Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
6 California opinions name it 2 courts 1994–2016 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Las Palmas Associates v. Las Palmas Center Associatesgreen2 sentences2016The theory has been described as follows: ‘ “In effect what happens is that the court, for sufficient reason, has determined that though there are two or more personalities, there is but one enterprise; and that this enterprise has been so handled that it should respond, as a whole, for the debts of certain component elements of it.[”]’ ” (Las Palmas Associates v. Las Palmas Center Associates (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1220, 1249-1250 [ 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 301 ].) There are two standard requirements for finding alter ego (and single business enterprise) liability: “ ‘(1) that there be such unity of inter 2013(Las Palmas Associates v. Las Palmas Center Associates (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1220, 1249 .) “The theory has been described as follows: ‘ “In effect what happens is that the court, for sufficient reason, has determined that though there are two or more personalities, there is but one enterprise; and that this enterprise has been so handled that it should respond, as a whole, for the debts of certain component elements of it.” ’ ” (Id. at pp. 1249-1250.) The single enterprise rule recognizes that “it would be unjust to permit those who control companies to treat them as a single or unitary enterp | 1 | 2 |
Mesler v. Bragg Management Co.green2 sentences2016The theory has been described as follows: ‘ “In effect what happens is that the court, for sufficient reason, has determined that though there are two or more personalities, there is but one enterprise; and that this enterprise has been so handled that it should respond, as a whole, for the debts of certain component elements of it.[”]’ ” (Las Palmas Associates v. Las Palmas Center Associates (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1220, 1249-1250 [ 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 301 ].) There are two standard requirements for finding alter ego (and single business enterprise) liability: “ ‘(1) that there be such unity of inter 2016The theory has been described as follows: ‘ “In effect what happens is that the court, for sufficient reason, has determined that though there are two or more personalities, there is but one enterprise; and that this enterprise has been so handled that it should respond, as a whole, for the debts of certain component elements of it.[”]’ ” (Las Palmas Associates v. Las Palmas Center Associates (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1220, 1249-1250 [ 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 301 ].) There are two standard requirements for finding alter ego (and single business enterprise) liability: “ ‘(1) that there be such unity of inter | 1 | 1 |
Greenspan v. LADT LLCgreen2 sentences2013“Factors for the trial court to consider” when assessing alter ego liability under the single enterprise rule “include the commingling of funds and assets of the two entities, identical equitable ownership in the two entities, use of the same offices and employees, disregard 7 of corporate formalities, identical directors and officers, and use of one as a mere shell or conduit for the affairs of the other.” (Troyk v. Farmers Group, Inc. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1305, 1342 ; accord Greenspan v. LADT LLC (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 486, 512-513 [listing factors].) Plaintiffs allege the Simonse Entities 2013“Factors for the trial court to consider” when assessing alter ego liability under the single enterprise rule “include the commingling of funds and assets of the two entities, identical equitable ownership in the two entities, use of the same offices and employees, disregard 7 of corporate formalities, identical directors and officers, and use of one as a mere shell or conduit for the affairs of the other.” (Troyk v. Farmers Group, Inc. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1305, 1342 ; accord Greenspan v. LADT LLC (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 486, 512-513 [listing factors].) Plaintiffs allege the Simonse Entities | 1 | 1 |
Rashtian v. Brac-BH, Inc.green2 sentences2010We granted the request. (5) Where a vehicle's operator settles the claim of a third party injured due to the operator's negligence for a sum equal to, or in excess of, the amount of the vehicle owner's statutory liability for the operator's negligence, the owner's obligation is discharged. ( Rashtian v. BRAC-BH, Inc. (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1847, 1853 [ 12 Cal.Rptr.2d 411 ].) Because the documents of which we take judicial notice sufficiently establish that Dederer settled with plaintiffs for $15,000, there can be no statutory liability remaining to be claimed against ERAC-LA. 2010We granted the request. (5) Where a vehicle's operator settles the claim of a third party injured due to the operator's negligence for a sum equal to, or in excess of, the amount of the vehicle owner's statutory liability for the operator's negligence, the owner's obligation is discharged. ( Rashtian v. BRAC-BH, Inc. (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1847, 1853 [ 12 Cal.Rptr.2d 411 ].) Because the documents of which we take judicial notice sufficiently establish that Dederer settled with plaintiffs for $15,000, there can be no statutory liability remaining to be claimed against ERAC-LA. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Troyk v. Farmers Group, Inc.
green
2 sentences2013“Factors for the trial court to consider” when assessing alter ego liability under the single enterprise rule “include the commingling of funds and assets of the two entities, identical equitable ownership in the two entities, use of the same offices and employees, disregard 7 of corporate formalities, identical directors and officers, and use of one as a mere shell or conduit for the affairs of the other.” (Troyk v. Farmers Group, Inc. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1305, 1342 ; accord Greenspan v. LADT LLC (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 486, 512-513 [listing factors].) Plaintiffs allege the Simonse Entities 2013“Factors for the trial court to consider” when assessing alter ego liability under the single enterprise rule “include the commingling of funds and assets of the two entities, identical equitable ownership in the two entities, use of the same offices and employees, disregard 7 of corporate formalities, identical directors and officers, and use of one as a mere shell or conduit for the affairs of the other.” (Troyk v. Farmers Group, Inc. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1305, 1342 ; accord Greenspan v. LADT LLC (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 486, 512-513 [listing factors].) Plaintiffs allege the Simonse Entities | 1 | 2013–2013 |
NEC Electronics Inc. v. Hurt
green
2 sentences2013Specifically, MCP relies on NEC Electronics, Inc. v. Hurt (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 772 [ 256 Cal.Rptr. 441 ] and Katzir’s Floor & Home Design, Inc. v. M-MLS.com (9th Cir. 2004) 394 F.3d 1143 to argue that, where the original defendants (here B.V. and Ltd.) mounted a lackluster defense and failed to contest the lawsuit effectively, due process prohibits adding the alter ego to the judgment. 2013Specifically, MCP relies on NEC Electronics, Inc. v. Hurt (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 772 [ 256 Cal.Rptr. 441 ] and Katzir’s Floor & Home Design, Inc. v. M-MLS.com (9th Cir. 2004) 394 F.3d 1143 to argue that, where the original defendants (here B.V. and Ltd.) mounted a lackluster defense and failed to contest the lawsuit effectively, due process prohibits adding the alter ego to the judgment. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
cluster 788906
green
1 sentence2013Specifically, MCP relies on NEC Electronics, Inc. v. Hurt (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 772 [ 256 Cal.Rptr. 441 ] and Katzir’s Floor & Home Design, Inc. v. M-MLS.com (9th Cir. 2004) 394 F.3d 1143 to argue that, where the original defendants (here B.V. and Ltd.) mounted a lackluster defense and failed to contest the lawsuit effectively, due process prohibits adding the alter ego to the judgment. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
AREI II Cases
green
1 sentence2013But the trial court was incorrect in denying leave to amend because “there is a reasonable possibility an amendment could cure the defect.” (AREI II Cases, supra, 216 Cal.App.4th at p. 1012 .) The cure lies in another variant of vicarious liability known as the single enterprise rule. “[U]nder the single-enterprise rule, liability can be found between sister companies” or other affiliated companies. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Osborn v. Hertz Corp.
green
1 sentence2010Negligent Entrustment Despite the existence of applicable, controlling precedent, Osborn v. Hertz Corp., supra, 205 Cal.App.3d 703 ( Osborn ), plaintiffs contend that the trial *829 court should not have granted summary judgment in favor of the Enterprise defendants. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
United States v. Turkette
green
2 sentences1995(Id. at p. 583 [ 69 L.Ed.2d at p. 254 ].) The enterprise requirement refers to an entity, which for purposes of Turkette consisted of a group of persons associated together for a common purpose of engaging in a course of conduct. 1995The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals, noting that the conclusion that a wholly criminal enterprise comes within the ambit of the statute does not necessarily mean that a pattern of racketeering activity is an enterprise. ( Id. at p. 583 [ 69 L.Ed.2d at p. 254 ].) The enterprise requirement refers to an entity, which for purposes of Turkette consisted of a group of persons associated together for a common purpose of engaging in a course of conduct. ( Ibid. ) An enterprise can be proven by evidence of an ongoing organization, formal or informal, and by evidence that th | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Ethyl Corporation v. United Steelworkers of America, Afl-Cio-Clc and Local No. 7441, United Steelworkers of America, Afl-Cio-Clc
green
2 sentences1994(Id. at pp. 183-184.) The court explained an award does not exceed the arbitrator’s powers if it is based on an interpretation—“unsound though it may be”—of the contract: “It is only when the arbitrator must have based his award on some body of thought, feeling, or policy, or law that is outside the contract . . . that the award can be said not to ‘draw its essence from the collective bargaining agreement’ . . . .” (Ethyl Corp. v. United Steelworkers of America, supra, 768 F.2d at pp. 184-185.) Although the Enterprise test emphasizes the source from which the arbitrator drew the award, it neve 1994(Id. at pp. 183-184.) The court explained an award does not exceed the arbitrator’s powers if it is based on an interpretation—“unsound though it may be”—of the contract: “It is only when the arbitrator must have based his award on some body of thought, feeling, or policy, or law that is outside the contract . . . that the award can be said not to ‘draw its essence from the collective bargaining agreement’ . . . .” (Ethyl Corp. v. United Steelworkers of America, supra, 768 F.2d at pp. 184-185.) Although the Enterprise test emphasizes the source from which the arbitrator drew the award, it neve | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Local 120, International Molders & Allied Workers Union, Afl-Cio v. Brooks Foundry, Inc.
green
2 sentences1994The arbitrator cannot shield his decision from scrutiny “simply by making the right noises—noises of contract interpretation . . . .” (Ethyl Corp. v. United Steelworkers of America, supra, 768 F.2d at p. 187 .) Rather, the question is whether the award is “so outré that we can infer that it was driven by a desire to do justice beyond the limits of the contract.” (Ibid.) Restated, the test asks “ ‘whether the arbitrator’s solution can be rationally derived from some plausible theory of the general framework or intent of the agreement.’ ” (Id. at p. 186.) Local 120 v. Brooks Foundry, Inc. (6th C 1994The arbitrator cannot shield his decision from scrutiny “simply by making the right noises—noises of contract interpretation . . . .” (Ethyl Corp. v. United Steelworkers of America, supra, 768 F.2d at p. 187 .) Rather, the question is whether the award is “so outré that we can infer that it was driven by a desire to do justice beyond the limits of the contract.” (Ibid.) Restated, the test asks “ ‘whether the arbitrator’s solution can be rationally derived from some plausible theory of the general framework or intent of the agreement.’ ” (Id. at p. 186.) Local 120 v. Brooks Foundry, Inc. (6th C | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.