 2022The court further observed that according to Smutz’s alleged admissions to Mezey, Smutz’s involvement in Olivares’s kidnapping was “somewhat” significant, in light of factors articulated in People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788 and People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522 . | 1 | 2022–2022 |
People v. Banks
green
2 sentences2022The court further observed that according to Smutz’s alleged admissions to Mezey, Smutz’s involvement in Olivares’s kidnapping was “somewhat” significant, in light of factors articulated in People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788 and People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522 . 2022The court further observed that according to Smutz’s alleged admissions to Mezey, Smutz’s involvement in Olivares’s kidnapping was “somewhat” significant, in light of factors articulated in People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788 and People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522 . | 1 | 2022–2022 |
People v. B.M. (In re B.M.)
green
2 sentences2019Because the defendant only held her momentarily and released her almost immediately, she “was in no danger from the force actually exerted on her body.” (Id. at p. 304.) The possibility that the defendant “could have easily broken [the victim’s] neck or could have choked her to the point of cutting off her breathing by exerting greater pressure on her neck or windpipe . . . would involve gross speculation on the part of the jury as to what the appellant would have done if he had not stopped.” (Id. at p. 303.) Our Supreme Court endorsed Duke’s analysis in B.M., supra, 6 Cal.5th 528 , 534- 535. 2019Because the defendant only held her momentarily and released her almost immediately, she “was in no danger from the force actually exerted on her body.” (Id. at p. 304.) The possibility that the defendant “could have easily broken [the victim’s] neck or could have choked her to the point of cutting off her breathing by exerting greater pressure on her neck or windpipe . . . would involve gross speculation on the part of the jury as to what the appellant would have done if he had not stopped.” (Id. at p. 303.) Our Supreme Court endorsed Duke’s analysis in B.M., supra, 6 Cal.5th 528 , 534- 535. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.