Fireman Fund motion in California

2024(Chen v. Los Angeles Truck Centers, LLC, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 867 .) Fireman’s Fund’s motion for summary judgment based on choice of law rules therefore does not provide an alternative basis on which to affirm the trial court’s judgment.

2023(Chen v. Los Angeles Truck Centers, LLC, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 867 .) Fireman’s Fund’s motion for summary judgment based on choice of law rules therefore does not provide an alternative basis on which to affirm the trial court’s judgment.

2014(Kasky v. Nike, Inc. (2002) 27 Cal.4th 939, 949 .) Whether Fireman’s Fund’s claim has minimal legal merit is close because it is far from apparent that Black’s communications were part of a business activity, even under the UCL’s broad reach.

2001In addition to violating section 1008, Fireman's Fund's motion runs afoul of the well-established principle "one trial court judge may not reconsider and overrule a ruling of another judge." ( Curtin v. Koskey, supra, 231 Cal.App.3d 873, 876-877 , 282 Cal.Rptr. 706 ; Ziller Electronics Lab v. Superior Court (1988) 206 Cal. App.3d 1222, 1232 , 254 Cal.Rptr. 410 .) While there is an exception to this rule when the judge that made the prior ruling is unavailable ( Ziller, supra, 206 Cal. App.3d 1222, 1232 , 254 Cal.Rptr. 410 ), in this case Fireman's Fund has not made an adequate showing Judge Ga

2001In addition to violating section 1008, Fireman's Fund's motion runs afoul of the well-established principle "one trial court judge may not reconsider and overrule a ruling of another judge." ( Curtin v. Koskey, supra, 231 Cal.App.3d 873, 876-877 , 282 Cal.Rptr. 706 ; Ziller Electronics Lab v. Superior Court (1988) 206 Cal. App.3d 1222, 1232 , 254 Cal.Rptr. 410 .) While there is an exception to this rule when the judge that made the prior ruling is unavailable ( Ziller, supra, 206 Cal. App.3d 1222, 1232 , 254 Cal.Rptr. 410 ), in this case Fireman's Fund has not made an adequate showing Judge Ga

2001Where two motions both implicate the same facts and law but seek opposite outcomes, the second motion necessarily constitutes a motion for reconsideration of the order on the first motion. ( Curtin v. Koskey (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 873, 877 , 282 Cal.Rptr. 706 [motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute implicated same considerations as motion for preferential trial setting, thus constituting motion to reconsider ruling on motion for preferential trial setting].) Having established Fireman's Fund's motion constituted a request to reconsider Judge Gardner's order on Gulfs motion, we find it faile

2001Where two motions both implicate the same facts and law but seek opposite outcomes, the second motion necessarily constitutes a motion for reconsideration of the order on the first motion. ( Curtin v. Koskey (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 873, 877 , 282 Cal.Rptr. 706 [motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute implicated same considerations as motion for preferential trial setting, thus constituting motion to reconsider ruling on motion for preferential trial setting].) Having established Fireman's Fund's motion constituted a request to reconsider Judge Gardner's order on Gulfs motion, we find it faile

2001Royal and the Fireman's Fund general liability policy define "occurrence" as "an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same general harmful conditions." Fireman's Fund's homeowners policy defines it as "an accident, including continuous or repealed exposure to similar harmful conditions." Commercial Underwriters defines it as "an accident or accidental event, including continuous or repeated exposure to conditions...." [7] See Coit Drapery Cleaners, Inc. v. Sequoia Insurance Co. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1595, 1606 , 18 Cal.Rptr.2d 692 ("We emphasize that we are

2001Royal and the Fireman's Fund general liability policy define "occurrence" as "an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same general harmful conditions." Fireman's Fund's homeowners policy defines it as "an accident, including continuous or repealed exposure to similar harmful conditions." Commercial Underwriters defines it as "an accident or accidental event, including continuous or repeated exposure to conditions...." [7] See Coit Drapery Cleaners, Inc. v. Sequoia Insurance Co. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1595, 1606 , 18 Cal.Rptr.2d 692 ("We emphasize that we are

2001Commercial has all of the above, plus `shock.'" This appears to be a correct statement of the policy terms. [4] Neither Royal nor Continental joined in Fireman's Fund's motion. [5] The New Jersey Supreme Court in Voorhees noted this result is in conformity with "[a] significant number of courts [which] have held that when emotional distress results in physical manifestations, it is covered under a bodily-injury policy." ( Voorhees, supra, 128 N.J. 165, 176-177 , 607 A.2d 1255 .) It also quoted Aim Insurance, supra, 229 Cal.App.3d 209, 280 Cal.Rptr. 766 , as a decision from one of "a number of

2001Commercial has all of the above, plus `shock.'" This appears to be a correct statement of the policy terms. [4] Neither Royal nor Continental joined in Fireman's Fund's motion. [5] The New Jersey Supreme Court in Voorhees noted this result is in conformity with "[a] significant number of courts [which] have held that when emotional distress results in physical manifestations, it is covered under a bodily-injury policy." ( Voorhees, supra, 128 N.J. 165, 176-177 , 607 A.2d 1255 .) It also quoted Aim Insurance, supra, 229 Cal.App.3d 209, 280 Cal.Rptr. 766 , as a decision from one of "a number of

2001Code of Civil Procedure section 1008 imposes a jurisdictional limitation. [15] If Judge Baker did not have *714 jurisdiction to grant Fireman's Fund's motion for summary judgment, her order is void even if it was correct on the merits. [16] In her tentative ruling dated February 9, 2000, Judge Baker asked the following questions: "Does this court have the jurisdiction to even consider Fireman's Motion now when it appears that Judge Gardner previously ruled that all insurers, including Fireman's had a duty to defend? [¶] [I]sn't Fireman's instant Motion, as well as summary judgment in favor of

2001Code of Civil Procedure section 1008 imposes a jurisdictional limitation. [15] If Judge Baker did not have *714 jurisdiction to grant Fireman's Fund's motion for summary judgment, her order is void even if it was correct on the merits. [16] In her tentative ruling dated February 9, 2000, Judge Baker asked the following questions: "Does this court have the jurisdiction to even consider Fireman's Motion now when it appears that Judge Gardner previously ruled that all insurers, including Fireman's had a duty to defend? [¶] [I]sn't Fireman's instant Motion, as well as summary judgment in favor of

2001Commercial has all of the above, plus `shock.'" This appears to be a correct statement of the policy terms. [4] Neither Royal nor Continental joined in Fireman's Fund's motion. [5] The New Jersey Supreme Court in Voorhees noted this result is in conformity with "[a] significant number of courts [which] have held that when emotional distress results in physical manifestations, it is covered under a bodily-injury policy." ( Voorhees, supra, 128 N.J. 165, 176-177 , 607 A.2d 1255 .) It also quoted Aim Insurance, supra, 229 Cal.App.3d 209, 280 Cal.Rptr. 766 , as a decision from one of "a number of

2001Commercial has all of the above, plus `shock.'" This appears to be a correct statement of the policy terms. [4] Neither Royal nor Continental joined in Fireman's Fund's motion. [5] The New Jersey Supreme Court in Voorhees noted this result is in conformity with "[a] significant number of courts [which] have held that when emotional distress results in physical manifestations, it is covered under a bodily-injury policy." ( Voorhees, supra, 128 N.J. 165, 176-177 , 607 A.2d 1255 .) It also quoted Aim Insurance, supra, 229 Cal.App.3d 209, 280 Cal.Rptr. 766 , as a decision from one of "a number of

1995Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., supra, 21 Cal.App.4th 1586 .) With respect to the equitable subrogation claim, we concluded Fireman’s Fund did not state a cause of action because (1) Kelly had released Maryland before Fireman’s Fund settled with Homeowners/Kelly, thereby precluding Fireman’s Fund from asserting a claim against Maryland on Kelly’s behalf; and (2) Fireman’s Fund had no obligation to make the settlement payment and was instead a mere “volunteer” based on Fireman’s Fund’s claim that none of the construction defects occurred during its policy period.