Fields motion in California

2025The court granted Fields’s motion to strike three of the four prior serious or violent felony convictions under People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 .

2014Section 667, subdivision (c) in pertinent part provides: “Notwithstanding any other law, if a defendant has been convicted of a felony and it has been pled and proved that the defendant has one or more prior serious and/or violent felony convictions ..., the court shall adhere to each of the following: [¶] ... [¶] (2) Probation for the current offense shall not be granted, nor shall execution or imposition of the sentence be suspended for any prior offense.” (Italics added.) Thus, the principal issue in this case is whether the court abused its discretion when it denied Fields’s motion to stri

2014In deciding whether to strike a prior conviction, “the court in question must consider whether, in light of the nature and circumstances of [the defendant’s] present felonies and prior serious and/or violent felony convictions, and the particulars of his background, character, and prospects, the defendant may be deemed outside the scheme’s spirit, in whole or in part, and hence should be treated as though he had not previously been convicted of one or more serious and/or violent felonies.” (People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161 .) The trial court’s decision is “subject to review for ab

2014(Reid v. Google, Inc. (2010) 50 Cal.4th 512, 534 .) 4 that[’s] my tentative—or I’m leaning, after reading this again last night, is to grant the [motion for summary judgment].” Following argument by the parties, the court took the motion for summary judgment under submission.

2014(See, e.g., People v. Moore (1988) 47 Cal.3d 63 , 87–89 [closing arguments can be considered in determining adequacy of accomplice instruction].) The record shows the portion challenged by Fields was intended to clarify for the jury that Fields’s “support” was broader than just his living expenses.

1990Defendant cites no expert testimony relating any additional symptoms or manifestations on which a jury might find a sociopathic mental illness of the kind qualifying for an insanity verdict under the Fields standard ( supra, 35 Cal.3d 329 ).

1990Defendant cites no expert testimony relating any additional symptoms or manifestations on which a jury might find a sociopathic mental illness of the kind qualifying for an insanity verdict under the Fields standard ( supra, 35 Cal.3d 329 ).

1985II (4, 5) (See fn. 5.) Blue Shield, however, contends the above-cited rule requiring an exclusion from coverage in a policy "`... must be conspicuous, plain and clear'" ( Gray v. Zurich Insurance Co. (1966) 65 Cal.2d 263, 271 [ 54 Cal. Rptr. 104 , 419 P.2d 168 ]) has no application to group policy here, citing Madden v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, supra, 17 Cal.3d 699, 710 , for the proposition its policy is not an "adhesion" contract, [5] *580 therefore not governed by the "conspicuous, plain and clear" rule of notice as to exclusions.

1985II Blue Shield, however, contends the above-cited rule requiring an exclusion from coverage in a policy “ ' . . must be conspicuous, plain and clear’ ” (Gray v. Zurich Insurance Co. (1966) 65 Cal.2d 263, 271 [ 54 Cal.Rptr. 104 , 419 P.2d 168 ]) has no application to group policy here, citing Madden v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, supra, 17 Cal.3d 699, 710 , for the proposition its policy is not an “adhesion” contract, 5 therefore not governed by the “conspicuous, plain and clear” rule of notice as to exclusions.