Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
6 California opinions name it 2 courts 1973–2022 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Bullock v. Cartergreen2 sentences1974The Registrar contends, however, that Bullock can and must be read to invalidate only unreasonable filing fees, pointing to the following language: "It must be emphasized that nothing herein is intended to cast doubt on the validity of reasonable candidate filing fees or licensing fees in other contexts." ( Bullock v. Carter, supra, 405 U.S. 134, 149 [31 *346 L.Ed.2d 92, 103].) He insists that the key invalidating ingredient in the Texas filing-fee system was not the fact that fees were required, but that the required fees were excessive in amount: "Unlike a filing-fee requirement that most ca 1974The Registrar contends, however, that Bullock can and must be read to invalidate only unreasonable filing fees, pointing to the following language: “It must be emphasized that nothing herein is intended to cast doubt on the validity of reasonable candidate filing fees or licensing fees in other contexts.” (Bullock v. Carter, supra, 405 U.S. 134, 149 [ 31 L.Ed.2d 92, 103 ].) He insists that the key invalidating ingredient in the Texas filing-fee system was not the fact that fees were required, but that the required fees were excessive in amount: “Unlike a filing-fee requirement that most candid | 1 | 2 |
Harboring Villas Homeowners Ass'n. v. Superior Court of Orange Countygreen2 sentences2014(Government Code § 905.2 (c).” (Italics added.) The trial court noted that Rivera’s declaration stated that “the claim was not ‘accepted’ by the Board.” DISCUSSION “A motion for judgment on the pleadings performs the same function as a general demurrer . . . .” (Cloud v. Northrop Grumman Corp. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 995, 999 [ 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 544 ].) “It is axiomatic that a demurrer lies only for defects appearing on the face of the pleadings.” (Harboring Villas Homeowners Assn. v. Superior Court (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 426, 429 [ 73 Cal.Rptr.2d 646 ].) Consequently, when considering a motion for 2014(Government Code § 905.2 (c).” (Italics added.) The trial court noted that Rivera’s declaration stated that “the claim was not ‘accepted’ by the Board.” DISCUSSION “A motion for judgment on the pleadings performs the same function as a general demurrer . . . .” (Cloud v. Northrop Grumman Corp. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 995, 999 [ 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 544 ].) “It is axiomatic that a demurrer lies only for defects appearing on the face of the pleadings.” (Harboring Villas Homeowners Assn. v. Superior Court (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 426, 429 [ 73 Cal.Rptr.2d 646 ].) Consequently, when considering a motion for | 1 | 1 |
Lance Camper Manufacturing Corp. v. Republic Indemnity Co. of Americagreen2 sentences2014(Government Code § 905.2 (c).” (Italics added.) The trial court noted that Rivera’s declaration stated that “the claim was not ‘accepted’ by the Board.” DISCUSSION “A motion for judgment on the pleadings performs the same function as a general demurrer . . . .” (Cloud v. Northrop Grumman Corp. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 995, 999 [ 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 544 ].) “It is axiomatic that a demurrer lies only for defects appearing on the face of the pleadings.” (Harboring Villas Homeowners Assn. v. Superior Court (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 426, 429 [ 73 Cal.Rptr.2d 646 ].) Consequently, when considering a motion for 2014(Government Code § 905.2 (c).” (Italics added.) The trial court noted that Rivera’s declaration stated that “the claim was not ‘accepted’ by the Board.” DISCUSSION “A motion for judgment on the pleadings performs the same function as a general demurrer . . . .” (Cloud v. Northrop Grumman Corp. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 995, 999 [ 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 544 ].) “It is axiomatic that a demurrer lies only for defects appearing on the face of the pleadings.” (Harboring Villas Homeowners Assn. v. Superior Court (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 426, 429 [ 73 Cal.Rptr.2d 646 ].) Consequently, when considering a motion for | 1 | 1 |
Cloud v. Northrop Grumman Corp.green2 sentences2014(Government Code § 905.2 (c).” (Italics added.) The trial court noted that Rivera’s declaration stated that “the claim was not ‘accepted’ by the Board.” DISCUSSION “A motion for judgment on the pleadings performs the same function as a general demurrer . . . .” (Cloud v. Northrop Grumman Corp. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 995, 999 [ 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 544 ].) “It is axiomatic that a demurrer lies only for defects appearing on the face of the pleadings.” (Harboring Villas Homeowners Assn. v. Superior Court (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 426, 429 [ 73 Cal.Rptr.2d 646 ].) Consequently, when considering a motion for 2014(Government Code § 905.2 (c).” (Italics added.) The trial court noted that Rivera’s declaration stated that “the claim was not ‘accepted’ by the Board.” DISCUSSION “A motion for judgment on the pleadings performs the same function as a general demurrer . . . .” (Cloud v. Northrop Grumman Corp. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 995, 999 [ 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 544 ].) “It is axiomatic that a demurrer lies only for defects appearing on the face of the pleadings.” (Harboring Villas Homeowners Assn. v. Superior Court (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 426, 429 [ 73 Cal.Rptr.2d 646 ].) Consequently, when considering a motion for | 1 | 1 |
People v. Shipmangreen2 sentences1974That an extraordinary proceeding is neither an action nor criminal in nature is buttressed by the fact that the statutory provisions relating to extraordinary writs are contained in part 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, entitled “Of Special Proceedings of a Civil Nature.” (Italics added.) 5 The filing fee requirement for this court and for the Courts of Appeal is provided in section 68926, stating in pertinent part: “The fee for filing a petition for a writ within the original civil jurisdiction of the Supreme Court or of a court of appeal is fifty dollars ($50).” 6 For other examples where r 1974That an extraordinary proceeding is neither an action nor criminal in nature is buttressed by the fact that the statutory provisions relating to extraordinary writs are contained in part 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, entitled “Of Special Proceedings of a Civil Nature.” (Italics added.) 5 The filing fee requirement for this court and for the Courts of Appeal is provided in section 68926, stating in pertinent part: “The fee for filing a petition for a writ within the original civil jurisdiction of the Supreme Court or of a court of appeal is fifty dollars ($50).” 6 For other examples where r | 1 | 1 |
Select Base Materials, Inc. v. Board of Equalizationgreen2 sentences1974The People, on the other hand, contend that the filing fee requirement for special proceedings in the superior court (see fn. 2, ante) is not dis *838 allowed by section 26857 since a proceeding for extraordinary relief, whether or not it arises from a pending criminal prosecution, is not a “criminal action.” 4 In determining the meaning of a statute, we “should ascertain the intent of the Legislature so as to effectuate the purpose of the law.” (Select Base Materials v. Board of Equal. (1959) 51 Cal.2d 640, 645 [ 335 P.2d 672 ]; see also Moyer v. Workmen’s Comp. 1974The People, on the other hand, contend that the filing fee requirement for special proceedings in the superior court (see fn. 2, ante) is not dis *838 allowed by section 26857 since a proceeding for extraordinary relief, whether or not it arises from a pending criminal prosecution, is not a “criminal action.” 4 In determining the meaning of a statute, we “should ascertain the intent of the Legislature so as to effectuate the purpose of the law.” (Select Base Materials v. Board of Equal. (1959) 51 Cal.2d 640, 645 [ 335 P.2d 672 ]; see also Moyer v. Workmen’s Comp. | 1 | 1 |
Polakovic v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences1974That an extraordinary proceeding is neither an action nor criminal in nature is buttressed by the fact that the statutory provisions relating to extraordinary writs are contained in part 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, entitled “Of Special Proceedings of a Civil Nature.” (Italics added.) 5 The filing fee requirement for this court and for the Courts of Appeal is provided in section 68926, stating in pertinent part: “The fee for filing a petition for a writ within the original civil jurisdiction of the Supreme Court or of a court of appeal is fifty dollars ($50).” 6 For other examples where r 1974That an extraordinary proceeding is neither an action nor criminal in nature is buttressed by the fact that the statutory provisions relating to extraordinary writs are contained in part 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, entitled “Of Special Proceedings of a Civil Nature.” (Italics added.) 5 The filing fee requirement for this court and for the Courts of Appeal is provided in section 68926, stating in pertinent part: “The fee for filing a petition for a writ within the original civil jurisdiction of the Supreme Court or of a court of appeal is fifty dollars ($50).” 6 For other examples where r | 1 | 1 |
Gross v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences1974That an extraordinary proceeding is neither an action nor criminal in nature is buttressed by the fact that the statutory provisions relating to extraordinary writs are contained in part 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, entitled “Of Special Proceedings of a Civil Nature.” (Italics added.) 5 The filing fee requirement for this court and for the Courts of Appeal is provided in section 68926, stating in pertinent part: “The fee for filing a petition for a writ within the original civil jurisdiction of the Supreme Court or of a court of appeal is fifty dollars ($50).” 6 For other examples where r 1974That an extraordinary proceeding is neither an action nor criminal in nature is buttressed by the fact that the statutory provisions relating to extraordinary writs are contained in part 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, entitled “Of Special Proceedings of a Civil Nature.” (Italics added.) 5 The filing fee requirement for this court and for the Courts of Appeal is provided in section 68926, stating in pertinent part: “The fee for filing a petition for a writ within the original civil jurisdiction of the Supreme Court or of a court of appeal is fifty dollars ($50).” 6 For other examples where r | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Bravo v. Cabell
green
1 sentence2022The court agreed with the defendants that the filing fee requirement did not apply to them because the documents they submitted for filing arose out of a criminal action, concluding that “where a proceeding for a prerogative writ arises from a pending criminal prosecution in the municipal court, . . . the proceeding [is] so integrally connected with the criminal action that the county clerk must apply the statutory exemption for fees ‘in any criminal action.’ ” (Ibid.) In reaching that conclusion, the Bravo court “discern[ed] no significant difference between a review of a criminal proceeding | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Lubin v. Panish
green
1 sentence1975The court recognized that the reason for the filing fee requirement is to limit the size of the ballot and to compel candidates to pay some of the administrative costs of the election process, and it characterized a state’s interest in keeping the ballot within manageable, understandable limits as of the “highest order” (id. at p. 715 [ 39 L.Ed.2d at p. 708 ]). | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Moyer v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals Board
green
2 sentences1974Appeals Bd., supra, 10 Cal.3d 222, 230 .) Having this principle in mind, we proceed to determine the meaning of the provision in section 26857. 1974Appeals Bd., supra, 10 Cal.3d 222, 230 .) Having this principle in mind, we proceed to determine the meaning of the provision in section 26857. | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Jenness v. Fortson
green
2 sentences1973Nevertheless the court ruled (at p. 146 [ 31 L.Ed.2d at p. 101 ]) not only that the filing fee requirement was both under-inclusive and overinclusive, but also that “other means to protect those valid interests are available.” The court did not articulate the “other means” intended, but we infer from its reliance on Jenness v. Fortson (1971) 403 U.S. 431 [ 29 L.Ed.2d 554 , 91 S.Ct. 1970 ], that such means at least include the use of nominating petitions signed by a prescribed percentage of registered voters. 1973Nevertheless the court ruled (at p. 146 [ 31 L.Ed.2d at p. 101 ]) not only that the filing fee requirement was both under-inclusive and overinclusive, but also that “other means to protect those valid interests are available.” The court did not articulate the “other means” intended, but we infer from its reliance on Jenness v. Fortson (1971) 403 U.S. 431 [ 29 L.Ed.2d 554 , 91 S.Ct. 1970 ], that such means at least include the use of nominating petitions signed by a prescribed percentage of registered voters. | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Dunn v. Blumstein
green
2 sentences1973Even more in point is Dunn v. Blumstein (1972) 405 U.S. 330 [ 31 L.Ed.2d 274 , 92 S.Ct. 995 ], decided a month after Bullock . 1973Even more in point is Dunn v. Blumstein (1972) 405 U.S. 330 [ 31 L.Ed.2d 274 , 92 S.Ct. 995 ], decided a month after Bullock . | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.